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Abstract
This thesis examines the ways in which Britishness has informed nationalism in Scotland, 
Australia and England. Nationalism is defined as the legitimation of a particular location 
of sovereignty, in which sovereignty can be vested in either the state or the people. This 
understanding is derived from the historical development of nationalism and the need to 
legitimate new or existing state structures in the novel social, economic and political 
conditions of the modem era.
From 1707 the British ruling class sought to legitimate a multi-national state and 
empire. Structural features of the British state shaped the ideology of Britishness. The 
modem British state was created at the turn of the eighteenth century when distinct 
national identities were already forming in its constituent parts and the British economy 
was one of the most developed in the world. The legitimation of the sovereignty of state 
over the British Isles, resulted in the development of an ideology which justified the 
status quo as well as legitimised a multi-national polity. The expansion of the British 
Empire during the nineteenth century added an extra dimension to the language of 
legitimation. Britishness now also justified the appropriation of other people’s lands, as 
well as accommodating developing settler nationalisms.
Britishness was an imperial ideology which conditioned the nationalism of the 
Empire’s constituent nations and continued to do so up to the present day. Scottish 
participation in the British project was predicated on the maintenance of a significant 
degree of autonomy, guaranteed by the terms of the Treaty of Union of 1707. When this 
autonomy became threatened during the 1980s, support for both home rule and 
independence grew, resulting in a successful referendum on the establishment of a 
Scottish parliament in 1997. This was not simply a rejection of Britishness, but a re­
assertion of Scottish autonomy. In contrast to Scotland, no successful alliance was 
created by Australian republicans in 1999. The minimalists’ adherence the sovereignty 
of Parliament precluded the sufficient mobilisation of popular opinion in support of the 
republic and allowed the minimalists to be effectively portrayed as “elitists”. It was
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ultimately the legacy of Britishness amongst the republicans, as much as the monarchists, 
which contributed to the defeat of the republic in 1999. Running parallel to, though 
rarely linked with, the campaign to establish an Australian republic, was the movement 
for Reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians. Britishness in 
Australia was re-asserted by the Right when countering the demands of Reconciliation’s 
supporters for restitution of indigenous grievances. The continuing sovereignty of the 
Crown-in-Parliament in England meant English nationalism was expressed as a 
legitimation of the British state, even after devolved assemblies had been created in other 
pails of the United Kingdom.
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Introduction
n p ih e  original idea for this thesis arose out of my study of nationalism in Scotland just 
X  prior to the devolution referendum of 1997. The following year I moved to 
Australia, one year ahead of the referendum on the republic. In both Scotland and 
Australia, although for different reasons, it appeared that the legacy of the British state 
and the British Empire were being profoundly challenged by nationalist movements. 
British symbols and institutions were seemingly being cast off or re-molded by the 
pressure of popular opinion and successful political campaigns. Related concerns entered 
into my thinking and subsequently into the thesis. Was the British state falling apart? If 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were to have devolved parliaments and assemblies, 
what would happen to English nationalism in England and its relationship to Britishness? 
Would the rise of a specifically English consciousness be a re-assertion of a nationalism 
articulated by the Right, the means by which the British state would be substantially 
reformed, the cause of the eventual break-up of Britain, or all (or none) of these?
The relationship between Britishness and nationalism in Australia at the end of 
the twentieth century seemed to be a comparable phenomenon. The Australian 
Republican Movement was presenting the removal of the Queen as head of state as the 
last step in Australia’s long road to independent status. The objectives of the Scottish 
nationalists and Australian republicans were different, but they both rejected aspects of 
Britishness: in Scotland’s case an unreformed Unionism and in Australia’s the monarchy. 
However, republicanism was not the only movement that was questioning the legacy of 
Britishness in Australia. Running parallel to the debate about republicanism throughout 
the 1990s (although rarely explicitly linked with it) was the movement for Reconciliation 
between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians. In the attempt to create a broad 
political environment conducive to addressing indigenous disadvantage, many 
Australians were forced to confront the nature of the initial British colonisation of the 
Australian continent. This meant challenging many of the nationalist assumptions 
derived from British political discourse about freedom, liberty and progress that had 
helped to justify both British imperialism and a nascent Australian nationalism.
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Although both minimalist republicanism and Reconciliation attempted to avoid partisan 
politics, this was not possible. During the 1990s, Australia’s two Prime Ministers, Paul 
Keating and John Howard, respectively promoted and then resisted the republic and 
reconciliation in language that either rejected or endorsed the British legacy.
However, subsequent research demonstrated that simply contrasting nationalism 
and Britishness was far too superficial an approach. In all cases studied here, nationalism 
and imperialism were bound up in a close interwoven relationship. To suggest that all 
Scottish nationalists demanded the break-up of Britain and independence for Scotland 
was to misunderstand the nature of Scottish nationalism as it had developed since 1707. 
To understand Australian republicanism as a complete rejection of the British legacy 
represented a similar misunderstanding of the historical development of Australian 
national consciousness. Indigenous activists and the Reconciliation movement’s leaders 
did not reject Australian nationalism, but required a re-working of the historical 
understandings of the British and imperial origins of that nationalism to create a political 
atmosphere sympathetic to addressing indigenous disadvantage. English nationalism was 
perhaps the most merged with discourses of Britishness, but even here there was some 
room for an articulation of difference between the two categories of “England” and 
“Britain”. However, such explicit distinctions were rare or even unnecessary until 
devolution to Scotland and Wales in 1999 gave formal political expression to the multi­
national composition of the British state. English nationalism came into being almost by 
default as the structure of the British state shifted to accommodate the nationalisms of the 
periphery. There developed in England a nationalism without nationalists, as the 
majority of putatively English nationalists continued to articulate their nationalism as a 
defence of Britishness and the two categories remained largely merged.
The thesis attempts a broad analysis, rather than a detailed account of each of 
these nationalist episodes. In such an approach, something of a deeper understanding is 
lost, but this is compensated for by a wider understanding that seeks to demonstrate the 
links and similarities between nationalists discourses and movements. Although initially 
intended as a directly comparative study, the thesis became instead an historically
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grounded analysis of Britishness examined through four distinct, but related, case studies; 
two in Australia and two in Britain. Given that these nationalisms were being advocated 
against the legacy of Britishness a two-part structure emerged. The first part of the 
thesis is theoretical and historical, dealing with the emergence of nationalism as a 
political ideology and suggesting a definition of nationalism that can encompass its 
potential to integrate and include as well as its potential to disintegrate and exclude. 
Britishness is analysed in relation to the historical development of nationalism and the 
way Britishness in turn affected the development of particular nationalisms in both 
Britain and Australia. The second part of the thesis then examines the role of Britishness 
in contemporary expressions of nationalism in Britain and Australia and the degree to 
which discourses of Britishness inform, or are rejected by, current nationalist movements. 
The case studies are arranged in a rough chronological order: Scottish nationalism from 
the 1980s to the successful devolution referendum in 1997; Australian republicanism 
during the 1990s up to the unsuccessful referendum in 1999; the chequered success of 
Reconciliation up to the centenary of Australian federation in 2001; and the fate of 
Britishness in England from the 1990s until the general election of June 2001. The thesis 
concludes with an overall analysis of nationalism and Britishness in Britain and 
Australia.
Overall, I argue that the legacy of Britishness is still discernible in, and relevant 
to, each of the nationalisms examined in this thesis. Beneath that argument runs another, 
that states that the degree to which Britishness was accepted or resisted by nationalists in 
Scotland, settler Australia, indigenous Australia and England affects the content and 
expression of those nationalist movements. The overall understanding of nationalism in 
this thesis rests on an engagement with the theories of Ernest Gellner, but one which 
rejects his basic conclusion that nation-states emerge from resistance to the structures of 
imperial rule. Instead, the relationship between nation and empire is presented as much 
more symbiotic, with ideologies developed to legitimate state, nation and empire feeding 
into each other. The one exception to this general conclusion in the thesis is the rise of a 
specifically Aboriginal nationalism and consciousness, which since the 1960s, has 
rejected Britishness and asserted an identity which rests on the refutation of imperial and
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settler narratives and legitimation. However, even this form of anti-colonialism resulted 
in a re-assertion of Britishness by conservative settlers in Australia towards the end of the 
last decade.
The first part of the thesis makes the claim that origins are important in 
understanding contemporary nationalism. This is not origins in the nationalist sense of 
pre-modem or mythical antecedents of the modem nation, but rather the origins of 
nationalism as a political phenomenon. Chapter 1 examines how such an ideology came 
about, and the forces that produced it and disseminated it around the globe. The 
argument builds on the now common assumption that nationalism and national 
consciousness as general phenomena are not products of nations or a particular “national 
genius”, but are intimately linked to the development of modem society and the global 
political economy. The development of capitalist economies in north-western Europe 
and the demand for a greater and more efficient integration of individuals into an 
expanding economic network, created the need for new types of consciousness. The 
development of the modem state, relations between the colonies and the imperial centres 
and the emergence of notions such as liberty and popular sovereignty created diverse 
nationalist movements, justifying the creation of state borders congruent with the 
emerging “nationality”. Such a structural understanding of nationalism should not detract 
from the deep attachments that individuals can feel towards “their” nation. Nationalism 
as a general phenomenon is indeed linked to the extension of social relations throughout 
the globe since the sixteenth century, but its particular expressions, nations, become the 
sites of political contest that shape national consciousness. Such contests are crucial as 
they are linked to notions of legitimacy and power. Furthermore, any understanding of 
nationalism must reconcile two seemingly contradictory aspects: nationalism is an 
ideology that holds states together, legitimating the state in the name of a nation, as well 
as an ideology that causes states to collapse into smaller units, again justified in the name 
of a nation. Another vital aspect of nationalism is inclusion and exclusion: an individual 
or group can be included or excluded by those who are able to influence the content of a 
particular nationalism, creating feelings of belonging for the in-group and persecution for 
the out-group. Separating these aspects of nationalism into “state-focused” or “counter-
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state” and “civic” and “ethnic” varieties of nationalism may begin to help us analyse 
nationalism, or even take up a normative position on it, but it begins to create a false 
dichotomy. Nationalism is at all times inclusive and exclusive and legitimates particular 
states as well as causing states to collapse. The political concept of sovereignty is central 
in this understanding of nationalism. Thus nationalists seek to legitimate a particular 
location of sovereignty as they try to obtain or maintain political power. The location of 
that sovereignty may be an established state, or for an aspiring national movement, “the 
people”. The former then attempts to create some sort of national consciousness that 
generates consent for the continuing exercise of power by the state that governs in the 
name of the nation. The latter invokes the sovereignty of the people in seeking the 
support of the populace in order to realise its political goals, thereby undermining the 
legitimacy of an established state. In all cases, a successful nationalist movement is one 
that is the product of an alliance between different social classes, in particular the elites at 
the core of the nationalist movement and the masses from whom support is drawn. The 
elites need the masses to provide the numbers and support for the movement to establish 
the nationalist goals. This gives us a general definition of political nationalism as the 
legitimation of a particular location of sovereignty, whilst a successful nationalist 
movement is one that results in an alliance between elites and masses in order to achieve 
the programme and goals of the nationalist movement.
Origins are also important in the development of the symbols and institutions that 
characterised government in Britain and the settler colonies and dominions, as will be 
demonstrated in the chapters that follow. Chapter 2 traces the origins of Britishness from 
the creation of the British state between 1688 and 1707. At this time, nationalism was 
emerging in England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales, as it was elsewhere in the “modem” 
world. In order to legitimate the state in the developing “era of nationalism”, a British 
nationalism was promoted by the state’s supporters. However, this “nationalism” had to 
reconcile the diversity of the various actual and potential nationalities within its realm, as 
well as the different locations of sovereignty that had persisted beyond the creation of the 
United Kingdom. It was not the case that the British people had been “discovered” by 
nationalist ethnographers and folklorists, or had reached a stage of “national awakening”
5
and subsequently demanded a state to represent their “national interests”. The British 
state had been created before any notion of “the British people” came into existence. 
Hence “the British people” had to be given common political symbols with which they 
could all identify and be mobilised. The establishment of British settler colonies only 
increased the need for such supra-national symbols in order to provide a focus of unity 
between the widespread community of Britons in various parts of the Empire, who 
eventually developed nationalisms of their own. The multi-national model established 
with the creation of the United Kingdom, where loyalty was given to the Crown first and 
the (unspecified) Country second, was ideal for maintaining colonial allegiances within 
the bounds of Empire. The result was the veneration of the symbols of state as the means 
by which the diverse nationalities of the British colonies and dominions could legitimate 
their allegiance to Empire. It was the need to legitimate this state and the Empire it 
governed while maintaining or developing a sense of distinctiveness, that gave particular 
characteristics to the different nationalisms in question. The monarchy became the 
foremost institution of Britishness, at once thoroughly British, but sufficiently supra­
national to avoid affronting the global community of Britons who wished to reconcile 
their own emerging nationalisms within an imperial framework. In this sense, the 
Glorious Revolution and the Settlement of 1688-1707 become important moments in 
Australian history, as they provided the ideological context for the content and 
development of Australian nationalism and consciousness, one in which rhetorical 
notions of “tolerance” and “democracy” became central. Walter Bagehot theorised the 
practice of British-style government in 1867: in Britain’s constitutional system, the 
monarchy became the “dignified” part of government, to which people developed an 
almost personal sense of loyalty, while the “efficient” part of government, parliament, 
actually got down to the business of governing, with consent mediated through loyalty to 
the Crown. The ideology of Britishness served to legitimate a particular location of 
sovereignty: that of the Crown-in-Parliament. This version of sovereignty gave structural 
form to the type of government -  the Westminster system -  in Britain and later developed 
in Australia. But in defending this location of sovereignty, the notion of popular 
sovereignty had to be rejected or carefully managed. Thus nationalism in Britain and 
Australia was, in large part, a state-based ideology seeking to justify the ruling class
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bargain that created the United Kingdom in 1707 or continued participation of colonial 
populations in British imperialism. Counter narratives emerged, but the ideology of 
Britishness was successfully managed in both Britain and Australia until recently, 
permeating national consciousness so that the nationalism of each place was intimately 
merged with the imperial discourses of the British Empire.
Scottish nationalism in the 1990s, the subject of Chapter 3, arguably illustrated 
this merging. Scottish nationalists had overwhelmingly justified their participation in the 
Union since 1707 on the basis that a great deal of autonomy was accorded to Scottish 
elites in managing the internal affairs of Scotland. Indeed such autonomy was guaranteed 
by the terms of the Treaty itself. In Scotland, the middle classes, whose members such as 
the intelligentsia and petit bourgeoisie historically formed the core of most nationalist 
movements, remained in control of the institutions of Scottish society and local 
government. With such effective autonomy preserved, there was little committed support 
for a Scottish parliament. Scottish nationalism expressed itself within the context of 
Britishness, insisting on preserving autonomy and distinctiveness as well as inclusion 
within the unitary British state. Thus nationalist demands for, or government offers of, 
home rule were ultimately unsuccessful between the 1880s until 1997.
This situation began to change most notably from the 1960s onwards. Scottish 
nationalism that had heretofore been characterised by support for the Treaty of Union of 
1707, gained a secessionist dimension with the formation of the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) in 1934. Despite some fleeting electoral success in 1945, it was not until the late 
1960s that SNP inspired secessionism became a permanent feature of Scottish politics. 
The height of SNP representation at Westminster came in 1974, at a time when Britain’s 
economic position vis-ä-vis its competitors was in decline, but when North Sea oil also 
promised a lifeline for Britain’s economy. But whilst nationalism is conditioned by the 
demands of the global political economy, a successful nationalist campaign must work 
within and against the established political forces of the local or national system. Thus 
whilst Britain’s industrial decline was evident, and particularly so in Scotland that had 
been overly dependent on a few heavy industries, this alone was not enough to decisively
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convince the electorate in 1979 that devolution was worth turning out to vote for, even if 
the vote was stacked against the pro-devolution campaign, or that independence was 
either viable or desirable. However, by 1997, the vote in favour of devolution was 
overwhelming. The difference was the experience of Conservative rule between those 
two dates. For the middle classes, the issue was one of sovereignty, with the growing 
centralisation of the British state eroding the traditional autonomy of Scottish systems of 
governance. The establishment of a Scottish Parliament was part of a wider rejection of 
Thatcherite Conservatism throughout Britain, but it was Scotland’s preserved autonomy 
that gave this protest its nationalist form. Anti-Conservatism in Scotland was given mass 
support by the early imposition of the Poll Tax. With hopes of a Labour Government at 
Westminster appearing remote throughout the 1980s, Scottish nationalism lost its 
overwhelming adherence to unreformed Unionism and became largely split between 
supporters of a devolved parliament and those who desired total separation within the 
European Union. Shortly after New Labour’s election victory of 1997, the referendum 
on devolution delivered a telling endorsement of the cross-party plans for a Parliament 
developed by the Scottish Constitutional Convention. Significantly, in addition to the 
elite and mass alliance generated by anti-Conservatism, the plans for a Scottish 
Parliament were eventually also supported by the separatists, who justified this seeming 
strengthening of the Union as only the beginning of a gradual process of independence. 
It was this successful nationalist alliance that explained the establishment of the Scottish 
Parliament in 1999. However, the result of nationalist agitation in Scotland (at least in 
the short to medium term) was the strengthening of the Union. Scottish autonomy within 
the Union had been preserved. A certain conception of Britishness, one based on the 
unitary nature of the British state, had been rejected, but a reformed Britishness giving 
devolved representation to Britain’s constituent nations had been endorsed.
Chapter 4 is concerned with republicanism and nationalism in Australia during th 
1990s. Australian republicanism reinforced Britishness whilst attempting to remove the 
Queen, the most prominent symbol of Britishness in public life, as head of state. This is 
not because minimalist republicanism was rejected in the referendum of 1999, leaving 
Australia as a constitutional monarchy. The result of the referendum could not hide the
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fact that the monarchy was a legal anachronism in Australia. The failure was the 
republican movement’s own conservatism and its commitment to a particular aspect of 
Britishness, the sovereignty of parliament. This rejection of popular sovereignty 
precluded the formation of successful alliances between the elites and the mass electorate 
that had been a feature of the success of Scottish nationalists’ demands for a Scottish 
Parliament. The minimalist support for the British legacy of the sovereignty of 
Parliament helped damn the republicans as “elitist”, a fatal criticism for a movement that 
had to gain popular support for its demands, even if those labeling the movement as 
“elitist” were often drawn from the elites themselves.
Like Scottish nationalism, the development of Australian nationalism had been 
one that was predominantly in favour of the continued connection with Britain, at least in 
its official variant. A distinctive Australian consciousness had developed during the 
nineteenth century, but it was deeply conditioned by the parameters of Britishness that 
helped maintain Australia’s links to the Empire and hence capital for the developments of 
the colonies and strategic defence in the guise of the Royal Navy. Australian nationalism 
of the nineteenth century was arguably often a call for “British liberties” to be established 
in Australia. Even if popular conceptions of Australian consciousness stressed discourses 
of mateship, egalitarianism and racial solidarity, Australia’s official nationalism remained 
heavily dependent on symbols of Britishness such as the rule of law, parliaments and, 
most importantly, the monarchy. Australia’s participation in the Great War provided an 
episode through which the emerging Australian consciousness could be condensed and 
expressed, but what is often regarded as “the birth of the Australian nation” was not 
linked to any independence movement or the establishment of a state. Whilst anti- 
Britishness was evident in some popular expressions of Australian nationalism and within 
the Irish-Australian community in particular, the symbols and institutions of Britishness 
found much support in Australia’s governing elites and Protestant community. This 
affection was such that the imperial sentiment was able to withstand the loss of Singapore 
in 1942 and only began to diminish when a de-colonising Britain turned increasingly to 
Europe for trade from the 1960s onwards. Local politics again affected the development 
of a nationalist, republican movement. When the Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, was
9
dismissed by the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, it seemed as if the monarchy in 
Australia had overstepped its constitutional bounds. As a result republicanism moved 
from being disreputable to gaining an increasing degree of acceptance amongst the 
intelligentsia and eventually the middle classes.
Again like Scottish nationalism, Australian republicanism in the 1990s contained 
a variety of different attitudes and positions, that would crucially become divided 
between minimalists and direct electionists as the campaign neared its climax. Initially, 
however, the language of the republicans had been one of Australia attaining full 
independence, free of British influence and hence a nation at last. This notion of 
Australia, a “young nation”, finally free of “parental” institutions, appeared to have such 
a degree of support during the early 1990s, that for many the establishment of an 
Australian republic seemed “inevitable”. This degree of support, dependent on 
government support, did not ultimately translate into an alliance between the minimalist 
republicans and the electorate. This was a result of the effective labeling of the 
minimalist republicans as “elitist”. There was some truth in this beyond the North Shore 
addresses of some in the minimalist camp. The long-time leader of the Australian 
Republican Movement (ARM) Malcolm Turnbull was himself a Sydney-based lawyer 
and member of the Liberal Party. But so too was Kerry Jones, the leader of the 
Australians for Constitutional Monarchy. That one elite group could label another 
“elitist” was the result of the conservatism of the ARM and the deep influence of British 
parliamentary traditions that shaped ruling class Australian consciousness as much as 
British. The ARM was a top-down structure that according to its first chairman appeared 
to have been thought up over a boozy lunch one afternoon in Sydney. Australian 
republicanism of the 1990s was thus not linked to any material interests and hence rested 
almost entirely on arguments about Australia’s “national identity”. While “national 
identity” was talked about, little effort was made to link the campaign to wider themes in 
Australian anti-Britishness that might have provided a populist content for the proposal. 
At the same time as appearing somewhat esoteric, the sovereignty of parliament was 
sacrosanct to the ARM and republicans such as Paul Keating. The minimalist position 
effectively proposed the removal of the “dignified” part of the monarchy, while retaining,
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and even strengthening the position of the “efficient” part of the Westminster system, 
Parliament. Despite insisting on the importance of symbols in national life, minimalist 
defence of the sovereignty of parliament robbed the Australian populace the symbolic 
power to elect the head of state, and gave the electorate little in return for their 
participation in the reformers’ project. By the time the referendum took place in 1999, 
the minimalist “elite” had become alienated from the masses and the alliance necessary to 
carry the referendum could not be made.
The Crown-in-Parliament was not the only location of sovereignty in Australia. 
The British invasion of the Australian continent created two distinct types of 
consciousness; settler and indigenous. Although separate, these two types of Australian 
consciousness helped to shape and define each other, whether through conflict or co­
operation. The relationship between Crown and Country for indigenous Australians was 
different from the settlers’ relationship, as indigenous “country” had been taken in the 
name of the Crown, making the British system of governance the ultimate legitimator of 
dispossession. Unlike the establishment of non-British communities in Australia, such as 
the early Chinese and Silesian Lutheran communities, or post-War migrants from Europe 
and Asia, the indigenous presence always potentially de-legitimated British and 
Australian rule, by contesting the settlers’ acquisition of indigenous land. This 
contestation not only shaped indigenous consciousness in modem Australia, but also 
played an important part in developing the content of settler Australian nationalism.
Indigenous sovereignty was deemed to have been extinguished when the British 
claimed the Australian land-mass between 1786 and 1879. This dispossession was 
resisted by Aborigines, first through open frontier warfare and after through non-violent 
means. The creation of an indigenous consciousness was the product of an unequal 
colonial power relationship. In contrast to settler nationalism in Australia, indigenous 
consciousness emerged resisting empire, rather than siding with it. However, the 
relationship to Britishness was not entirely oppositional. After the period of frontier 
warfare, indigenous activists were forced to adopt the ways of the coloniser in order to 
resist some of colonialism’s worst effects. This meant appeals to the monarch and the
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British government over the heads of the colonial regimes, as well as an engagement with 
“national” politics as the amount of federal control over indigenous people increased 
during the twentieth century. The development of an indigenous consciousness did not 
result in widespread calls for secession, but this is not to say that indigenous activists did 
not engage in nationalist politics from the 1960s. Given the relatively small numbers of 
indigenous people within the total Australian population, activists could not hope to win 
support for their demands without an alliance between indigenous people and settler 
Australians. Thus Aboriginal demands for restitution and equality began to be couched 
in terms of judgments about the level of “civilisation” of the Australian nation. This 
tactic was most effectively used during the 1967 referendum campaign over 
discriminatory sections of the Australian constitution.
The same tactic was employed by those promoting Reconciliation between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians between 1991 and 2001. In order to create a 
political atmosphere amenable to the restitution of indigenous grievances resulting from 
past discrimination and dispossession, activists forced issues about the record of British 
and Australian imperialism into the realm of political debate and grass-roots politics, as 
described in Chapter 5. It was in this manner also that Britishness became a political 
issue in Australia during the 1990s. The demands of the Reconciliation movement was 
soon caught up in wider debates about indigenous sovereignty and disadvantage. The 
Mabo decision of the High Court in 1992 overturned the notion of terra nullius, that 
indigenous sovereignty had been extinguished by British claims. The debate over the 
Stolen Generations, and John Howard’s refusal to apologise on behalf of the 
Commonwealth, brought questions about past practices and present disadvantage to the 
forefront of political debate in 1997. In resisting the claims of indigenous sovereignty, 
that allowed the Centre-Right in Australia to unify a voter base that had been fractured by 
the emergence of Hansonism in 1996 and the accelerated introduction of neo-liberal 
economics, Britishness was reasserted. The appeal by Reconciliation’s leadership to 
Australian nationalism had proved a double-edged sword. An exclusionary nationalism 
was articulated by the government and its supporters, and indigenous culture was
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included in expressions of Australian nationalism as symbols of Australia’s pre-modem 
past, but nothing more.
If any particular nationalism was truly merged with Britishness, it was surely 
England’s. A specifically English nationalism emerged by default after devolution, but 
this nationalism lacked any sort of formalised political expression. That this was so, was 
due to the historic configuration of the British state. While an autonomous civil society 
was maintained in Scotland, the structural distinction between England and Britain was 
much less evident. As England and Britain were regarded as largely synonymous entities 
by nationalists in England, English nationalism became merged with Britishness and a 
defence of Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty. It was the state and its institutions, not the 
English people, which were predominantly celebrated during “national” festivals and 
holidays. As such, the monarch was promoted as the embodiment of the national spirit. 
As English nationalism was linked so closely to the state, when the state extended its 
reach beyond England by Union with Scotland or by extension into the new colonies of 
the Empire, English consciousness also expanded beyond England’s actual borders.
Events of the 1990s continued this sense of merged Anglo-British consciousness, 
even if Englishness seemed to be on the rise in popular culture. The establishment of a 
parliament in Scotland and assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland made it more 
difficult for English nationalists to conflate England with the British state. Paradoxically, 
Britishness was promoted even further in England following devolution. Structural 
reforms had been offered to nationalists in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. But in 
England, there was less reform or devolution to the regions, but instead the promotion of 
a “modernised” Britain by New Labour, that came to power in 1997. Even the monarchy 
could not escape such “modernisation”. In fact the monarchy had become even more 
important in a devolved Britain as a symbol that could now unite the disparate nations, 
whose nationalist movements had extracted significant concessions from the central 
government in order to remain in the Union.
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The defence of a reformed Britishness was not the result of a “modernising” 
Labour government alone. The Conservative Party not only initially resisted devolution, 
but also campaigned against the extension of the supra-national powers of the European 
Union. Reduced to an English rump in 1997, the historical commitment to Crown-in- 
Parliament sovereignty, prevented the Conservative Party from unequivocally embracing 
English nationalism and exploiting that nationalism for electoral purposes. The 
Conservatives had very much nailed their colours to the British mast at a time when 
Scottish nationalism was at the forefront of challenging the unitary sovereignty of 
Westminster “from within”. Attitudes towards the European Union diverged either side 
of the Border. Conservative “Euroscepticism” continued the defence of Britishness as an 
expression of English nationalism, whilst Scottish attitudes were far less hostile to the 
EU. Anti-European sentiment in England gave continued popular support to Crown-in- 
Parliament sovereignty. Even outrage at EU directives stipulating the minimum 
permissible meat content of sausages, the cocoa content of chocolate or the straightness 
of cucumbers were ultimately a defence of the ability of the Crown-in-Parliament to 
legislate for the United Kingdom, despite that sovereignty being curtailed in certain areas 
by devolution. The defence of Britishness in England meant that political versions of 
Englishness and Britishness remained fully merged.
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chapter 1:
Nationalism: Legitimating Sovereignty
T -n order to fully understand the fate of Britishness in Scotland, Australia and England, 
A w e need to ground such an examination in the general emergence of nationalism as a 
political ideology. This theoretical and historical analysis will inform the understanding 
of concepts such as nationalism, nation and national consciousness throughout this thesis.
I argue that changes in the mode of practice and integration that caused the uneven 
transition from the feudal to the modem era, required a novel means of legitimating 
power. Uneven development can help explain the break-up of large, multi-national 
empires into smaller states. Some states, notably those in western Europe, survived the 
age of nationalism intact, even if their overseas empires collapsed. In these states, and in 
the smaller states that seceded from larger empires, nationalisms function was integrative, 
rather than disintegrative. However, rather than legitimating a movement for secession, 
nationalism in western Europe had to legitimate the preservation of states whose origins 
lay in the pre-modem era. Instead of viewing these as distinct variants, the challenge for 
a definition of nationalism is to account for both these aspects; an ideology that both 
justifies secession in the name of “the nation” and one that legitimates the state. What is 
common to both types of nationalism is the legitimation of a location of sovereignty, be 
that sovereignty vested in the people or the state. It is through legitimating a particular 
location of sovereignty that different nationalist movements derive their character and 
rhetoric, that ultimately generates particular forms of national consciousness.
Ernest Gellner’s theories are a useful starting point for a discussion of the 
development of nationalism. Gellner was the theorist who did the most to establish 
nationalism as a field of study in its own right, rather than being the preserve of area 
specialists. Gellner’s theory was initially outlined in a single chapter in Thought and 
Change (1964), but was eventually developed into the book length Nations and 
Nationalism (1983). Events in eastern Europe in the 1990s, forced Gellner to return to 
the subject of nationalism in Encounters with Nationalism (1994) and Nationalism, 
published posthumously in 1997, in addition to other books and numerous articles
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concerned directly or tangentially with nationalism. Gellner was particularly concerned 
to demonstrate that nationalism was not caused by an atavistic association with a 
particular ethnic group, but was rather a rational response to the development of modem, 
industrial society. By first outlining and the criticising Gellner’s theory, I hope to 
establish an understanding of nationalism that will guide my own attempt to understand 
nationalism in Britain and Australia.
Gellner began his analysis from the proposition that ‘Nationalism is primarily a 
political principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent’ 
(Gellner, 1983: 1). For Gellner, the modem nation arose out of the transition of society 
from a pre-modem stage into a modem, advanced economic society. Thus Gellner 
argued that it was the process of industrialisation that became central to the theoretical 
understanding of the emergence of nationalism and the nation. But the process of 
industrialisation and modernisation is not, on its own, sufficient to bring about a sense of 
belonging to a wider, largely anonymous community. Nor is it enough to lead people to 
attempt to gain a set of ruling institutions, staffed by those seen as “one’s own people”. 
What really matters is that the experience of industrialisation occurs in different places at 
different times. It was this emphasis on the social conditions necessary for the 
development of nationalism that led Gellner toward his central thesis:
The great but valid paradox is this: nations can only be defined in terms of the age of 
nationalism, rather than, as you might expect, the other way round. It is not the case 
that “the age of nationalism” is a mere summation of the awakening and political self- 
assertion of this, that or the other nation. Rather, when general social conditions 
make for standardised, homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading 
entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well defined 
educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of 
unit with which men [sic] willingly and often ardently identify. The cultures now 
seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy. Only then does it come to 
appear that any defiance of their boundaries by political units constitutes a scandal 
(Gellner, 1983:55).
16
Gellner’s interpretation of the transition to an industrial era is that the process of 
industrialisation spread from its north-western European “core” and was experienced as 
a ‘tidal wave’ of uneven development as its effects upon social structures was felt, first in 
one place and then in another. The uneven development of industrialisation throughout 
Europe produced feelings of resentment amongst the populations enduring its effects. 
This resentment was particularly acute with regard to the exercise of political and 
economic power. It was perceived that great material benefit could be derived from this 
new ordering of society by those social classes positioned favourably in relation to 
governance and production. But access to such power was limited by the pre-existing 
political structures. For Gellner, these structures were predominantly multi-ethnic 
dynastic empires, with a particular cultural group at its “core”. It was this “core”, 
particularly the bourgeoisie, that was initially best placed to reap the benefits of 
industrialisation before any other group or class. The roots of nationalism were not 
ideological, despite the writings of nationalists themselves. Instead they arose through 
the experience of being denied opportunities and life chances, a daily reality for those 
individual members of groups outside the “core” at the centre of the developmental 
process. Those individuals excluded from those potential benefits by the current power 
structures, sought to effect a radical change in the configuration of the polity by 
mobilising support around a shared culture. (Gellner, 1983: 58-62).
However, industrialisation had also changed the nature and role of culture. In this 
sense, Gellner approached nationalism, not asking what “culture” is, but rather what 
“culture” does; that is to say, he examined what he perceived to be the function of culture 
in modem, industrial societies. Gellner divided human history into three key stages: 
primitive, agro-literate and modem-industrial. In agro-literate societies, culture was a 
social mechanism that embedded people into a stable hierarchical structure. Thus in pre­
modem societies people were defined, not “vertically” with reference to their ethnic or 
linguistic backgrounds, but “horizontally” by their rank. But the division of labour in an 
industrial society was much more fluid than in pre-modem societies and in these 
conditions culture came to mean something else. The function of culture was now one in
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which it was required to integrate and co-ordinate a growing and ever more complex 
social system. In an industrialising world, “national culture” helped facilitate the vital 
processes of communication and production.
However, this “national culture” had to be manufactured out of the manifold 
vernacular cultures existing at that time. The “high culture” of the aspirant social group 
was imposed on the potential nation, even though the form of the national culture might 
borrow freely from local “low cultures”. To provide for the standardisation of culture 
(and often language) across a national space, a system of education was required. The 
only organisation capable of providing and funding such an extensive project was a 
modem state apparatus. This made the acquisition of a state, whose jurisdiction was now 
ideally congruent with a particular “national culture”, doubly important in the industrial 
era. Vernacular languages were used by aspirant nationalist movements to outflank the 
existing political structures whose court and bureaucratic languages were predominantly 
those of the “core cultures”. However, the link between language, culture and education 
was not merely a political one. The education system provided a double function, 
producing people not only as “nationals”, but also preparing them for a life-time of work 
in modem-industrial society. Gellner argued that literacy is the minimum requirement 
for membership in a modem society. The emergent nationalists utilised the vernacular as 
a medium of communication in order to preserve and consolidate their gains, whilst 
encouraging and facilitating the social participation of the masses in the economy. It was 
through this system of education that culture first became homogenised and then 
transmitted. This emergent sense of identity, underpinned by an education in the 
‘national’ tongue, became political loyalty to the state (old or new) when attachment to 
the state appeared to allow mobility within this new, national space.
[The individual] is not a nationalist out of atavism (quite the reverse), but rather from 
a perfectly sound but seldom lucid and conscious appreciation of his own interests. 
He needs a politically protected Gesellschaft, though he talks of it in the idiom of a 
spontaneously engendered Gemeinschaft. The rhetoric of nationalism is inversely
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related to its social reality: it speaks of Gemeinschaft, and is rooted in a semantically 
and often phonetically standardised Gesellschaft (Gellner, 1994a: 107).
Thus if the possession of a particular culture was necessary for inclusion within in a 
particular economic and political system, then loyalties were rationally expressed as a 
reflection and veneration of that specific culture. It was this understanding of nationalism 
that led Gellner to argue that ‘nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self- 
consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist’ (Gellner, 1964: 168).
Gellner’s theory, whilst significant, is also deficient in certain respects when 
seeking to understand and define nationalism. The first criticism to be made against 
Gellner’s theory is that it is too optimistic. Nationalism may indeed perform some sort of 
function in modem society, but this may not be to the greater good of all. As mentioned 
above, the emphasis in Gellner’s thought on nationalism is on the decline of multi­
national empires and the corresponding rise of national states. Gellner has little to say on 
the international aspects of the development of nationalism, nor on some of its destructive 
history. Venerating a particular culture might improve one’s job chances, but why does it 
also lead people to lay down their lives for the nation? In referring to the creation of 
national states in nineteenth century Germany and Italy, Gellner remarks that ‘a number 
of battles and much diplomatic activity were required, but no other more extreme 
measures were called for’ (Gellner 1994b: 30). That these two states would become the 
sites of the most virulent forms of nationalism and racism during the first half of the 
twentieth century is hardly dealt with in Gellner’s work.
Tom Naim criticised Gellner for glossing over the horrors of industrialisation and 
under-emphasising the genocidal tendencies in nationalism. For Naim, ‘uneven 
development’ was no more than a politely academic way of saying ‘war’ (Naim, 1981: 
345). It was the ordeal of development that explained nationalism’s hold on the 
individual as well as why the nation became the focus of legitimacy in the modem era. 
Naim attempted to formulate a theory of nationalism that could explain both the 
progressive and reactionary aspects of nationalism. He too accords a measure of
19
functionality to nationalism. But whilst Naim also makes uneven development central to 
his explanation of nationalism, it was not industrialisation that was central to this 
understanding, but capitalism. Thus for Naim, the origins of nationalism are located ‘not 
in the folk, nor in the individual’s repressed passion for some sort of wholeness of 
identity, but in the machinery of the world political economy’ (Naim, 1981: 335). Again, 
the prime movers in the development of nationalism were elites on the periphery of larger 
societies, positioned unfavourably in a developing capitalist economy. However, the 
significant aspect of the development of nationalism was not so much the involvement of 
the bourgeoisie as the involvement of the masses. In order to out-manoeuvre existing 
power holders and create a truly mass movement, the peripheral elites were forced to call 
upon the masses for support. This alliance brought large sections of the population into 
the realm of “national” politics, a process that Naim describes as ‘the necessary resort to 
populism’ (Naim: 1981: 339). Such appeals for support had to be made in terms that 
would be understandable and acceptable to members of the peasantry and the working 
class. By enlisting the subordinate classes into their political project, the elites were 
forced to legitimate their efforts to transform and develop both economy and society with 
reference to the culture of the masses. However, elites in the peripheral regions could not 
replicate the stages of long development experienced by the original modernising powers, 
but had to develop rapidly. Nevertheless, these elites, and sometimes the masses, desired 
factories, schools and parliaments, but desired these aspects of developments on their 
own terms, not terms imposed by the existing development controllers (Naim, 1997: 50). 
Thus nationalism became the means by which modernity, with all its associated 
bureaucratic structures, industrialisation and standarised languages, was introduced 
around the globe, whilst at the same time providing a (fabricated) sense of continuity 
with the past during the ordeal of development:
it is through nationalism that societies try to propel themselves forward to certain 
kinds of goal (industrialisation, prosperity, equality with other peoples, etc.) by a 
certain sort o f regression - by looking inwards, drawing more deeply on their 
indigenous resources, resurrecting past folk-heroes and myths about themselves and 
so on (Naim, 1981: 348).
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It is this “regression” that explains the importance of history, or at least narratives of the 
past, to nationalist movements. As Anthony Smith has pointed out, ‘historians have in 
many ways furnished the rationale and character of their aspirant nations’ (Smith, 1996: 
175). Historical narratives are generated both by professional historians and as part of 
nationalist politics. The latter narratives are far less precise than those produced by the 
professional historian, but are arguably more potent for being vaguer. Often the results of 
professional and amateur historical research are incorporated into nationalist rhetoric 
about the past. John Hutchinson divides nationalism into two broad variants: “political 
nationalism”, that aims at the creation of autonomous state institutions and “cultural 
nationalism”, that seeks the moral regeneration of a particular national community 
(Hutchinson, 1994: 41). Hutchinson argues that:
Although [cultural nationalism] looks backwards, it is not regressive; rather it puts 
forward a mobile view of history that evokes a golden age of achievement as a 
critique of the present, with the hope of propelling the community to ever higher 
stages of development (Hutchinson, 1994: 41).
It is this ‘critique of the present’ that makes understandings of the past such an important, 
and often contentious, aspect of nationalist politics. Hutchinson is right to argue that not 
all nationalist projects are statist (Hutchinson, 1994: 39). For cultural nationalists, the 
state is only of secondary importance and is sometimes viewed with suspicion as an agent 
able to enforce cultural conformity. While cultural nationalists can do without political 
nationalism, however, political nationalists cannot do without culture. “National culture” 
operates as the prime means of legitimation in the nationalist era, and political 
nationalists must encourage, appropriate or even create a national culture to legitimate 
their movement (so much the better if the cultural nationalists have already done the job 
for them). Eric Hobsbawm has observed that nationalists use history ‘as a legitimator of 
action and cement of group cohesion. Frequently it becomes the actual symbol of 
struggle’ (Hobsbawm, 1983: 12). Hobsbawm ties his understanding of the legitimating 
function of the past to the concept of the “invented tradition”. Invented traditions are
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responses to novel situations that take the form of reference to old situations or practices 
and are particularly visible in the period of rapid transformation over the past two 
hundred years (Hobsbawm, 1983: 5). Three types of invented tradition are discernible 
according to Hobsbawm: those establishing and maintaining social cohesion; those 
establishing or legitimising institutions or authority relations; and those whose main aims 
were the inculcation of belief systems and modes of behaviour (Hobsbawm, 1983: 9). 
For the political nationalist, all three functions were part of their project, and the past 
became an important source of national culture. “History” thus became a crucial aspect of 
the attempt to create social alliances necessary in the creation and success of nationalist 
movements.
A stress on the importance of class and social alliances was also made by Czech 
historian Miroslav Hroch. Unlike Gellner, and in common with some of Naim’s more 
recent theorising, Hroch believed that nationalism was more than a solely modem 
phenomenon, and that it could not be created without reference to pre-modem ethnic 
groupings in the region in which a particular nationalism was to develop. Based on his 
comparative historical study of nineteenth century eastern Europe, Hroch outlined 
various social conditions that permitted the creation of a nationalist movement. The first 
of these was a crisis of legitimacy of the old order, which was initially a crisis of the 
place of religion in society as a means of legitimating rule in early modem states. Added 
to this was a high degree of social mobility amongst certain sections of the population 
coupled with a high level of social communication within the group. Critically, a 
nationalist movement formed when social tensions were effectively mapped onto 
linguistic and cultural divisions, particularly in eastern Europe.
Within the nationalist movement itself, Hroch identified three distinct formative 
phases. During the first phase, activists were primarily devoted to scholarly 
dissemination of ideas about the cultural, linguistic and sometimes historic specificity of 
a particular nation, without pressing for national demands to remedy any perceived 
injustices. In the second phase, a new set of activists emerged who sought to “awaken” 
the nation through political agitation, initially without much success, but in some cases
22
finding a large following. The third phase resulted when the national movement became 
a mass movement, through an alliance of social classes and in particular the middle 
classes and peasantry (Hroch, 1996: 81).
Hroch has claimed that the phase of mass mobilisation remained somewhat 
underdeveloped with regard to comparative historical research (Hroch, 1996: 88). This is 
unfortunate, as it is this stage, the alliance between the middle and working classes or 
peasantry, that is the most crucial for the success or failure of a nationalist movement. 
Hroch himself has stated that ‘the participation of these two classes was a fundamental 
prerequisite for the coming of the modem nation, since without them no nation could 
attain a fully rounded class structure (i.e. a class structure typical of a capitalist society), 
and this class-structure is indispensable for the completion of the nation creating process’ 
(Hroch, 1985: 179). However, like Gellner, Hroch placed too much emphasis on 
endogenous reasons for the development of national movements. There is no account in 
his theory of the role that international diplomacy and the interests of the Great Powers 
had on shaping the map of eastern Europe. Furthermore, in eastern Europe it was the aim 
of the nationalist movements to create states, whereas nationalism in places where states 
were already established displayed a somewhat different dynamic. In these cases, the 
social alliance was entered into to preserve and legitimate the status quo rather than 
reorganise the political map in favour of the bourgeoisie with reference to linguistic 
groups.
A further critique of Gellner’s theory is also far too functionalist. For Gellner, 
nationalism is a response to the needs generated by an industrial society. Such a society, 
with its complex division of labour and developed bureaucracy can only function with a 
mobile, literate and culturally standardised population (Gellner, 1983: 46). Such an 
emphasis on functionality runs the risk of reducing nationalism to the role of ‘an 
industrial lubricant’ (Kedourie, 1993 [I960]: 144). The role of human agency is greatly 
underplayed in the development of nationalism and nationalist movements. For instance, 
the activities of an oppressive state, particularly in under-developed areas, may be a more 
crucial explanation of nationalist activity than a developing industrial economy. Brendan
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O’Leary has pointed out that Gellner’s account rests on material and cultural 
explanations, but lacks a sensitive account of the role of politics and consciously political 
movements in promoting or thwarting the development of particular nationalisms. ‘In 
short, the political regime within which national minorities operate, rather than their 
material or cultural grievances, may best explain their predisposition to be secessionists, 
federalists, or consociationalists’ (O’Leary, 1998: 65). This stress on functionalism in 
Gellner’s theory not only removes human agency, but also weakens the basis for any 
normative attitude towards nationalism (Beiner, 1999: 181). If nationalism is just part of 
modem industrial societies, then it is unclear why should any group of people actively 
embrace or reject it. Nationalism is not a neutral phenomenon, despite its non- 
ideological origins, but becomes part of a political programme. For nationalists, the 
national movement is a means of reaching the goals through a political process that best 
serves their interests. The state is important in Gellner’s theory, but more as an aspiration 
for nationalist movements, rather than as a powerful actor in its own right. John 
Breuilly’s approach to nationalism, brings the state back in and places it at the centre of 
analysis. Brueilly argues that nationalism is primarily explained by politics and that 
politics is above all about the control and exercise of power. Furthermore, power in the 
modem era is essentially about control of the state (Breuilly, 1982: 2-9). The 
development of the idea of the nation, says Breuilly, ‘is best understood in terms of the 
new ways in which political oppositions must face a new type of state’ (Breuilly, 1982: 
44). Arguing that the ideology of nationalism has probably been ascribed too great a role 
in reconciling the mass of the state’s subjects to its rule, Breuilly concludes that 
nationalism emerges not because of the existence of a “nation” but because political 
opposition to state power mobilised around nationalist concepts was sometimes the most 
rational form of protest against the modem state (Breuilly, 1982: 382). Such an 
understanding which privileges the emergence of the modem state as the central casual 
factor in the rise of nationalism, fails to sufficiently address why a new type of state had 
to emerge and why the preceding feudal era was transformed into what we understand as 
“modernity”. The transformation of the state is indeed an important part of the rise of 
nationalism, but it is only one part of the general transformation of society and politics
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that formed part of the necessary conditions for the emergence of national consciousness 
and nationalism.
Another criticism to be levelled at Gellner’s theory is its poor relationship to the 
historical record. If nationalism was a by-product of industrialisation, then it cannot have 
been in existence prior to the latter half of the eighteenth century. Such a conclusion is 
open to question. This theory does little to explain the origins of Polish or Irish 
nationalism, for example, that owed more to political oppression than industrial 
development. Nevertheless, historians such as Eric Hobsbawm, have followed Gellner’s 
lead, arguing that “the national question” arose out of an intersection of politics and 
social, economic and technological transformation. In common with Breuilly, although 
for somewhat different reasons, Hobsbawm argues that it is the state, rather than social 
change as such, that is the central force in the development of nationalism; states create 
nations rather than nations creating states. So whilst Gellner can be criticised for under­
emphasising the role of the state in nationalism, Hobsbawm has exaggerated that role. 
Locating the rise of nationalism as a feature of modem society, Hobsbawm argues that 
the development of nationalism was a ruling class response to the increasing involvement 
of the subordinate classes in the political realm during the nineteenth century 
(Hobsbawm, 1992: 88). Furthermore, the ruling class could impose its interests on more 
and more of the population under its jurisdiction through the expanding organs of state 
power (which it controlled), notably via the bureaucratic and education systems. It is 
from this standpoint that Hobsbawm argues that the nation ‘is a social entity only insofar 
as it relates to a certain kind of modem territorial state, the “nation-state”, and it is 
pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it (Hobsbawm, 
1992: 9). Here, However Hobsbawm over-emphasises the role of the state at the expense 
of popular national sentiment. As we have seen the legitimation of a location of 
sovereignty is crucial to an understanding of nationalism, but the language of legitimation 
must have popular resonance to be effective. It is this need that gives nationalism its 
popular character.
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Hobsbawm also points out that the great nineteenth century era of nation-building 
and state formation coincided with the era of liberal capitalism (Hobsbawm, 1992: 24). 
However, he fails to develop this argument and appears at such pains to discredit 
nationalism as a political invention that he does not enquire further about the links 
between nationalism and capitalism prior to the end of the eighteenth century. He is 
explicit when he says that nationalism, in the modem sense of the word, ‘is no older than 
the eighteenth century, give or take the odd predecessor’ (Hobsbawm, 1992: 3). But it is 
precisely ‘the odd predecessor’ that helps explain the development of nationalism. As 
such, a body of scholarship emerged that criticised understandings of nationalism as a 
modem phenomena as overly instrumental and glossing over a key element of enquiry, 
namely the nation itself. However, the polarisation of this debate tends to shroud one of 
the main points of similarity that these approaches share -  the objective modernity of 
nationalism, despite the subjective claims of nationalist movements in regards to the 
particular nation in question. One camp, the “ethno-symbolists” stress the subjective 
content of nationalism, whilst the “modernists” emphasise nationalism’s recent origins as 
a political ideology.
In one sense, Gellner’s efforts to stress the rationality of national loyalty 
represented an attempt to counter the notion of nationalism as an atavistic response to 
change, unleashing latent, immemorial hatreds amongst nations, that Gellner labeled the 
‘Dark Gods’ theory of nationalism. This understanding of nationalism, that Gellner 
attributes to Elie Kedourie (1993 [I960]), can be summarised as the assumption that 
atavistic and murderous passions lie shallowly beneath the surface of all nationalist 
movements, and indeed human nature in general. These passions, it is claimed, are only 
kept in check by strong states and the international system. This explanation of 
nationalism gained some popular currency in the early 1990s with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and nationalist revolutions in its client states. Such an analysis, whilst 
seeking to discredit nationalism, actually reinforces it by believing what the nationalists 
say about themselves and their nations -  that they are immutable, time-honoured 
categories of social being waiting to find political expression. Thus oppression could be 
justified as long as “ethnic passions” were kept in check. Whilst we might criticise
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Gellner’s work for being overly optimistic, the basic idea that nationalism is linked to 
socio-economic changes in the modem era is a far more sustainable understanding of 
nationalism than the idea that it is a product of irrational aspects of human nature, whose 
legitimacy rests upon the historical longevity of a particular nation. However, the strong 
link between nationalism and modernity evident in the work of Gellner, Naim and 
Hobsbawm, has led some subsequent theorists to place the origins of nationalism long 
before the advent of capitalism or industrialisation.
Historian Adrian Hastings has entirely rejected the link between nationalism and 
modernity. He argues that an understanding of nations and nationalism ‘will only be 
advanced when any inseparable bonding of them to [the] modernisation of society is 
abandoned’ (Hastings, 1996: 9). For him, state, religion and literature were the key 
measures by which to define the development of nationalism. Accordingly, Hastings 
stretched the origins of nationalism back beyond modernity, arguing for the idea of an 
English nation existing in the Middle Ages. But Hasting’s key elements in his definition 
of nationalism are predominantly ruling class preserves and cannot explain the popular 
character of nationalism. Even accepting that religion played an important part in 
collective consciousness, we would have to wait until the Reformation for a clear link 
between religious and national consciousness in England.
Hastings is in some respects closer to both John Armstrong and Anthony Smith in 
laying stress upon the pre-modem origins of the nation. Armstrong examines the 
emergence of ethnic identification and its development into nationalism over a long 
historical time-span, casting his analysis back beyond the modem era. Armstrong argues 
that the modernist understanding of nationalism has been skewed by the character of the 
Enlightenment, which preceded the emergence of romantic nationalism at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century:
Because the epoch of Absolutism that immediately preceded European nationalism 
involved, at least for elites, an exceptionally strong rejection of ethnic differentiation, 
nationalism is often seen as utterly unprecedented. A longer look suggests that
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widespread intense ethnic identification, although expressed in other forms, is 
recurrent. For example, Absolutist Enlightenment dispersed the revived linguistic 
consciousness encouraged by Reformation and Counter-Reformation conflicts. One 
result has been that modem nationalist thought, has sought permanent “essences” of 
national character instead of recognising the fundamental but shifting significance of 
boundaries for human identity (Armstrong, 1982: 4).
Armstrong highlights the role of myths and symbols in tracing a lineage back from 
contemporary nationalisms back into the past, or at least before the Enlightenment. It is 
this set of symbols and myths that can sustain a polity and create an identity beyond that 
which can be imposed by force or created by prosperity. Thus the legitimacy of a 
particular nation stems from the continuation of symbols over a considerable historical 
time span.
Anthony Smith adds to this the idea of an ethnie -  a collectivity possessing a 
sense of group consciousness centred around shared myths, memories, values and 
symbols. Smith argues that we should ground the study of nationalism on a historical 
base involving considerable time-spans. Such an approach would reveal that ‘the unit we 
call “nations” and the sentiments and ideals we call “nationalism” can be found in all 
periods of history, even when we camouflage the fact by using other terms to describe 
analogous phenomena’ (Smith, 1986: 12). This long-term analysis is employed by Smith 
in order to address a gap in the theory provided by the modernists: ‘if there were no 
model of past ethnicity and no pre-existent ethnie there could be neither nations or 
nationalism. There would be only states and etatisme imposed from above, a very 
different phenomenon’ (Smith, 1986: 214). Thus, for Smith, the very unit that 
modernists such as Gellner, Naim and Hobsbawm argued had become of crucial 
importance due to vast social transformations of the modem era, remains under theorised 
in their accounts. Smith argued that nationalism was not just a political movement or 
ideology, but its relationship to culture and ethnicity needs to be understood too. Thus 
whilst it is important to distinguish nationalism, the ideological movement, from the 
wider phenomenon of national consciousness, we cannot begin to understand nationalism
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as a political force without grounding an analysis in a wider context that sees national 
consciousness as more than an invented response to modem society. To understand the 
configurations and values of present-day nationalisms, Smith looks to the continuities 
with pre-modem ethnie (Smith, 1991: 91). By so doing he seeks to overcome ‘the most 
perplexing feature of investigation into ethnic and national phenomena: the curiously 
simultaneous solidity and insubstantiality of ethnic communities and nations. In many 
ways it is easier to “grasp” nationalism, the ideological movement, than nations, the 
organisational cultures’ (Smith, 1986: 2).
Parts of this “ethno-symbolist” understanding of nationalism are useful. The 
concept of the national mythology as a means by which consent and participation are 
encouraged and legitimised is a crucial element of nationalism’s “functionality”. This 
considerable body of work is perhaps best seen as a corrective to some of the more 
uncompromising modernist theorists of the nation. Such criticisms were absorbed by 
certain “modernists”, who conceded that Gellner’s theory did not stress the importance of 
the pre-modem communities from which modem nations drew their symbolism and 
“character”. Naim has corrected Gellner by arguing that ‘the kind of remaking which 
features in modem nationalism is not creation ex nihilo, but a reformulation constrained 
by determinate parameters of past’ (Naim, 1997: 104). Hroch offered a similar 
explanation for the importance of ethno-linguistic demands in eastern European 
nationalism. Hroch suggested that this element in eastern European nationalisms could 
be explained historically with reference to the underdevelopment and rural nature of 
eastern Europe at the moment at which nationalists began to agitate for reforms. ‘To a 
Czech or Estonian peasant, “freedom” meant the abolition of feudal exactions and the 
ability to use their own farmlands without impediment, not a parliamentary regime’ 
(Hroch, 1996: 92). Thus the class alliance between bourgeoisie and peasantry had to be 
forged round this common relation of language and ethnicity, not a discourse of political 
liberties as was a feature of nationalism in the developed west. As the emergence of 
nationalism in the west showed, the etatisme referred to by Smith, can and did become a 
“national” consciousness, and the long-established symbols of state became markers of 
culture for such state-based nations.
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However, the thrust of such “ethno-symbolic” arguments tend to remain at the 
level of an assertion that continuities with the past exist in nationalism and national 
consciousness. Such an assertion may indeed be hard to refute, inasmuch as the past is 
often invoked in nationalist projects, but in itself reveals little about ideological means by 
which these identities are promoted and maintained and for whose benefit. Additionally, 
such arguments are weaker regarding the contested nature of the construction and 
maintenance of any given national identity. Smith’s historical analysis of the modem 
nation and the pre-modem ethnie, led him to a definition of national identity based on 
what he perceived as fundamental common features to all such identities. These are a 
historic territory or homeland, common myths, a common mass public culture, common 
legal rights and duties for all members and a common economy (Smith, 1991: 15-17). 
However, such an approach runs the risk of description at the expense of analysis. 
Furthermore, it is unclear why, if the concept of the nation is so problematic and difficult 
to grasp, we should accept the similar concept of ethnie as a basis of analysis? The 
difficulty for the students of nationalism is to differentiate the existence of the nation in 
the past from the importance of the past in legitimating nations.
But here again there is a difficulty with the ethno-symbolist position. Smith is 
judging certain instances of nationalism as “artificial” and ipso facto that other forms of 
nationalism are genuine. Some nations, in particular settler societies such as Australia, 
have only had “artificial” means of inducing a sense of national consciousness. 
Furthermore, if Smith is implying that “artificial” nationalism is induced by the state, we 
need to question which entity is the less real -  the state with its ability to affect the lives 
of those under its jurisdiction in very concrete ways, or an abstract entity based on shared 
history, common languages and a common territory. State-based nationalisms are just as 
real as those based on the “objective” factors identified by Smith, such as language.
Having accepted that nationalism existed prior to industrialisation, we need to ask 
how far back in history we must go before we can identify the origins of nationalism? 
The historical timing of the development of nationalism in different parts of the globe
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effected the language of legitimation employed by particular nationalists. In contrast to 
Gellner and other modernists, Liah Greenfeld argues that the key reality lying at the core 
of nationalism is not industrialisation, capitalism or the state, but that of the nation itself. 
Greenfeld outlined a process of semantic change surrounding the word “nation” which 
only developed its contemporary meaning at the beginning of the sixteenth century in 
England, where the term, formerly meaning an elite, was eventually applied to the entire 
population. ‘This semantic transformation’ argued Greenfeld, ‘signaled the emergence of 
the first nation in the world, in the sense in which the word is understood today, and 
launched the era of nationalism’ (Greenfeld, 1992: 6). Furthermore, Greenfeld argued 
that the concept of the nation (at least in England and America) was intimately bound up 
with the emergence of ideas about democracy. The development of nationalism was a 
result of the anomie brought about by structural changes affecting certain strata in 
society, combined with a sense of resentment against the beneficiaries of the previous or 
existing social systems. Along with Gellner, Greenfeld underlines the importance of 
feelings of inequality as a source of nationalist mobilisation, but it is the nation which 
precedes, or rather initiates, nationalism. Nationalism, having developed initially in 
England, is copied by other developing states as a means to emulate England’s political, 
military and economic success. Greenfeld concluded that ‘the dominance of England in 
eighteenth century Europe, and then the dominance of the West in the world, made 
nationality the cannon’ (Greenfeld, 1992: 14).
Despite emphasising the pre-industrial origins of nationalism, neither Greenfeld 
nor Smith can detach their analysis from modernity as such. For Greenfeld, nationalism, 
is not caused by modernity, but becomes the method by which modernity is introduced 
into various societies from the sixteenth century onwards. In Greenfeld’s view England 
was becoming a nation just at the time when it was also becoming a capitalist economy, 
but this is significantly overlooked in her analysis, with primacy given to political over 
structural reasons for change. Similarly, Anthony Smith does not avoid the link between 
nationalism and modernity. An aspect of Smith’s work less often commented on than his 
attachment to ethno-symbolism is the importance he lays on the transition to modernity in 
creating nationalism. For Smith, the emergence of nationalism and the nation-state can
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be traced back to three linked revolutions taking place at first in western Europe, 
although not necessarily at the same time or in the same place. These revolutions were: 
the transformation of the division of labour; transformation in the control of 
administration and a shift in cultural co-ordination (Smith, 1986: 131). The transition to 
capitalism witnessed a much higher degree of economic integration than hitherto, but one 
marked by harsh discontinuities. This process initially occurred in the centralising states 
of the western part of Europe. Closely interwoven with this was the transformation of 
military and administrative capacities of these states. Finally there was a cultural and 
educational revolution whereby the ecclesiastical basis of education was replaced by the 
rational state, which then set itself up as the secular deity, establishing a new social strata 
whose allegiance was to the state (Smith, 1986: 131-33). Even the modernists 
themselves concede the antecedents of particular nations matter in some cases. Gellner’s 
observation that ‘nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it 
invents nations where they do not exist’ is immediately qualified with the caveat ‘but it 
does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on’ (Gellner, 1964: 168). Eric 
Hobsbawm introduces the notion of ‘popular proto-nationalism’ to deal with national 
consciousness prior to the 1780s. Popular proto-nationalism includes elements of a 
common group consciousness such as language, ethnicity, religion, social movements of 
defence against an invader and most importantly, ‘the consciousness of belonging to or 
having belonged to a lasting political entity’ (Hobsbawm, 1992: 73):
proto-nationalism, where it existed, made the task of nationalism easier, however 
great the differences between the two, insofar as existing symbols and sentiments of 
proto-national community could be mobilised behind a modem cause or a modem 
state. But this is far from saying that the two were the same, or even that one must 
logically or even inevitably lead into the other (Hobsbawm, 1992: 77).
He adds ‘the content of nineteenth century national propaganda is an unreliable guide to 
what the rank and file of the common people actually thought before they began to 
adhere to the national cause’ (Hobsbawm, 1992: 76). This is indeed correct, but such an 
argument doesn’t actually disprove the existence of nationalism prior to the end of the
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eighteenth century, it merely underlines the difficulty of divining such attitudes. 
Gellner’s mistake may have been to insist on the link between nationalism and 
industrialisation, whereas the wider concepts of modernisation and the emergence of 
capitalism are more useful in understanding the development of nationalism, particularly 
in its initial phases. Thus it is unclear as to why Gellner should ascribe the dislocating 
social affects of the nineteenth century to industrialisation alone, however horrific 
conditions in newly industrialising areas may have been. Such dislocation had already 
been ascribed to capitalism by 1848 as Neil Davidson has reminded us (Davidson, 2000: 
16):
All fixed fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and 
opinions, are swept away, all new formed ones become antiquated before they can 
ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last 
compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and relations with his 
kind (Marx and Engels, 1973 [1848]: 37).
A further criticism linked to the specific nature of Gellner’s theory, is its 
geographic bias. If Gellner’s ideas about the development of nationalism can be 
criticised for being too specifically concerned with the industrial era, then they are also 
too specifically European. In fact, such ideas may work best when applied to central and 
eastern Europe, rather than the states of the Atlantic rim, both in Europe and the 
Americas. Important though it is, the type of nationalism described by Gellner, is that of 
the various independence movements that arose under the dynastic empires of central and 
eastern Europe. Despite his work on Islam, Gellner also has relatively little to say on 
nationalism and decolonisation. Also, less attention is given to the established states of 
western Europe from where, according to Gellner, nationalism began its tidal advance. 
Thus there is little analysis of the development of nationalism amongst the imperial 
powers. Such imperial expansion was also significant in creating a sense of collective 
identity, usually through ideas about the imperial mission or racialised notions of 
difference with legitimated the possession of the empire. For the subject peoples of 
empire, contact with the nationalisms of the developed countries was no less important in
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forming their own national consciousness. However, in this instance it was the 
imposition of a colonial power relationship, as much as the aspiration of the colonial 
bourgeoisie for economic development rather than the actual fact of it, which created 
nationalism in the colonial context. Nigel Harris argues that the development of 
nationalism in these western European imperial states owed much more to endogenous 
forces than would later be the case. According to Harris, ‘in a colonial situation, 
subordinate peoples have a particular group identity forced upon them by the operation of 
power, rather than by some prior common features’ (Harris, 1992: 12). In addition to the 
creation of a national consciousness through oppression, the oppressors themselves 
developed a national consciousness as a result of the imperial experience. It was here 
that notions of racial superiority and civilising missions merged into the national 
consciousness of the imperial centre, as the imperialists legitimated their own projects in 
the language of racial and national destiny.
Another area under-examined in Gellner’s thought as a result of his Euro-centric 
bias is that of the imperial fragments of Europe. Little is said about nationalism in the 
Americas and other settler societies, or the role that economic or industrial development 
might have played in generating nationalism in such countries. Benedict Anderson’s 
analysis of nationalism is far more persuasive with regard to settler societies than Gellner 
and combines this extra-European analysis by locating the origins of nationalism in the 
development of capitalism, in particular print-capitalism. Anderson’s work is perhaps 
best known for his definition of the nation as ‘an imagined political community’ 
(Anderson, 1991: 6), but it is his analysis of the role of print-capitalism that concerns us 
here. It is within this historical development that Anderson locates the origins of national 
consciousness. According to Anderson, ‘the convergence of capitalism and print 
technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form 
of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modem 
nation’ (Anderson, 1991: 46). Paul James has criticised Anderson’s stress on imagination 
as central to the understanding of nations and nationalism. James argues that this 
approach detracts from an understanding of the ways in which nationalism effects the 
everyday experiences of individuals’ existence (James, 1996a: 7). For James, nations and
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nationalism are the products of a series of changes in the modes of human practice. 
These changes are notable in the modes of production, exchange, organisation, 
communication and enquiry. Thus the nation is more than just an abstract mental 
construct as is implied by Anderson’s emphasis on the subjectivities of national 
consciousness. Instead, aspects of the previous arguments which have stressed the 
causal centrality of industrialisation, capitalism, the state and communications 
technologies are here taken as part of a larger whole, a fundamental transformation which 
creates the conditions necessary for the emergence of nationalism. Above all, it is this 
transformation in these modes of practice which result in novel forms of integration 
emerging (James, 1996a: 19-21). As with Anderson’s stress on the importance of print 
capitalism in the emergence of nationalism, James’ analysis based on modes of practice 
and integration does not limit nationalism to a European source, although the necessary 
conditions he describes were clearly marked there, particularly along the Atlantic 
coastline.
Nevertheless, Anderson also deals convincingly with the development of 
nationalism outside of, and prior to, nationalism in Europe. Again nationalist movements 
developed and succeeded here before the development of industrialisation. Referring to 
the “creole pioneers” of nationalism in the Americas during the eighteenth and beginning 
of the nineteenth centuries, Anderson fills in a gap left by his linking of capitalism, print 
technology and language. The development of nationalism in the New World could not 
mobilise around language as a marker of difference as invariably the language of the 
colony was the same as that of the imperial power. Instead, the revolutions in the 
Americas created politically “national” units out of former administrative and economic 
boundaries. Print capitalism did play a role in the development of national consciousness 
in these various parts of the European empires, but this type of creole nationalism rested 
on the development of a parochial print-capitalism, rather than requiring the medium of a 
different language altogether (Anderson, 1991: 62). This leads to the addition of a 
redefined sense of social mobility as an important causal element in the development of 
nationalism. Thus, in the New World the drive to national independence has less to do
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with language and more to do with the frustrated but limited political aspirations of a 
creole elite:
If peninsular officials could travel the road from Zaragoza to Cartagena, Madrid, 
Lima and again Madrid, the “Mexican” or “Chilean” creole typically served only in 
the territories of colonial Mexico or Chile: his lateral movement was as cramped as 
his vertical ascent. In this way, the apex of his looping climb, the highest 
administrative centre to which he could be assigned, was the capital of the imperial 
administrative unit in which he found himself (Anderson, 1991: 57).
Having broken free of the old empires and seized power, American elites could not 
establish the legitimacy necessary to consolidate their rule until later in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. The novelty of their political experiment had not furnished 
the new nations with a legitimating past, and it was several generations before the 
struggles for power could be reassuringly packaged in narratives of the “national past”.
Understanding why nationalism persists and why it takes the particular forms it 
does, requires an examination of the role of human agency and politics within the 
phenomenon of nationalism. In particular the link between nation and state needs 
explanation and why nationalism is crucial for the legitimation of power in the modem 
era. Once the general phenomenon of nationalism has re-ordered the state system, the 
concept of “the nation” cannot be dispensed with for it has become the primary 
legitimating principle of the new “nation-state”. An emphasis on the legitimation of the 
state as well as the nationalist project has the advantage of bringing both human agency 
and politics into an account of nationalism. Both were under-explored in the account of 
nationalism’s emergence above. Thus if we shift the emphasis in Anderson’s famous 
definition of a nation as an imagined political community from the method of 
imagination to why the community is imagined, we can begin to understand how 
structural shifts and the modem state can help foster distinct national consciousness 
amongst groups of individuals. Whilst no doubt the link between the two concepts of 
nation and state has altered since the nineteenth century, those in control of the state
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apparatus still have a vested interest in promoting nationalism and national consciousness 
as a means of legitimating their access to, and control of, political power.
The integrity of the state generates its own logic for the persistence of 
nationalism. This has led some commentators to see the nation as defined by the state. 
Michael Mann somewhat overstates his case when he claims that the nation is a ‘state 
defined sense of community’ (Mann, 1993: 138). This confuses nationalist aspirations 
with reality. Although linked, “state” and “nation” are different concepts. It may be 
advantageous for certain members of a particular nation to claim a state in the name of 
“their” people and it is certainly useful for those running states to legitimate their rule 
with reference to “the nation”, but the two concepts are not the same. So-called 
“stateless-nations”, could only be described as having a ‘state-defined sense of 
community’ if that definition could be expanded to include resistance to a state or states. 
However, it would be wrong to dismiss the importance of the state in creating national 
consciousness. Mann argues that ‘if ideologies are to spread, they must be organised 
through specific channels of communication’ (Mann, 1993: 142). Thus for Mann, the 
nation cannot exist without the state. However, it is clear that the number of extant states 
clearly does not reflect the number of potential nations that could claim separate 
statehood. Any theory of nationalism also has to account for the existence of stateless 
nations, and nationalist movements which do not aim at the creation of autonomous state 
institutions, whose national consciousness is not directly encouraged by the state.
Social psychologist, Michael Billig examined the ways in which national 
identities are reproduced in the developed West. Building on Benedict Anderson’s 
analysis of the nation, Billig argues that it is the way in which a nation is “imagined”, and 
not just the fact that it is so, that is important. Billig maintains that a daily system of 
reproduction of (national) identities takes place, embedded in the established habits of 
everyday life. ‘For such a daily reproduction to occur, one might hypothesise that a 
whole complex of assumptions, beliefs, habits, representations and practices must also be 
reproduced. Moreover this complex consciousness must be reproduced in a banally 
mundane way, for the world of nations is the everyday world, the familiar terrain of
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contemporary times’ (Billig, 1995: 6). Such mechanisms for the reproduction of national 
identities include flags, the structure of news reports and newspapers with their domestic 
and international news sections, weather forecasts showing the national territory, that 
locates the individual within a particular nation in a wider world. For such reasons, 
national identity contains a strong social-psychological element, linking individual 
consciousness with wider forms of collective belonging (Billig, 1995: 10). However, to 
focus solely at this individual level would be to overlook how such identities are 
reproduced and maintained at a macro level. Re-iterating the point made above, national 
identity is not solely an inner psychological mode of being, but is an ideological creation, 
part of the process of nationalism and the daily reproduction of nations. This again points 
to a particular line of enquiry; when individuals are being “reminded” that they are part 
of a nation, who is reminding them and what knowledge frameworks are being imparted? 
Geoffrey Stokes argues that wherever an identity is invoked, there exists a continually 
unfolding political project based on unrealised ideals and aspirations, involving claims 
about groups of individuals who putatively share the same interests. Identity politics 
involves a contest over the extent and content of those identity boundaries, as well as a 
dispute over who has the power to define those boundaries (Stokes, 1997: 10). Thus it is 
necessary to consider the discourse and power relations contained in the reproduction of 
national identities, namely which groups benefit the most from nationalist projects and 
the perpetuation of particular versions of national consciousness.
Billig does make the mistake of confusing nation with state, as did Mann above. 
That is to say, the thrust of Billig’s argument is that the continual, though rarely heeded, 
reinforcing of legitimacy by states in the developed West is experienced as “national 
identity” by each and every individual, which is then drawn upon by state agencies 
during times of crisis or change. Such a view that sees nationalism produced solely from 
above, runs the risk of assuming that what the state says about nationalism is endorsed or 
condoned by “the nation”, leaving little room for an explanation of resistance to official 
narratives. National events, such as state-sponsored celebrations, might aspire to create 
or foster a particular type of identity, but whether they succeed in this is another matter. 
In fact, the whole concept of “a national identity” is too problematic to be used as a
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category of analysis (McCrone, 1998: 3) when seeking to understand nationalism. 
Accordingly, elements such as language, shared history, links to a territory and political 
organisation should not be seen in the first instance as the causes of nationalism, but 
instead they are symbols of nationalism, becoming the manner in which particular 
nationalisms are expressed and the particular elements and symbols contributing to a 
sense of national consciousness. Billig’s point about the way in which particular national 
identities can be reproduced daily by state agencies is valid, but a state-based identity and 
a national one are not necessarily the same thing.
Nevertheless, “the nation” is an important part of the mediated relationship 
between the individual and the state. A useful attempt to understand the link between the 
individual and the national collectivity has been provided by Neil Davidson. Davidson 
employs the concept of national consciousness, which he contrasts with class 
consciousness. The notion of class consciousness implies that a worker may bring his or 
her individual and consciousness in line with an objective material reality of capitalist 
society. This means that the individual can recognise his or her true interests and act 
accordingly. National consciousness operates the other way round. Hence a nationalist 
may aim to create a nation (-state), thereby bringing reality into line with their subjective 
consciousness (Davidson, 2000: 13). Accordingly, national consciousness can exist prior 
to, and independently of, a national state, the product of the economic, social and political 
transformations of uneven development. This implies that an understanding of concepts 
such as the nation, nationalism and national consciousness already exist and are available 
to the individual, even if they are contested concepts. These concepts form part of a 
general nationalist ideology, which developed out of the historic transformations outlined 
above, from which new forms of abstract community emerged. In attempting to 
understand such transformations, the ideology of nationalism emerged. John Breuilly 
argues that:
Ideology has its roots in an intellectual attempt to solve some puzzle about society as
a whole. Because such puzzles and related predicaments are shared generally, the
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answers offered at a fairly sophisticated level by intellectuals can, in a simplified 
form, be adopted by others as an ideology (Breuilly, 1982: 334).
As such, ‘ideology appears as both a rationalisation of certain forms of political action 
and as an instrument of such action’ (Breuilly, 1982: 367). The general ideology of 
nationalism, that nations exist and should have as much autonomy or independence as 
they desire, then feeds into particular nationalist ideologies, which stress the unique 
character of particular nations, which helps integrate national communities. As with 
Gellner, Naim and Hobsbawn, Davidson believes that nationalism plays a functional role 
in capitalist societies: ‘The ideological role played by the ruling class in reinforcing 
nationalism is therefore only possible because nationalism already provides one possible 
means of meeting the psychic needs created by capitalism’ (Davidson, 2000: 44). In this 
way the functionalism of Gellner’s account becomes de-coupled from a notion that it 
operates for the general good and is replaced by the notions of interests and political 
power. But crucially, national consciousness becomes nationalism only when linked to 
some political project aimed at the attainment of statehood (Davidson, 2000: 15). Thus it 
is quite possible for national consciousness to exist, without the necessary existence of a 
nationalist movement. Only when such a consciousness becomes threatened, or 
nationalist agitation for certain demands, appears to offer more benefits than risks will a 
political nationalist movement come into being. Davidson’s conceptualisation of national 
consciousness permits the existence of national sentiment even in the absence of a 
particular “national” state, or even a nationalist project. If we link nationalism too 
closely with the state we will miss something important about nationalism -  namely that 
the transition to a capitalist economy and modernity created the conditions for the 
emergence of nationalism, but only in certain cases did “nations” attain statehood. Thus 
we should look beyond the state in our explanation of nationalism, otherwise we risk 
restricting our analysis to too narrow a base.
Whilst the role that nationalism plays in legitimating states is a crucial part of the 
phenomenon of nationalism, nationalist movements can also de-legitimate particular 
states in order to attain their own statehood. Rogers Brubaker rejects the notion that
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nationalist movements will always strive for statehood (Brubaker, 1998: 276). He adopts 
a two-part conception of nationalist movements: counter-state and state-focused. In the 
former, the nation is conceived of as in opposition to the institutional or territorial 
framework of the state or states, whilst in the latter, the nation is constituted as congruent 
with and institutionally and territorially framed by, the state (Brubaker, 1998: 290). Such 
a conception allows us to understand nationalism as a movement that can operate outside 
of, and in opposition to, the state. However, both variants of nationalism have something 
in common: they are ultimately concerned with legitimating a particular location of 
sovereignty, even if that location differs in each type. In state-focused nationalism, the 
location of sovereignty is the state itself and as such the nation that is invoked by those in 
positions of political power as a means of legitimating the existence and continuation of 
the state. In counter-state nationalism, the location of sovereignty is “the people” 
(conceived as “the nation”), that is invoked by nationalists as a means of mobilising 
support against the state. Thus we can best define nationalism as a phenomenon of the 
modem era which legitimates a particular location of sovereignty.
Through a critique of Ernest Gellner’s thought about nationalism, I have 
attempted to arrive at an understanding of the subject that will frame the analysis adopted 
in the succeeding chapters. Gellner’s greatest contribution to the field of nationalism 
studies was to popularise the idea that nationalism was linked to some form of economic 
development and social change, rather than being an extreme manifestation of irrational 
human behaviour. However, the strong link he tries to make between nationalism and 
industrialisation, limits his understanding of nationalism to no earlier than the mid-to-late 
eighteenth century. Such a link between nationalism and industrialisation means his 
theory is unable to explain anything that might be identified as nationalism prior to that 
era. However, what sets nationalism apart from the mere existence of distinct human 
groups, is the link between the human group and possession of a modem state in the 
name of that human group, even if such a human group needs to be encouraged into 
being by nationalists themselves. Thus we need go back no further than the Reformation, 
the development of the modem state and the emergence of a capitalist economy to see the 
rise of nationalism. Although states were crucially important in conditioning nationalist
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movements in the developing capitalist economies of western Europe and north America, 
the state alone cannot explain the rise of nationalism. Many of the dislocating effects that 
Gellner ascribes to industrialisation could just as equally be caused by the effects of the 
emergence of a global capitalist economy. In these novel social conditions, new forms of 
legitimacy had to be found for the exercise of power. As the uneven development of 
global capitalism was creating the conditions required for the development of national 
consciousness, elites presiding over existing states justified their rule in the new language 
of nationalism. For those elites excluded from the benefits of development, nationalism 
provided a justification for breaking free from the control of the “core” and establishing a 
state in the name of the nation. For both state-focused and secessionist nationalists, 
sovereignty became the crucial issue justifying their political actions. It was through 
legitimating the location of sovereignty, be it of the state or of the people, that 
nationalists movements developed their form and content.
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chapter 2
Britishness: Empire and Nation in Scotland, Australia 
and England
r I ^he ideology of Britishness was generated by the need to legitimate the multi- 
X  national British state and the possession of an extensive empire. The political 
tensions that the supporters of this state had to address in order to justify their rule, were 
crucial to the formation of an ideology that provided a focal point of allegiance for the 
diverse nationalities within the British Isles, plus the developing nationalisms in the 
colonies and Dominions. The United Kingdom was created out of the Union of two 
sovereign states, England and Scotland, in 1707. Britain, therefore, was created at the 
outset of the age of nationalism. In order to legitimate the sovereignty of this multi­
national state in the nationalist era, an ideology needed to be formulated that would 
command allegiance in all parts of the realm whilst allowing for the continuing autonomy 
of its constituent parts. Richard Rose has argued that the creation of the United Kingdom 
was ‘certainly not the product of a logical plan, nor is it the product of a particular 
ideology’ (Rose, 1982: 4). Rose is correct in that the United Kingdom was not the 
creation of a particular ideology, but a particular ideology was a product of the creation 
of the United Kingdom. As the newly formed British ruling class consolidated its 
position during the eighteenth century, an ideology of “Britishness” developed post facto 
in order to legitimise the new state in the face of possible threats from social and 
nationalist sources. Crucial to this overarching, imperial ideology was the sovereignty of 
the Crown-in-Parliament. Allegiance to the monarchy and the veneration of the system 
of government over which he or she presided allowed distinct nationalisms to develop 
under British rule, as long as loyalty was to king or queen first and country second. The 
historical and structural legacy of Britishness is important in understanding the source, 
content and politics of nationalism in Scotland, Australia and England in the 1990s. This 
chapter traces and analyses the origins and history of nationalism in Scotland, in- 
Australian, both settler and indigenous, and lastly in England, where nationalism and 
Britishness were the most merged.
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The Emergence of Nationalism in Britain
The conditions necessary for the emergence of nationalism outlined in the first chapter 
were present in parts of the British Isles, notably England and Lowland Scotland, prior to 
the creation of the British state in 1707. As a result of this early economic 
transformation, separate national identities existed that affected the ideology that was 
established in defence of the political settlements of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. From the Reformation until the Civil Wars of the 1640s, the 
population of England doubled, and despite generally lower living standards, agricultural 
production increased overall and was able to support this expanding number of 
inhabitants. Internal trade grew rapidly due to an absence of tolls on roads and rivers, 
giving England an advantage over other, rival European economies. Additionally, 
overseas trade increased dramatically from 1604, with the cloth trade being particularly 
important. Coal mining developed in Newcastle after 1540 and ‘became the first really 
large-scale bulk-producing industry in the western world’ (Stone, 1972: 68-70). Much of 
the economic growth was centred on London during this period and its economy grew 
significantly. By the time of the Civil Wars (1639-51), London virtually financed the 
Parliamentarian war effort alone.
Although Stone says it is difficult to argue for a clear-cut relationship between the 
economic developments and the collapse of the ancien regime in the British Isles, what 
can be said is that ‘these economic developments were dissolving old bonds of service 
and obligation and creating new relationships founded on the operations of the market, 
and that the domestic and foreign policies of the Stuarts were failing to respond to these 
changing circumstances’ (Stone, 1972: 72). In other words, social relationships between 
lord and tenant were governed not so much by medieval customary relations of service, 
but rather by the laws of the market place. At this time of change from the feudal to the 
capitalist mode of production, other forms of consciousness emerged to replace feudal 
contract, and it is from here that we can begin to date the emergence of nationalism and 
national consciousness within the British Isles.
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However, the mode of production alone is not sufficient to explain why 
nationalism in general developed into particular nationalisms or a particular national 
consciousness. At a popular level, the Protestant Reformation and the Break with Rome 
was given mass significance by the Marian Persecution of the 1550s, an event that would 
resonate in Protestant mythology down the centuries. The Reformation in Scotland was 
far more radical than in England and the emergence of Presbyterianism there, in contrast 
to the hierarchical structure of the Church of England, created an enduring distinction 
between Scotland and its southern neighbour. Greenfeld argues that ‘the dissident 
character of the Reformation and the congruence of Protestant theology accepted in 
England with values of rationalist individualism rendered Protestantism a perfect ally for 
the nascent national sentiment’ (Greenfeld, 1992: 65-6). However, rather than seeing 
Protestantism allied with an emerging nationalism, it is preferable to understand the two 
new concepts as emerging with each other. Given that the development of nationalisms 
here were amongst the first of their kind, nationalist concepts could only be approached 
through pre-existing ideologies and discourses, which in Europe was generally that of 
religion, and specifically in mainland Britain that of the Protestant Reformation.
Stone has highlighted the inability of the Tudor state to impose itself on pre­
existing medieval institutions such as Parliament. Having annexed the Church lands, the 
Crown squandered the wealth gained in a series of costly wars. But as long as the Tudors 
identified with Protestantism, they consolidated and legitimated their rule, securing both 
popular and elite support. In this manner, Stone portrayed Elizabeth I as the link between 
religion and nascent English nationalism. Tensions developed when this tacit link 
between monarchy and Protestantism was challenged in the seventeenth century, first by 
the reforms of Charles VI and I and Bishop Laud, and later by the overt Catholicism of 
James VII and II.
The Civil Wars began as a clash between two forms of authoritarianism, the one 
monarchical and the other parliamentarian, but became a war for religious liberty during 
the course of the conflict (Morrill, 1993: 394). Christopher Hill argues that the English 
Revolution, like all revolutions, was caused by the breakdown of the old social order, but
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was not actively brought about by the bourgeoisie or the Long Parliament. However, the 
outcome of the Revolution was the establishment of conditions far more favourable to the 
development of capitalism than those prior to 1640. This outcome, and the Revolution 
itself, were made possible because there had already been a considerable degree of 
capitalist development in England, and ‘it was the structures, fractures and pressures of 
the society, rather than the wishes of the leaders, which dictated the outbreak of 
revolution and shaped the state which emerged from it’ (Hill, 1980: 111). This 
breakdown in social order was something that the elites of the British Isles were anxious 
not to repeat. ‘The wealthy landed elite who headed the Revolution had vivid memories 
of how that last revolution against Royal tyranny and suspected popery had drifted out of 
control in 1641-47, and they were determined not to let this happen again. The last thing 
they wanted was a repetition of the mob violence and popular uprisings of 1641-49’ 
(Stone, 1980: 63). This, combined with the replacement of pre-capitalist social structures, 
required a new form of political consciousness to replace the now defunct Stewart system 
of Kingship. The first attempt to create a new and stable political order involved the 
restoration of the monarchy in 1660. When this settlement was endangered by James II 
between 1685-88, he was ousted from the throne.
The events of 1688 resolved the conflict over absolutist monarchy and 
parliamentary sovereignty in Parliament’s favour (Schwoerer, 1980: 227). The divine 
right of kings was rejected and was replaced with the indisputable sovereignty of the 
combined forces of the Crown, Lords and Commons. ‘In practice the constitution was at 
last made to work not only by the appeasement of the deep-seated conflicts of the 
previous century but also by the rise of oligarchy and a deliberate restriction of the role 
of government to that of passive maintenance of the status quo’ (Stone, 1980: 90). 
Socially, the events of the seventeenth century removed the main obstacles to the 
development of a three-tiered rural society consisting of landowners, substantial numbers 
of tenant lease-holders and landless labourers. The triumph of the merchant-aristocrats 
also facilitated the enormous development of overseas trade and the reorganisation of 
finances to fight recurrent wars with France and other imperial rivals. Borrowing from 
the Anderson-Naim thesis of the 1960s, we might conclude that revolutionary events of
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seventeenth century gave Britain the “least pure” of all bourgeois revolutions, that 
resulted in the bourgeoisie never having to challenge the intellectual basis of aristocracy 
(Anderson, 1992). Lawrence Stone added:
the mid-seventeenth-century attack on almost all aspects of the social and political 
order was unsuccessful because it was premature: it lacked solid material or 
ideological support in what was basically an agrarian and strongly hierarchical 
society. Most of the schemes adumbrated at that time were peacefully implemented 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, since by then the social structure 
and ideological framework had evolved to the point where the reforms coincided 
with the aspirations and interests of the dominant classes (Stone, 1980: 62).
Crown, Parliament and Nation
The most important starting point for understanding of the ideology of Britishness is the 
defence of the settlement of 1688-1707. In order to legitimate the new British ruling 
class, an ideology was developed that justified the continuing exercise of power from the 
British parliament at Westminster, but that also allowed for the continuing autonomy of 
pre-existing national communities. The popular sovereignty of the constituent nations 
was rejected by the ruling class and the sovereignty of the Crown-in-Parliament was 
promoted in its place. Notions of Britishness were created around attempts to legitimate 
this political alliance between the royal dynasty and the supporters of Parliament’s landed 
oligarchs in the new language of nationalism. It was the monarchy, the visible symbol of 
Westminster sovereignty, that ultimately became the focal point of popular allegiance, 
allowing national differences to be mediated through loyalty to the Crown.
In one sense, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 represented the decisive victory of 
a landed aristocracy over absolute monarchical power, a victory that was expressed in the 
novel location of shared political power and sovereignty in the Crown-in-Parliament. 
However, the succession of the Protestant Elector of Orange to the British throne was 
also a strategy that unified the variants of Protestantism in Britain under the Crown, 
whilst also securing the support of the Irish Ascendancy and Ulster Presbyterians. This
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Protestant supremacy was guaranteed in the Act of Settlement of 1701, and it was 
through Protestantism that this arrangement received the bulk of its popular support. In 
contrast, the settlement of 1707 was one in which the landed oligarchies of England and 
Scotland negotiated an incorporating Union, abolishing their respective Parliaments and 
creating a new, British Parliament in their place. This agreement was met with popular 
hostility or indifference. Nevertheless, the result was a unitary state, with political 
sovereignty vested in the Crown-in-Parliament at Westminster, albeit one in which 
Scotland maintained a high degree of autonomy. Monarchy and parliament became the 
focus for a developing British nationalism, providing a focal point of allegiance for the 
diverse nationalities of the British Isles and the Empire.
The timing of the Union is important in understanding the national consciousness 
that legitimated the state in years to come. As a result of the upheavals of the seventeenth 
century, Britain was an early-modern monarchical state, governed by an aristocratic elite. 
However, as capital accumulation and later industrialisation increased there was enough 
common ground between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie to form an alliance of 
common interest, centred on the state. These commonalties included defense and 
expansion of Empire, a degree of economic and political integration between these two 
classes, and as industrialisation progressed, a common political enemy in the working 
classes (Naim, 1981: 32). What is important about the timing of the creation of the 
British state in relation to economic development, is that the state was never obliged to 
impose itself upon civil society in order to foster development to the same extent as other 
states that followed in its wake were (Naim, 1981: 19). Economic development in 
Britain preceded, or went hand-in-hand with the rise of nationalism, rather than being the 
means by which such development was introduced by peripheral elites. As the 
development of industry gave Britain an enormous preponderance of economic and naval 
power from the late eighteenth century onwards, Britishness coalesced around the 
defence of those imperial interests and the political solution of 1688-1707 that governed 
at its core.
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Therefore, Ernest Gellner’s political definition of nationalism outlined in Chapter 
One, that nationalism is a political demand, and what it demands is the creation of a 
nation-state, needs to be qualified in the case of Britain. Gellner’s analyses of the origins 
of nationalism is strong on the creation of nation-states from former empires, but weaker 
when examining the ways in which nations or states are maintained through the 
hegemony of certain forms of national consciousness. In contrast to Gellner, it is argued 
here that imperialism and nationalism are not necessarily opposed to each other, but 
imperial and national discourses and consciousness may feed into each other. The 
processes of imperial and commercial expansion, industrialisation and nationalism are 
closely intertwined. Arguably, these processes, that caused the expansion of empire- 
states such as Britain, also engendered nationalism, clearly a threat to the legitimacy of 
such an imperial state. This led Britain, along with other European imperial states, to 
adopt what Benedict Anderson calls ‘official nationalism’, as a means of self­
legitimation. Anderson writes:
the fundamental legitimacy for most of these dynasties had nothing to do with 
nationalness. Romanovs ruled over Tartars and Letts, Germans and Armenians, 
Russians and Finns. Habsburgs were perched high over Magyars and Croats, Slovaks 
and Italians, Ukranians and Austro-Germans. Hanoverians presided over Bengalis 
and Quebecois, as well as Scots and Irish, English and Welsh. On the continent, 
furthermore, members of the same dynastic families often ruled in different, 
sometimes rivalrous states. What nationality should be assigned to Bourbons ruling 
in France and Spain, Hohenzollems in Prussia and Romania, Wittelsbachs in Bavaria 
and Greece? (Anderson, 1991: 83)
Responding to the growing threat to imperial legitimacy posed by the nationalist 
principle of “one nation, one state”, such imperial regimes sought to protect their 
interests and territorial integrity by appealing to their subjects in the new language of 
nationalism. Therefore, it became necessary to encourage and develop a sense of 
Britishness amongst both imperial elites and subordinate classes that could bind together 
a multi-national state, and an overseas empire as well as legitimate domination of foreign
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lands and markets. However, whilst the British state was created in 1707, with Ireland 
added in 1801, a sense of “British” consciousness was slow to emerge. When it did 
emerge, it was not so much a consciousness that completely submerged those 
identifications that preceded and developed alongside it, but certain previous forms of 
identification were permitted to continue and influence the expressions of Britishness 
(Colley, 1992: 17). Based on the argument that the British state rested lightly on the 
institutions of civil society (Naim 1981; Rose 1982), Linda Colley argued that British 
national identity complimented these pre-existing forms of identification and loyalty 
without completely over-riding them. Many of the institutions of the non-English 
nationalities within Britain such as language, religion and law could not be entirely or 
effectively brought into line with English models. English dominance could not be 
translated into a homogeneity promoted by the British state, not least because institutions 
such as Scottish law and the Kirk had been given constitutional protection in the Acts of 
Union of 1707. What did happen was the growth of certain ideological discourses 
around which a common sense of ‘Britishness’ emerged. Thus Colley has rejected the 
notion that British identity emerged as a blending of all the different cultures within the 
British Isles. Rather a sense of “Britishness” emerged around broad themes such as 
Protestantism, empire and war with imperial rivals (Colley, 1992). It was this last 
explanation, particularly war against Bourbon and Revolutionary France that Colley 
emphasised:
Time and time again, war with France brought Britons, whether they hailed from 
Wales, Scotland or England into confrontation with an obviously hostile Other and 
encouraged them to define themselves collectively against it. They defined 
themselves as Protestants struggling against the world’s foremost Catholic power. 
They defined themselves against the French as they imagined them to be, 
superstitious, decadent, militarist and unfree. And, increasingly as the wars went on, 
they defined themselves in contrast to the colonial peoples they conquered, peoples 
who were manifestly alien in terms of culture, religion and colour. (Colley, 1992: 5).
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For Colley, Britishness was formed out of an oppositional consciousness, against a 
Catholic enemy uniting the disparate British Protestants in a way that internal pressures 
alone could not. The focus in Colley’s thesis is on the manner in which different strata in 
British society all benefited in some way from being loyal to the established state and 
promoting or supporting a specifically British patriotism. However, the basis of this 
nationalism developing around anti-Catholicism, war with France and imperial expansion 
-  all mediated through the institution of the Crown-in-Parliament -  had been founded in 
the Settlement of 1688-1707. As the British ruling classes confronted new challenges 
from a politicised working class movement and a developing Irish separatism from the 
first half of the nineteenth century onwards, its response also conditioned the ideology of 
Britishness.
Rather than attempt to establish a common “national” culture at the level of civil 
society, the supporters of the British state were content to let the institutions of its 
constituent territories be. In this regard, it came to be regarded as something of a 
‘nightwatchman state’ (McCrone, 1997: 585). This over-arching state resting lightly on 
top of Britain’s constituent nations proved a useful model for control over the colonies 
and later maintaining a workable sense of Britishness throughout the “white” Dominions. 
Thus it would be possible to claim a dual identity that was British and Scottish and 
British and Welsh or British and Australian without any clash of aspirations or ideals. 
Only the English, closest to the centre of economic, financial and cultural power, 
articulating their own nationalism in terms of the state and its empire, would be able to 
discern little difference between the categories of English and British.
Crucial to the development of Britishness was the post facto creation of an 
ideology justifying the events of 1688-1707 and the resulting system of governance. This 
task was given particular urgency by the revolutionary events in France from 1789 
onwards and this urgency was sustained throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries by imperial expansion, international conflict and the growing role of 
subordinate social classes in political life. Edmund Burke provided one of the most 
cogent expressions of this ideology in 1790 in his Reflections on the Revolution in
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France. Burke, rejecting some of his earlier critiques of the British system, maintained 
that the best vindication of the British system was its evolutionary nature and apparent 
continuity. Its seeming (though illusory) absence of ideology meant, according to Burke, 
that the governance of Britain avoided the danger of being ‘entangled in the mazes of 
metaphysical sophistry’ that were beginning to emerge in revolutionary France (Burke, 
1979 [1790]: 105). Dating the emergence of this system from the Glorious Revolution, 
Burke argued that ‘the Revolution [of 1688] was made to preserve our ancient and 
indisputable laws and liberties, and that ancient constitution of government which is our 
only security for law and liberty’ (Burke, 1979 [1790]: 117). These “ancient liberties” 
were concepts that had been appropriated from English radicalism of the 1640s and were 
now, according to this emerging discourse, guaranteed by the British system of 
constitutional monarchy that had emerged from the end of the eighteenth century 
onwards.
Walter Bagehot gave the ideology of Britishness further expression in The 
English Constitution, first published in 1867. Bagehot, writing at the time of the Second 
Reform Bill, argued that a constitutional monarchy, with power residing in the Crown-in- 
Parliament, was the best form of government for ‘the vacant many’ as it was the most 
easily comprehensible of all forms of government (Bagehot, 1936 [1867]: 34). The 
Constitution was comprised of two parts, the ‘effective’, which was the machinery of 
Parliament and responsible government, and the ‘dignified’, that was represented by the 
awe-inspiring splendor of the Monarchy and aristocracy. Thus Bagehot combined 
Burke’s “ancient liberties” with an explicit justification of patrician control of the system 
of governance, adapting the British system to the political conditions and tensions 
surrounding the extension of the vote to the middle and lower classes.
John Stuart Mill was also concerned with the workings of representative 
government during the 1860s. Mill reflected the imperial, “British” nature of 
governance, stressing allegiance to the state over that of nationality. For Mill, nationality 
was a necessary underpinning for free institutions, but nationality was best defined not by 
language, religion or law, but by ‘a considerable amount of common political
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antecedents’ (Mill, 1926: 360). He also had a salutary warning to non-state nationalists 
as to where their loyalties should lie:
Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French 
Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilised 
and cultivated people - to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal 
terms to all the advantages of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French 
protection, and the dignity and prestige of French power - than to sulk on his own 
rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, 
without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same 
remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British 
nation. (Mill, 1926: 363-4).
Britishness avoided the notion of popular sovereignty, or loyalty being given to 
the people rather than the state. This notion, as Rowley points out, was problematic when 
governing a multi-national empire (Rowley, 2000: 32). Recognising the sovereignty of 
the people implied recognising multiple locations of sovereignty throughout the empire, 
potentially de-legitimising the rule of the imperial state itself. In order to legitimate 
itself in the age of nationalism, the monarchical British state was forced to adopt the 
language of nationalism despite being an empire. To unite a disparate Empire and 
manage the emerging nationalism in the dominions, it was the ‘dignified’ part of 
Britishness, the monarchy, that was reinvented as the central institution. David 
Cannadine has demonstrated how the British monarchy became a cipher for British 
greatness during the charged international atmosphere from the late nineteenth century to 
the end of the Second World War (Cannadine, 1983). The monarchy however also 
provided a much more personal form of legitimation for the Empire. A. J. Balfour wrote 
to Edward VII shortly after the death of Queen Victoria that ‘the King is no longer 
merely the king of Great Britain and Ireland... he is now the greatest constitutional bond 
uniting together in a single empire communities of free men separated by half the 
circumference of the globe’ (quoted in Bogdanor, 1995: 40). This role of the Monarchy 
became all the more apparent during the abdication crisis of 1936. The Secretary of State
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for Dominion Affairs cabled the both Governor-General of Australia and the UK High 
Commissioner in Canberra on 11 December 1936 with a transcript of Stanley Baldwin’s 
speech in Commons, that was read out in the Australian Parliament:
The British Monarchy is a unique institution. The Crown in this country has through 
the centuries been deprived of many of its prerogatives, but today, while that is true, it 
stands for far more than it ever has done before in its history. The importance of its 
integrity is beyond all question far greater than it has ever been, being as it is not only 
the last link of the Empire that is left but the guarantee in this country so long as it 
exists in that integrity against the many evils that have affected and afflicted other 
countries (National Archives of Australia: CP4/10, 1).
The monarchy was promoted as both the embodiment of the Whig version of history that 
had developed since 1688, whilst also remaining the symbol of a stable, conservative and 
British social order. It was these narratives that affected the language and content of the 
nationalisms developing within this imperial context.
It is important, however, not to treat the development of such imperial-national 
discourse in isolation, but rather in the context of interaction between the colonial and 
metropolitan parts of the Empire. Concepts such as race, nation and empire were all 
closely bound up in Anglo-British discourse. Empire provided the British and colonial 
subjects of the Crown with an experience by which they could interpret their 
commonalties when compared to people of other “races”, who were coming increasingly 
under their control. Justifications for the extension of imperial rule were drawn from the 
supposed benefits of the extension of the Westminster-model of government for the 
colonisers and colonised alike. According to Charles Dilke, touring the empire during 
the 1860s, the imperial experience provided ‘that element of vastness of dominion which, 
in this age, is needed to secure width of thought and nobility of purpose,’ as well as 
offering the ‘possibility of planting free institutions among the dark skinned nations of 
the world’ (Dilke, 1869b: 407). This belief in the perfection of the institutions of 
governance was crucial in the justification for governing other people, whether the lower 
classes of Britons or subordinate colonial populations in the Empire. Such a mythology
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of governance allowed power to be devolved to the “white” colonies and dominions 
peopled by those of “British stock”, whilst also allowing those same colonies to pursue 
sub-imperialisms of their own ‘as a trust for civilisation’ (Kidd, 1898: 58).
Empire and the “white” colonies in particular, played an important part in this 
racial ideology of governance and control. The dominions were seen as vital to the 
preservation of the race-nation, those of “British stock”, whose physical condition was 
feared to be declining in the crowded and polluted cities of industrial Britain. The 
colonies provided a source of hope to those who aimed at regenerating the vitality of the 
populace from Britain’s crowded industrial cities. English academic, J.A. Froude, visited 
Australia and other parts of ‘Oceana’ in 1885 and left with the conviction that ‘the life of 
a nation, like the life of a tree, is in its extremities’ (Froude, 1886: 387). Froude 
countered the growing argument about the financial burden of the Empire to the British 
Treasury, by arguing that it was these transplanted Britons who were the only people 
who could prevent the decline of the British race-nation and enable it to continue 
competing with other European empires. If the Empire were sloughed off, dire 
consequences for the British, at ‘home’ and in the colonies, would follow. ‘Still less 
would the race hereafter to grow there maintain either the strength of limb or the energy 
of heart which raised their fathers to the lofty eminence which they achieved and 
bequeathed’ (Froude, 1886: 386).
The British state then, was created as a unitary entity, albeit based on multi-state 
origins, with interests in a large, overseas empire. Its economic strength derived from its 
early capitalist and industrial development. Britain maintained this dominance as an 
industrial and imperial power until the end of the nineteenth century. However, 
nationalist and revolutionary movements were a constant threat to European imperial 
states, and Britain was no exception. The British ruling class attempted to legitimate 
itself by encouraging a sense of “British” identity, based around the sovereignty of the 
Crown-in-Parliament. In this regard it was successful for a long time. It was in this 
context that the different nationalisms within Britain and Australia developed.
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Autonomy, Britishness and Scottish Nationalism
Crucial to understanding Scottish nationalism and Scottish nationalists’ attitude to the 
Union with England is the concept of “autonomy”. Scottish participation in the Union 
was predicated on the continuing exercise of a great deal of autonomy by the middle 
classes in the running of Scotland’s domestic affairs. As long as this autonomy, 
embodied in the Treaty of Union, was unchallenged by Westminster, Scotland’s position 
in the United Kingdom was not in doubt. This autonomy was preserved from 1707 in the 
institutions of civil society and the machinery of local government. Furthermore, this 
autonomy affected the character and expression of Britishness through Scottish 
participation in the imperial project, not so much as a “junior partner” but as one of its 
foremost proponents. Separatism did not become a feature of Scottish nationalism until 
the late 1960s, when Britain’s declining position as an industrial power and the 
encroaching powers of central government precipitated a shift in the attitude of Scottish 
nationalists toward the Union.
In order to consolidate his position in his new realm, William III commenced on a 
centralising drive in the British Isles from 1689, most notably in Ireland, but also in 
Scotland. William’s agenda was resisted by the Scottish Parliament, which passed acts 
aiming to secure its independence of action, and Anglo-Scottish tensions increased 
around the turn of the eighteenth century. However, a series of poor harvests at the end 
of the seventeenth century and threats to trade and Scottish estates in England 
compounded the failure of Scotland’s own attempt at a colonial empire in Central 
America, weakening the hand of those in Scotland who resisted Union with the English 
parliament. Although popular anti-Union sentiment was focussed around the issue of 
sovereignty, it was the proponents of an economic argument in favour of Union who 
were eventually successful in the parliamentary manoeuvering over this issue. The 
temptation to bring wealth into Scotland by joining in a tariff free union with England 
was too great for some powerful Scottish lairds, despite deep divisions within the Scottish 
community aroused by the idea of an incorporating Union. Arguably, the ruling elite in 
Scotland saw Union as a way of aggrandising their estates and incomes. Article XV  of 
the Treaty made provision for the payment of GBP398,085/1 Os to the Scottish treasury in
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order to compensate for the assumption of English debt. However, such economic 
concerns were more the bargain driven by the Scottish ruling classes for the loss of 
sovereignty than the central issue itself. The main issue, argues Davies was that of 
sovereignty. Once the Scottish elites had conceded that Scottish sovereignty could no 
longer exist as it had under the Union of Crowns, they became determined to drive the 
hardest economic bargain possible. This was a price that the English ruling classes were 
willing to pay for security in the north and the removal of cross-border tariffs (Davies, 
1999: 590-1).
At Westminster, the Act of Union received Royal Assent almost unnoticed, but 
the situation was different north of the Border. Scotland witnessed scenes of civil 
disorder during the parliamentary debates on Union. Daniel Defoe, reporting to the 
English government from Edinburgh during the debates, described the situation on the 
evening of 26 October 1706 to a correspondent in England:
I had not been Long There, but I heard a Great Noise and looking out saw a Terrible 
Multitude Come up the High street with A Drum at the head of Them shouting and 
swearing and Cryeing Out all Scotland would stand together, No Union, No Union, 
English dogs, and the like’ (Healey (ed.), 1955: 13).
As a result of his stay, Defoe concluded, ‘There is an Entire Harmony in this Country 
Consisting in Universal Discords’ (Healey (ed.), 1955: 136). Resistance to the Union 
not only formed around political sovereignty, but religious sovereignty too. Presbyterian 
ministers declared against the Union as they resented the presence of twenty-six bishops 
in the House of Lords, whilst the division between the Scottish community and its rulers 
was illustrated when a riot broke out in Glasgow following the Provost’s refusal to sign 
an anti-Union address from the burgh. Nevertheless, the Treaty was eventually passed by 
the Scottish Parliament and that body joined in an incorporating union with the 
Parliament at Westminster, thereby voting itself out of existence.
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The notion that the landed elites had been bought off or bribed quickly established 
itself in popular memory and was recorded in verse at the end of the eighteenth century 
by Robert Bums:
O would, or had I seen the day 
That treason thus could sell us,
My auld grey head had lein in clay,
Wi’ Bruce and loyal Wallace!
But pith and power, till my last hour,
I’ll mak this declaration:-
We’re bought and sold for English gold -
Such a parcel of rogues in a nation
(quoted in Calder and Donnelly, 1991: 65)
Sir Walter Scott commented on this historical tradition when he described popular 
attitudes to the Act of Union:
the nation, instead of regarding [the Union] as an identification of the interests of both 
kingdoms, considered it a total surrender of their independence, by their false and 
corrupted statesman, into the hand of their proud and powerful rival (Scott, 1997: 64).
However, we should be wary of such interpretations of the past that are at pains to 
portray the majority of Scots’ sense of well-being and national pride being continually 
offended by the Union of 1707. The social, political and economic events of the two 
centuries preceding 1707 had indeed created a distinct aristocratic patriotism and a 
religious-cum-national consciousness in Scotland as well as in England. Recurrent wars 
with England, from the Wars of Independence at the turn of the fourteenth century, to the 
‘Rough Wooing’ of the 1540s, to the Reformation and Civil Wars of the seventeenth 
century, provided a rich fund of myth and history from which the first (and later) Scottish 
nationalists could draw salutary tales. But whilst a good deal of popular anti-Englishness 
was apparent, this was not sufficient to prevent the Union of 1707. As noted, Walter
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Scott regarded the Union ‘as an identification of the interests of both kingdoms’. Scott 
was on the whole very favourably disposed to the Union, despite some of the romantic, 
nationalistic tone of his novels. Sir Walter Scott was a “Scottish nationalist”, however, in 
the sense that he believed that Scotland’s best interests were served by being part of 
Britain and its expanding empire. What Scott was concerned to protect within the 
structure of the Union was what he called Scotland’s ‘Silent Way’ (Naim, 1997: 194): 
that is to say, the relative autonomy from London, that characterised much of Scotland’s 
relationships with the other parts of Britain, but especially the central government in 
Westminster. Neil Davidson has argued that the Scots (through their ruling classes) not 
only retained their previous identity within the Union, but were also most insistent on 
integration (Davidson 2000: 78). According to Lindsay Paterson, ‘Scotland has been 
autonomous for most of the three centuries since the Union -  not a fully independent 
state, of course, but far more than a mere province. It has been at least as autonomous as 
other small European nations, for which the reality of politics has always been the 
negotiation of partial independence amid the rivalry of great powers’ (Patterson, 1994: 4). 
Following the Act of Union in 1707, effective power in Scotland rested at the local level 
with the royal burghs, parishes, sheriffs and commissioners of supply (Paterson, 1994: 
35). Scotland retained not only its own legal and education systems, but maintained a 
great deal of autonomy in religious matters and a distinctive form of local government 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This local autonomy was itself guaranteed 
by the Act of Union. Thus autonomy and incorporation existed side-by-side, helping to 
create a Scottish consciousness that was distinct from Britishness, but contributed 
significantly to the supra-national form that Britishness was obliged to take.
But it was not only this residual Scottish autonomy within the British state that 
explained the absence of separatist nationalism in Scotland until relatively recently. If we 
were to follow Gellner’s framework for the emergence of nationalism, then Scotland 
would appear to have many of the conditions necessary for the development of a 
secessionist nationalism -  a recent history of political independence, a distinctive religion 
and a history easily plundered for independence struggles. However, according to Tom 
Naim (1981), rather than feeling excluded from the benefits of this industrial
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development, the group most likely to express dissatisfaction in national terms -  the 
Scottish middle classes -  were actually benefiting from the political and economic 
structure of the British state. Thus, rather than having to forge an alliance with the 
masses against the aristocracy in order to gain political and economic power, the middle 
classes in Scotland were better off maintaining an alliance with Britain’s ruling classes 
and supporting the British state.
Nevertheless, it was all too easy for nationalists and even committed Unionists to 
represent the events of 1707 as loss of “Scottish independence”. As Norman Davies 
noted, from 1707 until 1999, the Scottish Government did not exist, ‘except as a regional 
department of a central administration in London’ (Davies, 1999: 524). However, that is 
not to say that a distinctive state apparatus in Scotland also ceased to exist. It is this 
bureaucratic continuity as much as the preservation of distinct institutions of Scottish 
society (Scottish law, Scottish education and the Kirk) that explains persistence and 
development of Scottish consciousness within a British state structure. It should be 
noted, however, that Scottish consciousness was not static. It was a dynamic and shifting 
entity that influenced, and was influenced by, the demands of British nationalism. Thus 
Scottish national consciousness developed with a British context, whilst influencing the 
character of Britishness at the same time. Davidson concludes that:
British national consciousness (as opposed to the British state) did not have a separate 
existence that the Scots refused to embrace until the Empire made it profitable to do 
so. In fact, it was Scottish participation in the Empire that helped bring the British 
nation into being’ (Davidson 2000: 113).
In 1707, however, the content of Scottishness was problematic. Davidson writes that at 
the time of Union, ‘the name of Scotland concealed the existence of two regions whose 
inhabitants had been antagonistic to each other for centuries. With neither region able to 
agree that the other was Scottish, how liable were they to subsume themselves jointly into 
a new British national identity?’ (Davidson, 2000: 75). The incorporation and destruction 
of the Highland clan system became an essential act for the Scottish bourgeoisie, as they,
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with the support of the British state, subdued the threat posed by the clan allegiances of 
Highland society and turned the Highlands into a more profitable, pastoral region. This 
economic development and political incorporation was pursued particularly through the 
Clearances, between the 1760s and 1860s, and the introduction of sheep farming in the 
Highland regions. Unlike England, where the bourgeois revolution was a pre-condition 
for the development of nationalism, in Scotland nationalism and the Union were crucial 
ingredients in the completion of the bourgeois revolution and its extension into the 
Highlands. At the same time, the newly subdued Highlands began to play a role in 
defining a Scottish consciousness emerging despite, and within, the context of a British 
consciousness. It was the royal visit to Edinburgh in 1822, orchestrated by Scott himself, 
that popularised a distant Monarch and appropriated a romanticised Highland dress to 
express and represent Scottish distinctiveness (Trevor-Roper, 1983).
However, it was not only Highland dress, but also Highland martial traditions that 
were appropriated into the British imperial project. One result of the destruction of 
Highland society was the incorporation of large numbers of Highlanders into the British 
military, particularly the army, where they were organised into separate and highly 
distinctive regiments. These regiments, comprised in Pitt the Elder’s words of ‘a hardy 
and intrepid race of men’ (quoted in Trevor-Roper, 1983: 25), were stationed and fought 
throughout the Empire. “Highlandism” proved a crucial link in creating a cohesive 
Scottish identity out of the division between the economically developed Lowlands and 
the less developed Highlands, as well as cementing ties between England and Scotland in 
the imperial mission and within the Union. The success of the Highland regiments was 
such, that during the latter half of the nineteenth century all Scottish infantry regiments 
were clothed in some form of tartan. Military service became an important aspect of 
Scotland’s relation with the British state. Scottish enthusiasm for service in Word War I 
was revealed by initial recruitment figures for Scotland, that were disproportionately high 
(the Army even dropped height restrictions and allowed “bantam battalions” for short, 
but tough, Glaswegians). Twenty-two out of the 157 battalions of the British 
Expeditionary Force in 1914 were Scottish and about one-sixth of the first two hundred 
thousand New Army recruits were Scottish (Harvie, 1993: 11). At the end of the conflict,
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the National War Memorial White Paper (1920) estimated a total of almost 100,000 
Scottish dead, or 13 per cent of all British casualties during the Great War (Harvie, 1993: 
24).
The imperial outlet for Scottish talents and investments was crucial in the 
development of Scottish and British national consciousness. The Empire opened up vast 
markets for Scottish capital. The Scottish economy between 1870 and 1950 was more 
intensely committed to heavy industries such as coal mining and ship building than any 
other region of the United Kingdom. In 1913, Scotland produced one-third of British 
shipping tonnage and one-fifth of the world’s shipping tonnage alone (Payne, 1996: 16). 
This Scottish involvement in Empire, both in trade and personnel, led Davidson to reject 
the notion that Scotland was a “junior partner” in the Empire, saying that often it was 
Scots who were at the forefront of imperial expansion (Davidson 2000: 106).
With the Scottish bourgeoisie doing so well out of access to imperial trade and 
with Scottish middle classes heavily involved in the running and governing of that 
Empire, Scottish nationalism took a divergent path when compared with the Gellnerian 
model of nationalist development. After the defeat of Jacobitism in 1746, the Scottish 
middle classes were content with the “Silent Way”. Scottish interests became identified 
with support of British state. The National Association for the Vindication of Scottish 
Rights (NAVSR) existed between 1853 and 1856, and possessed a bourgeois base and 
employed romantic rhetoric. What differentiated it from other European and American 
separatist movements was the absence of a demand for independence. For the NAVSR it 
was the “centralising” tendencies of the British government that were taken to be a 
breach of the Treaty of Union. Thus the NAVSR did not reject the Union, but sought to 
make it work better ( Morton, 1996: 264). Thus when Britain’s interests were seen to be 
under threat, the NAVSR threw its support behind the state. The Association suspended 
itself on the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854 and was disbanded by 1856. Other 
manifestations of Scottish nationalism were also closely linked to Britishness and a 
celebration of British virtues. Ex-Chartist John McAdam was prominent in the campaign 
to establish a memorial to William Wallace in Stirling during the 1860s. This campaign
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was linked with support for nationalist movements in Hungary and Italy that were seen as 
encouraging the kind of liberties already enjoyed by Protestant Britons. John McCaffrey 
argued that, ‘Those who now dominated Scottish life... attributed their social and 
political emancipation to the Union with England, and their political loyalty was to the 
British institutions that had given them Reform in 1832, not to the feudal institutions of 
the Scottish past. Nevertheless, they did not want their particular mixture of social and 
cultural values to be taken for granted’ (McCaffrey, 1998: 59). As long as those values 
and that social position were respected, the Union was supported in Scotland.
As with militarism, the Protestant connection provided another route for Scots to 
participate in the imperial mission, particularly as educators, explorers and evangelists 
(Walker, 1996: 249-51). However, the Church of Scotland provided an important 
element of governance in post-Union Scotland. The role of the Kirk as the unofficial 
forum for “national” affairs in Scotland gave a particular Presbyterian and popular tone to 
Scottish consciousness for much of the period of the Union. The split in the Kirk during 
the Disruption of 1841-43 did weaken the capacity of the established Church to speak for 
the nation, particularly on matters of education, but Scotland’s popular culture remained 
overwhelmingly Protestant (Devine, 1999: 291). Upon the re-unification of the divided 
Scottish churches in 1929, the Moderator of the United Free Church, Principal Alexander 
Martin, said in the ceremonies celebrating unification that: ‘No one who knew their 
Scottish history would deny that the Church had fulfilled many a noble public service in 
the past. It had been on the floor of the General Assemblies rather than in the corrupt 
estates that the battle of the Scottish people for freedom had been won’ (quoted in 
Walker, 1996: 255). But “freedom” in this sense meant not independence, but the 
continuation of Church autonomy, initially gained in 1707. In fact was debates about 
government interference from London that had finally caused the established Church to 
split in 1843. However, Protestantism not only became the vehicle for the defence of 
Scottish autonomy, but also fed into anti-Irish and anti-immigrant sentiment as the 
nineteenth century wore on. Protestant voices were heard complaining that the rush of 
Irish migrants into the west of Scotland from famine-ravaged and land-hungry Ireland, 
was equivalent to “Popery” re-colonising Scotland (Devine, 1999: 492). Orangism
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became a feature of Scottish life during the Home Rule debates of the 1910s and as a 
result of the alliance between the Conservatives and the Liberal Unionists in 1912. 
During the inter-War years, Protestant political organisation became yet more 
conspicuous with the formation of the Scottish Protestant League in Glasgow and 
Protestant Action in Edinburgh in the 1920s. Andrew Dewar Gibb, Regius Professor of 
Private Law at Glasgow University, gave some respectability to anti-Catholic attitudes 
during this period. He wrote on the issue of Irish immigration to Glasgow that ‘in the 
heart of a dwindling though virile and intelligent race there is growing up another people, 
immeasurably inferior in every way, but cohesive and solid, refusing obstinately, at the 
behest of obscurantist magic-men, to mingle with the people whose land they are 
usurping’ (quoted in Mayer, 1996: 276).
Debates about home rule highlighted the role of Protestantism in Scotland as well 
as Scotland’s place within the British state. Conservative support for Unionism (and 
hence Orangism) became the issue by which the Conservative and Unionist Party 
appealed to working class Protestants and maintained Scottish support for the Union with 
England. However, it would be wrong to see Scottish home rule as merely an adjunct to 
questions of Irish home rule, even if that was how the Liberal Party approached the 
problem in Westminster (Finlay, 1996: 72). The idea of some means of scrutiny of the 
developing administrative apparatus in Scotland by elected representatives was initially 
advocated by the Liberals and the nascent labour movement, and linked to the radical, 
reformist agenda. The Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) was formed in 1886 in 
the wake of the Irish home rule debates. The question of home rule grew in prominence 
between 1886 and 1906 when the Conservative Party ruled the United Kingdom, but 
Scotland was staunchly Liberal and Radical in its political complexion. In a speech 
during the Mid Lanarkshire by-election in 1888, Keir Hardie of the nascent Scottish 
Labour Party argued that ‘until we have a parliament of our own, we cannot obtain the 
many great reforms on which I believe the people of Scotland have set their hearts’ 
(Scottish Labour, 1997: 3). The demand for home rule was adopted by Scottish radicals 
as social reform became an issue and the notion that the House of Lords was blocking 
specific Scottish legislation, such as temperance acts and the Children Act of 1910. From
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the 1920s the pressure for home rule was maintained by the SHRA. In 1923 the SHRA 
advocated devolution of powers to a Scottish assembly. The idea of home rule developed 
mass support immediately after the Second World War and was expressed in the Scottish 
Covenant, a petition for home rule, eventually attracting over two million signatures 
between 1945 and 1949 (Lynch, 1992: 443). The Covenant asked its signatories to 
‘pledge ourselves in all loyalty to the Crown and within the framework of the United 
Kingdom, to do everything in our power to secure for Scotland a Parliament with 
adequate legislative authority in Scottish affairs’ (quoted in Devine, 1996: 6). However, 
neither of the major parties appeared particularly interested in Scottish home rule. 
Centralisation, nationalisation and Keynsian economics did not sit comfortably with the 
concept of devolution. The Labour Party under Clement Atlee did not implement home 
rule between 1945-51 and the British party declared itself to be opposed to home rule in 
1956, with Scottish Labour following in 1959. For most of the post-War years, the 
Conservative Party also remained opposed to home rule and Devine concluded that ‘there 
was no evidence that [home rule] could be regarded as an essential political aspiration to 
which people were strongly committed’ (Devine, 1996: 7).
The home rule issue did not really resume its prominence in Scottish politics until 
the end of the 1960s, pushed along by the development of the separatist nationalism of 
the Scottish National Party. A distinct, secessionist dimension to Scottish consciousness 
began to emerge in the inter-War years. In the 1920s, Scottish nationalism was 
dominated by the Left and was associated with republicanism and socialism, but by the 
1930s was making an appearance in middle class constituencies (Finlay, 1996). The 
National Party of Scotland was formed in 1928 as a break-away section of the Labour 
Party over disagreements about the commitment to home rule. The right-of-centre 
Scottish National Party emerged in 1932 during the Great Depression, and the two parties 
merged to form the modem Scottish National Party (SNP) in 1934. Despite some 
fleeting electoral success in 1945, it was not until 1968 that the SNP returned a member 
to Westminster. In contrast to Gellner’s theory of the development of nationalism, 
separatism in Scotland gained in popularity at the same time as Scottish industry declined 
rather than as it rose. As James Mitchell has noted, ‘Britain’s great appeal to Scots
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existed so long as it delivered’ (Mitchell, 1996: 94). However, by the 1960s, Scotland’s 
position as an industrial nation was less certain. These economic transformations were 
important in the development of nationalist arguments concerning both home rule and 
separatism, but again the ultimate emphasis was on the threat to Scotland’s autonomy 
within the United Kingdom. In the view of the SNP, this autonomy was particularly 
threatened during the twentieth century, ‘assisted and accelerated by two major wars, by 
the growth of company capitalism and, latterly, by the development of so-called state- 
socialism. Rationalisation and nationalisation have been almost equally effective in 
securing the control of Scotland’s economy by a non-elected English majority’ (Scottish 
National Party, 1962: 3). Eight years later, the separatists were arguing that:
In recent years the fabric of Scotland has been openly under deliberate attack. There 
has been no physical coercion, but centralisation has accelerated erosion of 
responsibility on all distinctive fronts of national life and endeavour, as the process of 
assimilation has been vigorously pursued (Scottish National Party, 1970).
In 1970 the SNP issued a Declaration o f Nationhood on Behalf o f the People o f Scotland, 
claiming independence ‘in the historic name of Scotland, a small nation whose world 
reputation in proven deeds and contribution to the progress and betterment of mankind is 
universally recognised’ (Scottish National Party, 1970). However, unlike the narrative of 
Britishness, the foundational myth of this historiography is not the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688-89 or the Treaty of Union of 1707, but the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320, 
issued during the fourteenth century Wars of Independence against the English Crown. 
The Declaration, was in fact an approach to the Pope by Scottish nobles attempting to 
block the inclusion of Scotland within the diocese of York. It later became a rallying cry 
for Scottish nationalists. The 1970 Declaration incorporated the word of its medieval 
predecessor:
Today we re-affirm our nationhood in the words and spirit of the Declaration of 
Arbroath, proclaimed 650 years ago and recognised as one of the world’s greatest 
expressions of freedom -  ‘We fight not for glory or wealth or honours, but only and
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alone we fight for Freedom, which no honest man surrenders but with his life... We 
desire no more than is our own, and no dwelling place beyond our borders; and we on 
our part, for the sake of peace, are willing to do all within our power’ (Scottish 
National Party, 1970).
By the 1970s, the separatists were making headway in Scottish opinion, peaking 
with eleven members returned to Westminster in 1974. The major political parties were 
forced to respond.. Ted Heath, leader of the opposition Conservative Party, first picked 
up the home rule issue in 1968. Heath proposed an elected Scottish assembly in his 
‘Declaration of Perth’, although the idea was dropped when the Conservatives came to 
power in 1970. By this time, the Labour Party’s position on devolution was equivocal 
and the issue divided the party membership. What support there was for devolution 
tended to be expressed as a necessary concession to Scottish nationalism in order to 
prevent the complete break-up of the United Kingdom. In 1976 the Scottish Trades 
Union Congress declared that ‘Workable devolution is, in the view of the STUC, the only 
way to silence the clamour for separation (Labour Party in Scotland, 1976: 1).
However, not all Labour members were won over by this argument, particularly at 
a time when centralised economic planning was still part of Labour Party policy. The 
devolution referendum was set for March 1979 by a Labour government with little room 
for political manoeuvre at Westminster. With Britain in the throes of economic unrest 
during the 1978-79 “Winter of Discontent”, constitutional reform appeared low on the 
Labour Party’s agenda. When the votes were counted after the 1 March referendum the 
results were ‘ambivalent’ (Devine, 1999: 589). Prior to the referendum, a successful 
amendment to the referendum bill tabled by a Labour MP, introduced the so-called “40% 
rule”. This stipulated that any “yes” vote had to carry more than 40% of the total 
electorate, not just a majority of those voting to be deemed effective. Although the “yes” 
vote managed a 77,000 majority, the turnout represented only 32.9% of the electorate and 
the proposed reform was not enacted (Scottish Office, 1997: 1). Two months later the 
Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher came to power and plans for devolution 
were shelved entirely. It was Scotland’s experience of Conservative rule between 1979
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and 1997 that would provide a decisive element in the establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament and a crucial re-negotiation of the Union of 1707.
Settler Nationalism and Britishness in Australia
Unlike Lowland Scotland, where a discemable Scottish consciousness pre-dated and 
informed the development of Britishness, Australian consciousness and nationalism 
developed entirely within the ideological confines of Britishness. Even republican ideas 
in Australia were conditioned by the relationship to Britishness, often demanding the 
extension of “British liberties” to Australian shores, or qualifying calls for separation 
with continuing allegiance to the Crown. In place of formal demands for national 
independence, understanding of Australian consciousness developed that stressed the 
modifying effect of the local environment on those of “British stock” in the creation of a 
uniquely Australian “national character”.
The ideology of Britishness had already been well established in Britain by the 
time convict transportation began the British invasion and settlement of the Australian 
continent. However, this is not to argue that Britishness was implanted in the colonies 
without modification. Experience on this frontier of British imperialism contributed to 
notions of Britishness as well as Australian consciousness during the nineteenth century. 
In common with England and Scotland, national consciousness in Australia developed 
within the framework of Britishness. Australian nationalists were forced to develop an 
understanding of Australian nationality that could unify the nascent Australian 
community and give expression to the sense of distinctiveness that was developing, 
whilst not alienating the imperial centre that provided the capital and most of the labour 
for the development of the colonies. When the Commonwealth of Australia was created 
in 1901, an even greater need to arose to legitimate the shifting location of sovereignty in 
national terms, even though the imperial connection remained crucial to Australia’s 
ruling classes until the 1960s. That is to say, nationalism in Australia developed within 
an imperial context and it was this context that overwhelmingly provided the content and 
symbols for Australia’s formative nationalism.
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No doubt convicts and transported Irish rebels could not be expected to endorse 
the virtues of the British “Rule of Law” or swear fulsome allegiance to the monarch. The 
relationship of Britishness to Australia changed, however, with the growth of free 
settlement from the turn of the nineteenth century. The establishment of colonies by the 
British government in Australia from 1788 onwards, not only came at a time of imperial 
rivalries with other European powers, but also took place fully one century after the 
ideology of Britishness took shape in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. This 
ideology, as we have seen, was already developed as a way of uniting and legitimating a 
ruling class governing a state accommodating several potential nationalisms. This 
characteristic of Britishness made it particularly useful to maintain unity and common 
purpose between its settler colonies, with their own emerging nationalisms, and the 
metropolitan ruling classes. Thus the “official nationalism” that arrived when the Crown 
annexed New South Wales was one which had developed from the turmoil and reaction 
of the seventeenth century and the expansion and loss of empire in the eighteenth. In this 
sense the continuity and change in Australia would not so much be dictated by a tradition 
of radicalism, but rather a Whiggish tradition that would soon become a conservative one 
after the revolution in France.
Whilst such links are be important in explaining some of the content of 
nationalism in Australia, Australian nationalism did not develop solely out of a 
sentimentality for the Old Country, nor a rejection of its less appealing attitudes and 
conditions. As in Scotland, the loyalty of the Australian bourgeoisie to Britain and the 
Empire rested on firm economic and military grounds. Humphrey McQueen 
characterised Australian nationalism, both radical and conservative, as ‘the chauvinism of 
British imperialism intensified by its geographic proximity to Asia’ (McQueen, 1970: 
21). Labor, and later Nationalist leader, William Hughes understood that the Australia 
of the Great War was ‘a nation by the grace of God and the British Empire’ (quoted in 
Hancock, 1930: 58).
However, moments of tension within the imperial relationship contributed to the 
emergence of a recognisably Australian nationalism, despite sectarian divisions between
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Protestants and Catholics. The development of a distinctively Australian consciousness 
can be dated from the self-styled “Currency Lads” of New South Wales in the early years 
of the colony. Whilst migration was still the principle form of population growth for the 
fledgling Australian colonies the number of “native bom” Australians was on the rise too. 
As with Anderson’s notions of the thwarted creole elite in the colonies, the native bom 
consciousness appeared particularly during debates about the establishment of 
responsible government in New South Wales during the 1840s and 1850s. Its greatest 
advocate was however an immigrant Scots Presbyterian minister, John Dunmore Lang. 
Lang vented this colonial frustration at a speech at the Sydney Arts School in 1850:
every brainless creature of blighted prospects and broken fortunes from England, with 
no personal merit but servility, and no intellectual qualification but toadyism, has 
been systematically placed above you even in this, the land of your birth (quoted in 
Molony, 2000: 196).
Lang argued that the Australian colonies of the eastern half of the continent (Western 
Australians had foregone their birthright as Britons to self-government by willingly 
accepting convict labour) had reached a stage of ‘political maturity’ and could now claim 
freedom and independence from the control of Westminster (Lang, 1852: 26). His calls 
for independence were also based on a technical argument that pre-figured the “West 
Lothian Question” by one hundred and twenty years. Lang rejected Australian 
representation in the imperial Parliament because it would be unfair for the member for 
Botany Bay to vote on matters pertaining solely to Britain (Lang, 1852: 35). Also 
underpinning Lang’s calls for independence were notions of “Anglo-Saxon” superiority. 
Referring to the self-governing status of the Sandwich Islands [Hawai’i], Lang posed the 
rhetorical question, ‘surely we are not to be told that a people of British origin are less 
likely to be able to govern themselves than a still smaller number of South Sea Islanders’ 
(Lang, 1852: 26). Furthermore, if his calls for universal manhood suffrage and equal 
electoral districts were to be unfavourably compared to recent revolutionary and counter­
revolutionary events in France, Anglo-Saxonism provided a rebuke. ‘Louis Napoleon 
has taught the European world a very important lesson... that there is no security for civil
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liberty in any country in which Romanism predominates. This is all in reality that the 
case of France teaches us’ (Lang, 1852: xi).
More urgent than the debates over responsible government in Sydney, was the 
outbreak of the miners’ rebellion at Ballarat, Victoria in 1854, and the suppression of that 
revolt at the Eureka stockade in December of that year. As with the later myth of the 
Kelly gang, the events at Eureka added an anti-authoritarian element to Australian 
consciousness. The “diggers” at Eureka rebelled against the taxes imposed by the British 
governor and the arbitrary nature of British rule in Victoria. During the “Monster 
Meeting” of 29 November 1854, rebel leader Raffaello Carboni called upon all present to 
salute the Southern Cross flag and seek to create a new home for true liberty, in which the 
land of the Southern Cross would become the ‘refuge of all the oppressed from all 
countries on earth’ (quoted in Molony, 2001: 122). The anti-authoritarian language 
survived the suppression of the rebellion, and entered into Australian political discourse. 
Despite stating when elected to the Victorian Parliament in 1857 that he was a democrat, 
(but neither a chartist, a radical or a communist), former Eureka leader Peter Lalor 
employed the language of Chartism to critique the imperial governments record on 
democratic reform. ‘Is it to prove to us,’ he demanded ‘that a British government can 
never bring forth a measure of reform without having first prepared a font of human 
blood in which to baptise that offspring of their generous love?’ (quoted in Molony, 
2001: 193).
Further evidence of the development of Australian national consciousness during 
the nineteenth century is clear. The Australian Natives Association was formed in 1872 
in order to promote the rights of “Australians”. The ANA hoped to help create a new 
breed of men through the emergence of an Australian nationality, and a breed of men 
whose racial background would be unsullied by the “convict stain” (Trainor, 1994: 82). 
The Centenary of the settlement of New South Wales in 1888 gave rise to republican 
riots, whilst artists such as those associated with the “Heidelberg School” in Victoria, 
celebrated the Australian landscape.
71
Not all support for the imperial connection came directly from the landed and 
middle classes. Andrew Scott has noted how the naming of the labour movement’s 
parliamentary party, as the Australian Labor Party (ALP), reflected the greater 
importance of nationalism in the colonies than in the metropole. Scott argued that 
‘nationalism was inherently easier for Australian labour to embrace than it was for British 
Labour, because in the colonies, nationalism could often be associated with anti­
imperialism, whereas for the British it usually meant pro-imperialism, a terrain which the 
Tories could much more comfortably occupy (Scott, 2000: 38). The radicalism of the 
1890s and the workers’ movement was given nationalist expression by poets such as 
‘Banjo’ Patterson and Henry Lawson. Lawson penned ‘The Shearers’ in 1901:
They tramp in mateship side by side -  
The Protestant and the ‘Roman’ -  
They call no biped lord or ‘sir’,
And they touch their hats to no man!
(quoted in Macintyre, 1999: 132)
Aspects of Australian nationalism of the 1890s were certainly nourished by 
radical critiques of the Empire (Scates, 1997), but it remained fundamentally a 
nationalism conditioned by the relationship to Britain. Whilst the radicalism of the 1890s 
saw the development of ideas of Australia as free from the deficiencies of the Old World, 
this radical-nationalism weakened or became diverted into imperial-nationalist projects 
such as federation by the turn of the twentieth century, even if the sense of “being 
Australian” was still relatively weak. John Fraser Foster noted in 1912 that whilst there 
was evidence of the ‘green leaf of Australian national consciousness sprouting in the 
new Commonwealth, the principle allegiances were to the states and above all to the 
Empire:
And that one word, “home”, more than any arguments about the advantages of 
imperial trade or demonstrations in favour of imperial cohesion, has soaked into the 
brain of the Australian, and he appreciates -  not always by reasoning about it, but
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with the regard a son has for his father -  that “home” is his country just as much as 
Australia, and that what affects the Englishman affects him (Fraser, 1912: 11-12)
However, such “anti-imperialism” as there was in Australian nationalism was limited in 
its character. More usually the imperialists in London were accused by the colonial elites 
for not being imperialist enough, as when Queensland’s annexation of New Guinea in 
1883 was only haltingly endorsed by Britain a year later (Porter, 1996: 105). One further 
important source of tension between Britain and the Australian colonies at the turn of the 
twentieth century was conflict over non-white immigration. The visit to Australia in 
1887 by two Chinese commissioners, and the arrival of a ship carrying Chinese migrants 
the following year, raised fears of an “invasion from the North” and mass anti-Chinese 
demonstrations and riots in Sydney. But despite this strong local sentiment, immigration 
was an international matter and thus reserved to the imperial government in London, who 
had very different concerns on the notion of the movement of labour around the Empire. 
Henry Parkes, the “Father of Federation” and Premier of New South Wales, declared:
Neither for Her Majesty’s ships of war, nor for Her Majesty’s representative on the 
spot, nor for the Secretary of State for the Colonies do we intend to turn aside from 
our purpose, which is to terminate the landing of Chinese on these shores forever 
(quoted in Hirst, 2001b: 296).
Thus the desire to preserve the racial characteristics of the British stock in Australia could 
actually set the colonial regimes against the imperial power. Such exclusivity found its 
way into the debates on federation. Alfred Deakin, Victorian Premier and future Prime 
Minister stated in 1901, ‘No motive power operated more universally... and more 
powerfully in dissolving the technical and arbitrary political divisions which previously 
separated us than did the desire that we should be one people and remain one people 
without the admixture of other races’ (quoted in Clark, 1986: 163). When China was 
defeated by Japan in 1895, Australian fears of northern invasion switched from the 
decrepit Manchu empire to the rising imperial power, despite Britain’s alliance with 
Japan in 1902. Even at the Treaty of Versailles negotiations after the Great War,
73
Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes insistence on the barring of Japanese traders 
from Australia caused considerable tension between Britain and its principal Asian ally 
(Hirst, 2001a: 60).
If Australian consciousness had been weak around the time of federation, then the 
events of the Great War provided material for a strong expression of Australian 
nationalism, fusing themes of the Australian consciousness that had emerged during the 
nineteenth century, notably the role of the bush in creating the “national character” as 
well as the egalitarianism inherited from the diggers on the gold fields. The events of the 
First World War, and particularly the Dardanelles campaign, provided a fund of myths 
for Australian nationalism that Federation could never inspire. According to the official 
war historian Charles Bean, service overseas enhanced that ‘passionate love of home, 
marked in Australians’ (Winter ed., 1992: 141). Furthermore, it was the Bush that had 
‘hammered out of the old stock a new man’ (quoted in White, 1981: 126) and given the 
Australian distinctive qualities that made him a good fighter, but a poor soldier. Richard 
White argues that ‘whatever characteristics the diggers were credited with, they returned 
to Australia as upholders of what it meant to be Australian. It was through them that the 
Australian identity could be given a heroic, legendary core, and they offered themselves, 
and were used, as the custodians of that nationhood’ (White, 1981: 130).
Tensions between Australia and Britain continued between the Wars and in 
particular during the Depression. In 1930, Australian Prime Minister James Scullin 
invited high ranking economist Sir Otto Niemeyer from London to investigate Australia’s 
finances. Niemeyer, who saw no firm economic foundation for the Australian standard 
of living, ultimately recommended a “prudent” course of financial action by urging the 
balancing of Australian budgets. This retrenchment was unacceptable to some local 
politicians and New South Wales premier J.T. Lang began a campaign that depicted 
Niemeyer as the calculating Englishman, acting against the interests of the hard-working 
yet naive Australian (Clark, 1986: 199). This type of economic conflict, as much as sport 
or the experience of warfare, contributed to Australian nationalism in the post-Great War 
years. As Kosmas Tsokas has argued, ‘In a real sense, the state made the Australian
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nation in the sense that it gave political expression to frontiers of conflict between the 
economic interests of a local ruling alliance and foreign interests, especially those of 
Britain’ (Tsokas, 2001: 294).
However, none of these expressions of nationalism were fundamentally 
antithetical to the British Empire. British domination of the world was often taken as the 
staring point for ideas about Australian independence and the monarchy became a crucial 
focal point for imperial loyalty. J. D. Lang’s understanding of Australian freedom and 
“republicanism” was closely linked to loyalty to the Crown. He denied that the 
Australian colonists were ‘cherishing in their hearts the satanic spirit of rebellion’ and 
argued that the colonists should be allowed to choose their allegiance to the Crown, 
rather than be forced to owe it (Lang, 1952: 48). The rebellion at Eureka in 1854, 
demanded little more than the extension of responsible government and the “liberties” of 
the English Constitution to the Victorian gold fields, although it was castigated by the 
Victorian press for its violence which made it ‘un-British’ (McKenna, 1996: 98). Paul 
Pickering has argued that the influence of Chartism as Eureka was strong, and that 
Chartism itself ‘was a view of the future that was deeply rooted in an understanding of 
the past’ (Pickering, 2001: 33). This revolt inspired by “English liberties”, had not only a 
structural impact on the form of Australian statehood, but also impacted on the symbolic 
inheritance of Australian radicalism (Pickering, 2001: 37). In 1901, The Bulletin also 
adhered to republicanism, but a type that might be best characterised by Bagehot’s term 
“a disguised republic”, reflecting the political solution to Monarchical power established 
in 1688:
The British Monarchy in its purely business aspect is practically unobjectionable... So 
long as it is understood that the British Monarch holds his or her position by the will 
of the nation and for the convenience of the nation, there is no reason for complaint 
against the monarchical system (quoted in McKenna, 1996: 205).
As with the nineteenth century British radicals and their Liberal allies, debate 
over the Empire at the turn of the twentieth century became not a discussion of whether it
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should be dismantled, but instead how best to use it for the benefit all humankind. 
Australia’s accepted role in this project was that of a sub-imperial power. The Victorian 
Labor Party’s 1910 manifesto argued that ‘When a majority of the people in the principle 
nations, such as the United States of America, Germany and Great Britain are converted 
to the Labour gospel, war as we know it will cease. The only use for armies and navies 
then will be to police the world and keep the small and less civilised nations in order’ 
(quoted in McQueen, 1970: 62).
By the outbreak of war in 1914, imperial-nationalism in Australia was strong. 
Australia’s most fervent war leader, William “Billy” Hughes was expelled from the 
Labor Party when his staunch defence of the Empire and Mother Country alienated him 
from his wartime colleagues. This is not to say that we should take Australia’s 
participation in the First World War as indicative of Australian consciousness at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. The reasons why people aided the imperial war effort 
may have been very different from the reasons that the Australian government aided the 
Empire. Like Scotland, the number of Australians volunteering for military service 
during the Great War was disproportionately high. The Australian government, however, 
had little option but to fight, as its external affairs were controlled by Whitehall. Even 
though the Australian electorate twice rejected conscription in 1916 and 1917, Australia’s 
continued involvement in the First World War was never in doubt.
By the 1930s, and despite the effects of the Great Depression, the imperial link 
was rarely questioned by Australia’s political leaders. Unlike Canada and the Union of 
South Africa, Australia was slow to seize the independence of action in foreign affairs 
offered by the 1931 Statute of Westminster, and it was not ratified by Canberra until 
1942. David Day has described the imperial link as: ‘Part racial, part religious, part 
military, the Imperial idea reached an almost metaphysical plane, replacing religion as the 
cloak of respectability for Australian conservatism’ (Day, 1988: 19). But if Britain was 
not exactly rejected by Australian nationalists, they certainly felt there was some room 
for improvement in the wide open air of the Dominion. Between the Wars, the idea of 
Australia as a sort of “better Britain” envisaged by the radicals of the 1890s persisted. In
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1930 historian W.K. Hancock wrote that ‘the Australian people has sprung from 
transplanted British stock. During the first forty or fifty years of the transplanting, this 
stock was of predominantly poor quality; but throughout the last one hundred years it has 
been generally clean and vigorous’ (Hancock, 1930: 33). Despite an emerging 
Australian consciousness, the monarchy remained and important referent in Australian 
nationalism. This link with the British Crown became all the more important to 
Australian elites when the Statute of Westminster allowed for the possibility of complete 
and formal independence for Australia. Describing the Abdication Crisis of 1936 as ‘an 
occasion without precedent in the constitutional history of our race’, Prime Minister 
Joseph Lyons argued that the monarchy was ‘the greatest unifying element in the British 
Empire and that any course calculated to weaken the ties of loyalty to the Crown, or the 
position which it occupied in the affection and respect of the British people, were fraught 
with danger to us all’ (National Archives of Australia: M2270/l,3). This unifying 
monarchy was assiduously re-popularised during the War years. Immediately after the 
War, the monarchy appeared only to gain in popularity and the turnouts for the Australian 
tour of the newly crowned Queen Elizabeth II in 1954 were enormous. Liberal Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies gave “poetic” expression to the effect of an absent monarch on 
Australian consciousness in 1962 when he said before the Queen:
I did but see her passing by,
And yet I love her till I die.
(quoted in Macintyre, 1999: 207).
Australian consciousness was not only bound up in the ideology and 
consciousness of Britishness, but contributed to its development in important ways. 
Responding to the arms race in Europe, a meeting at the Sydney Town Hall in March 
1909 unanimously endorsed the following motions:
1. That in the opinion of this Meeting of Citizens, glorifying the traditions of the British 
Race of which they are part, the time has arrived for the Commonwealth to take an 
active share in the naval defence of the Empire.
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2. That in view of the expressed determination of Britain’s rivals to challenge her naval 
supremacy, Australia should present a Dreadnought to the British Navy as the 
immediate expression of her invincible resolve to stand by the Mother Country and 
take her place in the Empire’s fighting line (National Archives of Australia: A6661, 
950).
This scheme to provide the Royal Navy with an Australian Dreadnought (the capital 
weapons of their day) did not come to fruition. However, the enthusiasm and funds 
generated were channeled into another project that became known as the ‘Dreadnought 
Farm’ scheme. Instead of providing the Empire with military hardware, Australia was 
offered up as a place send the population of Britain’s towns and cities in order to improve 
and rejuvenate the British stock. The scheme’s organiser in Britain, Thomas Sedgewick 
wrote to the Department of External Affairs in Australia of the ‘vast hordes of wasted 
boy life’ in industrial Britain. These town-lads were induced to travel to Australia 
despite being ‘made fully aware of the conditions, hours, distance from their nearest 
neighbours, monotony of life, and other drawbacks of the life from a town lad’s point of 
view’ (letter dated 8 May 1912). But the move was promoted as good for all parties 
involved. The London Daily Express, described one of the lads from south London who 
had been working in a bakehouse for 12 shillings a week:
Nearly six feet high, keen and intelligent and with muscles like a blacksmith... he has 
sailed to a country which offers him steady employment on the land -  a healthier place 
than in the bakehouse’ (quoted in National Archives of Australia: A6661, 950).
In 1912, the Daily News reported a speech my Mr. Kingsley Fairbridge of the Child 
Emigration Society ‘founded by colonials at Oxford in 1909’, explaining the benefits of 
this migration to Western Australians:
The Child Migration Society is doing three things for you. It is advertising Australia 
in England, it is bringing out English money, and it is supplying you with the best kind 
of immigrants’ (quoted in National Archives of Australia: A6661, 950).
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Such migration policies, whereby population exchange between Australia and Britain 
was promoted as a benefit to both countries, filling Australia’s “empty spaces” and 
rejuvenating the British stock, illustrated the close relationship between defence and race 
in Australia during the early twentieth century. In defending the continuation of the so- 
called “White Australia Policy” after the Second World War, Labor minister for 
immigration, Arthur Calwell, argued that it was imperative for Australia to have an 
‘increased population to develop fully our great country... [and] ‘to increase the 
population of Australia and expand this Pacific stronghold of the British Commonwealth 
of Nations, by immigration, with a target of 70,000 new citizens a year’ (Calwell, 1949b: 
11). Arguing that the ‘evils of miscegenation always result in bloodshed and rioting’ 
(Calwell, 1949a), Calwell reassured Australians that preference would be given to British 
immigrants that would protect what was the crowning achievement of the White 
Australia policy:
a united race of freedom-loving Australians who can intermarry and associate without 
the disadvantages that inevitably result from the fusion of dissimilar races; a united 
people who share the same loyalties, the same outlook and the same traditions 
(Calwell, 1949a).
Even the shock of the loss of Singapore in 1942 was not enough to end the imperial 
connection, despite Labor Prime Minister John Curtin’s turn towards the United States as 
Australia’s foremost military partner. Even at this stage, just following the Second World 
War, the terms “Britain” and “Australia” could be used interchangeably, at least by the 
political elite in Canberra. In reacting to the Labor government’s proposal to nationalise 
the Australian banks in during the late 1940s, parliamentary member of the newly formed 
Liberal Party, John Howse, claimed that this threat to individual choice posed a danger to 
‘the British or Australian way of life’ (quoted in Hancock, 2001: 134).
A shift occurred from the 1960s onwards, as Britain attempted to re-orient its 
foreign and trade polices towards the European Economic Community (EEC) on more
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formal terms and at the expense of older imperial connections. Stuart Ward has argued 
that the eclipse of the imperial imagination in Australia was not the product of a maturing 
Australian national sentiment, but that such changes were forced onto the Australian 
government by a de-colonising centre and such changes were in fact unwelcome to 
Australians, or at least their governing classes (Ward, 2001: 12). When Britain finally 
entered the EEC in 1973, a reforming Labor government under Gough Whitlam had been 
voted into power in Australia the previous December. The Whitlam government oversaw 
something of a cultural renaissance in Australia, with its active promotion of Australian 
arts and home-grown talent. There was also a shift in attitudes to immigration, away 
from Calwell’s defence of White Australia and preference for British migrants (the White 
Australia Policy was dropped from the ALP platform in 1966) and instituted a policy of 
“multiculturalism”. Such reorientation by the Whitlam government went under the name 
of “new nationalism” and appeared to mark something of a decisive break with the 
Britishness of Australian nationalism that dominated “official nationalism” right up until 
the 1960s.
By the early 1960s, deferential attitudes towards the monarchy were appearing 
outdated at best and embarrassing at worst. Menzies’ suggestion that the new Australian 
currency to be introduced in 1966 should be named the “Royal” was quickly suppressed. 
The ALP’s approach to monarchy was somewhat different. Whereas Menzies had 
attempted to popularise the monarchy, Whitlam’s government attempted to nationalise it. 
Hence in 1973, Queen Elizabeth II formally became Queen of Australia. But it was the 
dismissal of the Prime Minister Gough Whitlam by the Governor-General of Australia on 
11 November 1975, that gave a vital boost to republicanism in Australia. But it was not 
until 1991 that a serious movement for the removal of the Queen as Australian head of 
state was established, pushing questions about the role of Britishness in Australian public 
life into the political limelight.
Imperialism, Nationalism and Indigenous Sovereignty
The British invasion of the Australian continent created two distinct sets of 
consciousness; a settler consciousness on the one hand and an indigenous consciousness
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on the other. In the case of Australia’s settler nationalism, the uneven nature of the 
relationship between the Australian colonies and the imperial centre did not cause acute 
resentment, despite moments of tension. In fact it was the uneven developmental 
relationship between the imperial centre and the colonial periphery that kept the 
Australian colonies wedded to the centre. Up until the middle of the twentieth century, 
the imperial centre was far too important economically and militarily for political 
colonial elites to react against and reject, thereby taking Australia along the secessionist 
path of nationalism. However, the extension of British imperialism into Australia from 
the late eighteenth century onwards, did create a profoundly uneven economic and 
political relationship between the settlers and Australia’s original inhabitants. An 
encompassing “Aboriginal” consciousness was created by, and in resistance to, the 
extension of British and Australian rule throughout the continent. This resistance fell into 
two broad categories; the first involving military resistance to British imperialism and the 
second a non-military political activism, aimed at improving the condition of Aborigines 
by adopting the political methods of the colonisers. This second form of resistance 
forced the settler population to confront the effects of Australia’s imperial origins on 
Australia’s indigenous peoples, particularly when indigenous consciousness was 
expresses as a rejection of the Crown’s sovereignty. During the twentieth century, the 
campaigning techniques of Aboriginal activists would force the issue of indigenous 
disadvantage into the realm of Australian nationalism and national consciousness, until 
by the 1980s, the past treatment of Australian Aborigines became a crucial, yet contested, 
part of Australian consciousness. The assertion of indigenous consciousness and 
sovereignty in the language of survival and resistance represented a challenge not only to 
the legitimacy of the Australians Commonwealth, but to the very legitimacy of the 
Australian nation itself.
Anderson’s explanation of the development of “creole nationalisms” stresses the 
creation of a new national consciousness through interactions with the first inhabitants of 
the settled territories. However, Australian consciousness did not develop via an 
incorporation of indigenous inhabitants into the national entity, but rather through the 
dispossession of Aboriginal lands and the denial of indigenous sovereignty. Until 1992,
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the legal doctrine of terra nullius held that at the time of the British claims of sovereignty 
over Australia, the land was not held in any legal sense by the indigenous inhabitants, as 
it was not effectively exploited as an economic resource. Therefore the land was 
perceived as “empty” and open to legitimate claim by other powers without treaty with its 
inhabitants. As well as maintaining the mutually beneficial trade and military links 
between imperial metropole and colonial periphery, the emerging Australian nationalism 
had to justify the dispossession of the continent from its original owners. So whilst 
denying indigenous sovereignty, the imperial link was invoked during the nineteenth 
century, justifying the appropriation of indigenous lands through racialised notions of 
“Progress” and the extension of the civilising light of democracy into “dark” comers of 
the world.
At the same time that justifications for “national” self-rule were being developed 
in Europe and the Americas, a parallel argument was developing that certain peoples of 
the world were not yet ready for, or worthy of, the status of nationhood. Such an 
argument justified imperial expropriation and exploitation and was employed in the 
colonial situation. Differences in land use, technological development or the pre-modem 
political arrangements of the indigenous people were used as proof of the colonisers’ 
superiority. Thus whilst the principle of nationalism in general upheld the notion that all 
peoples had the right to self-determination and autonomy, the particular nationalisms of 
the imperial powers and their settler offshoots, served to deny such autonomy, and even 
humanity, to the colonised people and kept them in racially based subordination. For the 
free settlers, and even emancipists, the notion of economic betterment and social mobility 
formed an important justification for their presence in Australia. Such social mobility 
was severely restricted for much of the indigenous population and material conditions 
remained poor in comparison to the general condition of the settlers. Furthermore, any 
prospect of betterment that did exist for the indigenous population was only available on 
“modem”, that is the colonisers’, terms. Indigenous people, particularly in the heavily 
settled areas of Australia, were forced into new occupations such as farming, shepherding 
and the cattle industry. Many were housed in European-style dwellings on missions. But
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despite this incorporation into the global, imperial economy, racial attitudes and 
economic interests denied the indigenous population equality with the settler society.
Thus the intrusion of modernity into Australia had two notable effects for the 
continent’s original owners. Firstly, there could be no ignoring the intrusion, as its 
effects eventually spread throughout the continent and affected everyone who lived there, 
in however remote a location. Speaking of the outstation population in Arnhem Land, 
Adrianus Borsboom wrote: ‘the average middle-aged Aboriginal man or woman is 
familiar with many western goods and products. The presence of tea, sugar and flour as 
part of the daily diet and the use of cars, boats, planes and cash is as natural and self- 
evident as the existence of traditional bush food, the complex kinship system, the 
intimate spiritual relationship with the land and the reality of totemic beings’ (Borsboom, 
1989: 17). Secondly, Aboriginal consciousness eventually emerged out of the disparate 
language and kinship groups that comprised indigenous Australia as a result of the 
uneven power relationships caused by colonial rule. Indigenous affairs administrator, H. 
C. “Nugget” Coombs, argued that ‘It has only been since the white colonisation and the 
emergency need for groups, however separate and mutually suspicious, to work together 
to resist a common danger, that some sense of identity between diverse Aboriginal groups 
has begun to emerge’ (Coombs, 1994: 182). The development of this indigenous 
consciousness was a product both of self-definition and ascription. Bain Attwood has 
argued that the making of an Aboriginal consciousness was a process that was 
‘determined more by Europeans than Aborigines, because the settlers who had the power 
to shape the indigenous people as “Aboriginal”’ (Attwood, 1989: x). However, this is not 
to say that Aborigines were passive in this process, but it did force indigenous people to 
respond to the new situation and decide what aspects of their pre-contact cultures they 
retained in the new social and political situation. The creation of the “Aboriginal” served 
a function in white, settler consciousness also. Beliefs and attitudes about “race” shaped 
settlers’ views about Aborigines as well as Aborigines’ views about themselves, thus 
helping to determine what “being Aboriginal” involved. In the late nineteenth century, 
Victoria was the colony that devoted most sustained political attention to the situation of 
Aborigines. The Half-Caste Act, 1886 (Victoria), put a policy seal on racial classification
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of Aborigines as those “full bloods” apparently doomed to die out, and the “half-castes” 
able of “elevation” to white standards of civilisation. This not only crystallised racial 
categorisation as the Act was put into practice on the missions, but also helped whites 
define themselves as “Australians” at a time when Federation and nation-building was 
becoming a political issue (Attwood, 1989: 100).
Resistance to the colonial regime assumed both military and political forms as 
Aborigines, responded to invasion, dispossession and the intrusion of modernity. 
Contests over land were central in such resistance. Heather Goodall has demonstrated the 
material and spiritual importance of land in Aboriginal survival strategies in New South 
Wales since 1788. For Goodall, the link between land and culture in Aboriginal thought 
provided ‘a way to develop a survival lifestyle which was grounded, literally, in 
traditional meanings but which was also responsive to the rapidly changing contexts of 
the new social and economic order (Goodall, 1996: 352). Once the initial conflicts of 
dispossession had been fought out in the various colonies (south-eastern Australia by the 
1840s, Queensland by the 1870s and Western Australia and the Northern Territories up 
until the 1920s), Aborigines began to adopt the political methods of the colonisers in their 
campaigns for rights and restitution. Such reactions to the British invasion and settling of 
the land were first evident in the south-east of Australia, where contact occurred first and 
the dispossession was greatest. This “modem” political action, as opposed to armed 
resistance, assumed diverse forms. One such form was the traditional British method of 
protest, involving the petitioning of the monarch in London. A petition was sent on 17 
February 1846 from the inhabitants of Flinder’s Island in Bass Strait, the dispossessed 
Aborigines of Van Dieman’s Land, that began:
Your Petitioners humbly state to Y[our] Mjajesty] that Mr. Robinson made for us & 
with Col. Arthur an agreement which we have not lost from our minds & we have 
made our part of it good (quoted in Attwood and Markus, 1999: 38).
Other modem attempts at seeking redress was to petition the colonial parliament, as the 
Aboriginal farmers from Corranderk, Victoria did in asking for the removal of the station
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master in 1881. Thus did Aboriginal activists adopt the methods of the colonisers, even 
as they were resisting some of colonialism’s worst effects.
Nevertheless, the general condition of the Aboriginal population remained worse 
than that of the newer arrivals. Massacres and dispossession continued as settlers 
claimed more and more land, despite the efforts of humanitarians and the rhetoric of 
various governors. Mick Armstrong has argued that ‘Early Governors’ occasional 
humanitarian impulses counted for little against the need for economic development... It 
was this integration of the new colonies into the rapidly developing British economy 
which drove the dispossession of the Aborigines’ (Armstrong, 1996: 61). For Armstrong, 
racist attitudes towards Aboriginal Australians advanced the material interests of the 
squatters and, later, mining companies by making it easier to seize land (Armstrong, 
1996: 61). During the 1840s and ‘50s, the Scottish Highlanders, newly arrived in 
Australia, themselves dispossessed during “the Clearances”, in turn dispossessed the 
Kumai people of Gippsland, running sheep and cattle on the Kumai land (Watson, 1997 
[1984]). Even during the colonial period, the de-legitimising effects of dispossession and 
British imperialism in Australia were causing a sense of unease amongst the colonists. 
Tasmanian historian John West wrote in 1852:
No man can witness the triumph of colonisation, when cities rise in the dessert, and 
the wilderness blossoms as the rose, without being gladdened by the change; but the 
question which includes the fate of the aborigines -  what will become of them? -  
must check exultation (quoted in Reynolds, 2001: 145).
Some brief respite was afforded to Aboriginal people in regards to access to their 
traditional lands during the gold rushes on the 1850s and 1860s, when white labour was 
scarce on the pastoral runs. But with the political defeat of the Squattocracy in the 1850s 
and the advent of “ffee-selection” in the 1860s, this brief period of “dual occupation” of 
the land came to an end (Goodall, 1996: 68). The soldier settlements on the land at the 
end of the Great War further marginalised the Aboriginal people in their own lands that 
led Heather Goodall to refer to the period after World War I as a ‘second dispossession’
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(Goodall, 1996: 125). During the twentieth century, child removal policies formed a part 
of the settler governments’ strategies for dispossession and the control of the Aboriginal 
population. The eugenic aim of “breeding out the colour” was central to the goal of 
removing mixed-race children from Aboriginal society and raising them amongst settler 
Australians. After the Second World War when eugenics was discredited by association 
with the Nazi regime in Europe, assimilation became the Australian governments’ stated 
aim in regard to indigenous Australians. Paul Hasluck, who became Federal Minister for 
Territories in 1951 that through assimilation, Aborigines would ‘live as members of a 
single Australian community enjoying the same rights and privileges, accepting the same 
customs and influenced by the same beliefs as other Australians’ (quoted in Reynolds, 
2001: 166).
Indigenous resistance to imperial intrusion and colonial rule concentrated 
attention on the legitimacy of the non-indigenous sovereignty over Australia, at the same 
time as adopting settler society’s political methods. From the 1920s to the 1950s, 
Aboriginal political organisation entered into a series of alliances with settler Australians 
in order to improve the condition of the Aboriginal people. These political campaigns 
tended to focus on “equal rights” rather than “Aboriginal rights” based on historical 
claims and a special status as original owners of the Australian landmass. Initially 
political organisation was to be found at the state, rather than federal, level, as it was the 
states that had responsibility for Aboriginal affairs up until 1967. Such political 
organisations included the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association, formed in the 
early 1920s in Sydney and northern New South Wales; the Native Union (1926) of south­
west Western Australia; and the Australian Aborigines League (1933) of Melbourne. 
Another important organisation was the Association for the Protection of Native Races 
(APNR), a white organisation founded in 1911, originally focused on Polynesia, but 
which began devoting its attention to northern Australia following the massacres 
committed against Aborigines there in 1926 and 1928. However, such non-indigenous 
support could be a double-edged sword. Whilst it no doubt gave indigenous activists 
vital support, both financially and in terms of organisation, it often led anti-pathetic 
voices to claim that indigenous activism was “inauthentic”. Nevertheless, Aboriginal
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affairs were beginning to impact on a wider Australian consciousness. Although much of 
the indigenous activism was intensely “local”, the language of protest was anything but 
and appealed to universal norms. Claims for justice were either based on prior ownership 
of land or on demands for equal citizenship in the British and Australian system 
(Attwood and Markus, 1999: 9).
Consequently, from the 1920s, indigenous rights began to merge with questions 
of Australian national consciousness. Certain white nationalist groups adopted 
Aboriginal motifs as part of the nationalist trend relating Australian consciousness to 
place and landscape, such as the Wattle Leagues and the Heidelburg school, in addition to 
the imperial connection. In 1926 the northern New South Wales branch of the Australian 
Society of Patriots (ASP) asked the premier of New South Wales to set up a ministerial 
department ‘for the better management of the Aboriginals and for the protection and 
preservation of Australian Birds and Animals’ (quoted in Goodall, 1996: 156). But 
indigenous political strategies also focused attention on significant moments in the 
development of an Australian consciousness. The 1938 Day of Mourning, was designed 
as a counter to the celebrations of the 150th anniversary of the First Fleet’s landing at 
Sydney Cove. The message of the Day of Mourning was aimed at the settler nationalist 
rhetoric of the Sesquicentenary. The organisers of the Aboriginal Protest, Jack Patten 
and William Ferguson challenged the legitimacy of the settler nation, by presenting a 
very different version of Australian history to the dominant triumphalism of the settler 
celebration:
You are the New Australians, but we are the Old Australians. We have in our arteries 
the blood of the Original Australians who have lived in this land for many thousands 
of years. You came here only recently and took our lands by force. You have almost 
exterminated our people, but there are enough of us remaining to expose the humbug 
of your claim, as white Australians to be a civilised, progressive, kindly and humane 
nation (quoted in Attwood and Markus, 1999: 82).
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At this stage, Aboriginal demands were predominantly for equal status with settler 
Australians in the colonial system. Patten and Ferguson also argued on the Day of 
Mourning that ‘the typical Aboriginal or half-caste, bom and bred in the bush, is just as 
good a citizen, and just as good an Australian as anybody else’ (quoted in Attwood and 
Markus, 1999: 85). The campaign between 1958 and 1967 to alter certain sections of the 
Constitution that discriminated against indigenous Australians was similarly aimed at the 
consciousness of the Australian settler population in order to achieve symbolic measures 
of equality. The Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait 
Islanders (FCAATSI) turned the referendum to repeal sections 51(xxvi) and 127 of the 
Constitution into a referendum about what kind of nation Australia should present to 
itself and the outside world. The Referendum is often misconstrued as the moment when 
“Aborigines got the vote” or “gained citizenship rights”. In fact, the proposal to extend 
the powers of the federal government to legislate for Aboriginal people had been rejected 
in a referendum in 1944, whilst legislation of 1962, gave Aboriginal people the right to 
vote in federal elections, even if voting was not compulsory and was in practice difficult 
in many areas. Nevertheless, the narrative of equality and citizenship gave the campaign 
much of its emotive power. The referendum was significant for liberals and 
conservatives alike. For the conservatives, the attainment of “rights” meant that there 
was no more work to be done; for the liberals the victory was and is ‘living proof of the 
correctness of their whiggish assumptions about their fellow Australians’ humanity and 
tolerance and their faith in historical progress, all the more so given the “overwhelming” 
result’ (Attwood, Markus et al., 1997: 67).
In the post-War years, Aboriginal demands for sovereignty, autonomy and 
restitution could also be made against the background of the development of international 
law and the existence of supra-national institutions rather than just calls for equality with 
settler Australians. In 1965 Amnesty International wrote that ‘the conditions under 
which Aborigines live constitute contraventions of various Articles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Recommendations of the International Labour 
Organisation’ (Amnesty International (Victorian Section), 1965: 36). Similarly, the 
Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander Council, formed in 1990, argued that:
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Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides all 
peoples with a right to self determination. By virtue of that right peoples may freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. (Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Commission, 2000).
By the 1960s, the land rights movement had become politically salient. Again, 
Amnesty International noted that ‘The rights of Aborigines in relation to ownership of 
their traditional tribal lands have nowhere been legally recognised; reserves having 
frequently been land not wanted by whites at the time they were set aside, but subject to 
excision when minerals etc. are subsequently discovered’ (Amnesty International 
(Victorian Section), 1965: 36). The Wave Hill cattle station protest of 1966 developed 
out of protest over wages, but the Gurindji people also tagged on demands for 
retrocession of their traditional lands (Borsboom, 1989: 9). Such demands called into 
question the long-extant property relationship regarding land between settler and 
indigenous Australia and challenged the legitimacy of the settlers’ possession of the 
Australian continent. As demands for the restitution of traditional lands grew, old settler 
understandings of the Australian continent as an “empty” place prior to the arrival of the 
British became harder to maintain.
Disappointment with a lack of progress for Aboriginal rights in the wake of the 
1967 referendum came to a head with the establishment of the Aboriginal “Tent 
Embassy” on the lawns of Parliament House in Canberra in 1972, after Prime Minister 
McMahon had rejected the idea of land rights for Arnhem Land Aborigines. The Tent 
Embassy and other radical indigenous organisations rejected narrowly legalistic methods 
of protest and employed direct action, spuming alliances with “white” organisations such 
as churches and trade unions. The claim for sovereignty was a direct challenge to the 
very legitimacy of the Australian states and Commonwealth. Asserting prior and 
continuing ownership of the continent was in direct contradiction of the legal doctrine of 
terra nullius that justified British possession of Australia from 1788. The Embassy’s 
demands included:
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1. Full State rights to the NT under Aboriginal ownership and control with titles to all 
minerals etc.
2. Ownership of all other reserves and settlements throughout Australia with all titles to 
minerals and mining rights.
3. The preservation of all sacred lands and sites not included in points 1 and 2 above.
4. Ownership of certain areas of certain cities with all titles to minerals and mining 
rights.
5. As compensation, and initial payment of six billion dollars for all other land 
throughout Australia plus a percentage of the gross national income per annum 
(quoted in Attwood and Markus, 1999: 257-8).
According to Attwood and Markus, it was during the 1960s that Aborigines ‘came 
to see themselves as having a shared culture, that was increasingly defined and 
represented in terms of “tradition”. As such, indigenous Australians began to make 
claims for rights outside of the British-Australian political framework as aborigines. 
This was a process by which an attenuated sense of Aboriginality in “settled Australia” 
was renewed or revivified through their contact with traditionally oriented Aborigines in 
“remote” areas. Mike Anderson, vice-president of the New South Wales Aboriginal 
Lands Board, said that he looked to Arnhem Land ‘as a place where we can start to dig 
our roots in and restore the pride of the Aboriginal culture. If they destroy that we have 
no place’ (quoted in Attwood and Markus, 1999: 257). Aboriginal national consciousness 
and the language of an emergent Aboriginal nationalism developed out of the politics of 
land rights and sovereignty. On the issue of land rights, Aboriginal writer Kevin Gilbert, 
called for ‘black Israels - places where Aboriginal patriots can help to heal their crippled 
race as well as themselves. Places where clean, black people with firm values will be 
able to set up alcoholic aid centres, hospitals and rehabilitation projects... There must be 
rest and treatment centres for the emotionally crippled, the blacks whose nerves have 
been bombed out’ (quoted in Gostin, 1984: 250).
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By the late 1970s, an Australia-wide Aboriginal consciousness was well 
established and beginning to challenge the sovereignty of the settler nation. In 1979 Paul 
Coe of the New South Wales Aboriginal Legal Service attempted to bring attention to 
Aboriginal prior ownership of Australia in the court action Coe v. Commonwealth o f 
Australia, arguing that the Aboriginal nation had prior ownership before 1788. Thus the 
Aboriginal nation had been retrospectively invoked as a political response to conflict with 
settler society. The idea of a treaty, or Makarrata, between “Aboriginal” and “white” 
Australia was discussed between 1979 and 1983, re-surfacing again after 1988. In 1982, 
the National Aboriginal Conference maintained that ‘since colonisation of this country in 
1788 by the British, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people have maintained their 
sovereignty. In asserting this, we maintain that our nationhood is a matter both of fact 
and law... Notwithstanding what has been said so far by legal experts offering advice, we 
maintain that our nationhood is fundamental to our bargaining position if we are to 
entertain a Makarrata’ (quoted in Attwood and Markus, 1999: 294). However, this was 
not the accepted law of the land. The concept of terra nullius had been ultimately upheld 
by the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in 1971, although recognising the law 
and politics of the Yirrkala people. It was not for another twenty-one years that the 
concept of terra nullius would be effectively challenged.
It was the indigenous response to the Bicentenary of British colonisation in 1988 
that shifted questions of Aboriginal sovereignty into the plane of mainstream politics, 
posing questions about the nature and legitimacy of the entire Australian settler society. 
The Treaty 88 Campaign declared, ‘We, the Aboriginal People, restate that we are the 
Sovereign Owners of Australia. There have been no Treaties with us and we have never 
ceded our Sovereignty’ (Treaty 88 Campaign, 1988: 1). During the lead-up to the 
Bicentenary, indigenous activists and organisations employed the language of anti- 
colonialism, but as in 1967, still appealed to the settler nation’s consciousness. Treaty 
‘88 argued that ‘modem Australia is a white island in a sea of black nations. Its time of 
survival as a colonial anachronism is drawing to a close. Its only chance for growth and 
survival is to attain a standard of humanity, justice and universal peace and fair dealing so 
that it becomes, as it can become, the very symbol of racial harmony and justice to the
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nations which surround it’ (Treaty ‘88, 1987: 14). Support for Aboriginal nationalism 
and indigenous rights were now being presented by some indigenous activists and 
sympathisers as the processes that would redeem modem, “white” Australia from its 
shameful past conduct.
So by 1988, the imagining of Aboriginal people as a community with shared 
interests involved in a political struggle, was well established. As the Bicentenary 
celebrations and protests took place in Australia, the colonial moment was 
simultaneously inverted by Bumum Bumum under the Cliffs of Dover on 26 January 
1988. Planting the Aboriginal flag on United Kingdom territory, he declared, T, Bumum 
Bumum, a nobleman of ancient Australia do hereby take possession of England on behalf 
of Aboriginal Peoples. In claiming this colonial outpost, we wish no harm to you natives, 
but assure you that we are here to bring you good manners, refinement and an 
opportunity to make a “Koompartoo” -  a fresh start’ (Bumum Bumum, 1988). By the 
end of the 1980s, indigenous affairs had forced their way into the centre of debates about 
Australian nationalism. Indigenous activism from the 1920s had drawn attention to the 
British imperial origins of the settler Australian nation. This activism, not only 
challenged the legitimacy of the settler nation and its claim to be a progressive and 
civilising force, but also forced a shift in the way that the past would be considered in 
Australian public life. The treatment of indigenous peoples under imperial and colonial 
rule, their present condition in Australian society and the link between the past and 
present were to become important, but contested, aspects of Australian national 
consciousness and nationalism during the 1990s.
State and Nation in English Nationalism
It was in England that Britishness, which developed somewhat different meanings in 
Scotland and Australia, incorporated most of those aspects of empire and nation which 
characterised the British-imperial ideology. The terms “England” and “Britain” have 
often been conflated; at least, but not solely, by the English. Lacking the evident 
structural means to differentiate “the nation” from “Britain” that Scots nationalists could 
rely on, nationalist discourse in England became deeply bound up with the ideology of
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Britishness. Despite some moments of tension, English nationalism tended to express 
itself in the language of Britishness. Bernard Crick explains this conflation in terms of 
the underlying politics of Great Britain (Crick, 1989). Since its creation in 1707, English 
politicians and state functionaries had been concerned to protect the state from threats, 
both internal and external. Therefore any “non-British” nationalism was discouraged. In 
fact, the nationalism of the largest nation was of particular concern. Thus the anti- 
Scottish, English radicalism and Scotophobia of John Wilkes and his followers during the 
mid-eighteenth century was seen as a danger to the status quo guaranteed by the British 
state. Even seemingly modest calls for Irish home rule in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries were resisted in Parliament and almost led to civil war. Naim refers 
to this state-based politics as ‘occluded multi-nationalism’ (Naim, 1997: 212). The 
multi-national structure of the British state obscured the distinct identities of all the 
nations in Britain, at least until a measure of self-government was devolved to Scotland 
and Wales in 1999. However, with England as the most powerful and conspicuous of all 
the nations in the Union, the statist and imperial framework for discourses of nationalism 
and national identity would not so much submerge or hide Englishness, but feed into it. 
This situation gave Englishness much of the character of Britishness, “hiding” English 
identity by making it implicit in expressions of Britishness.
Therefore, during much of the past three hundred years, English consciousness 
was refracted through the ideology of Britishness. Often, this state and imperial-based 
ideology was expressed through the language of “national character”. Such ideas 
continued to be influential in legitimating systems of governance up until the Second 
World War. Writing an Introduction to a new edition of William Bagehot’s The English 
Constitution in 1936, Earl Balfour described the British character in terms of the 
institutions of governance, relating his thoughts to the debate on the extension of the 
Westminster system to other parts of the Empire:
It matters little what other gifts a people may possess if they are wanting in those 
which, from this point of view, are of most importance. If, for example, they have no 
capacity for grading their loyalties as well as for being moved by them; if they have
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no natural inclination to liberty and no natural respect for law; if they lack good 
humour and tolerate foul play; if they know not how to compromise and when; if they 
have not that distrust of extreme conclusions which is sometimes misdescribed as 
want of logic; if corruption does not repel them; and if their divisions tend to be too 
numerous or profound... (quoted in Bagehot, 1936 [1867]: xxii).
For Balfour, it was British institutions, particularly those of governance embodied in the 
British system of constitutional monarchy, that truly defined what it meant to be British 
and English. But this system of governance could not operate without the idea of the 
British nation as a unified people, a people unified across time by the perceived 
continuity of those institutions of governance and across space by notions of state-wide 
“national” character and genius. Balfour continued, ‘it is evident that our whole political 
machinery pre-supposes a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to 
bicker; and are so sure of their moderation that they are not disturbed by the never-ending 
din of political conflict’ (quoted in Bagehot, 1936: xxiv).
Given its reliance on institutions of governance as a source of definition, 
Britishness could easily be conflated with those same themes so important in English 
nationalist discourses that had emerged before and during the creation of the British state. 
By the early eighteenth century, the dominant discourse in radical English nationalism -  
liberties guarded by the Crown-in-Parliament -  meant that the concept of nation in 
English national discourse was not far removed from the concept of the state. Corrigan 
and Sayer go so far as to claim that in English nationalist discourse, the state was 
perceived as ‘the nation made manifest’ (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985: 195). When the 
English and Scottish parliaments joined in 1707, the boundaries of this state-based 
identity expanded further, creating British politics dominated by an already established 
English framework at Westminster, but maintaining distinct civil societies in the former 
realms. In contrast to the civil disorder in Edinburgh, the English parliament at 
Westminster carried on its business after passing the Act of Union with barely any 
disruption, having passed further acts concerning road maintenance in Bedfordshire and 
the enlargement of an entrance to the Palace of Westminster (Davies, 1999: 526-27).
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Seen from London, the English state had become the British state almost without any 
disruption and very little fanfare.
It would be wrong however to deny the existence of moments of tension between 
the imperial version of Anglo-Britishness and notions of England as a distinct entity 
within Britain. As noted above, John Wilkes made a clear distinction between England 
and Britain during the latter half of the eighteenth century. He linked his version of 
Englishness to a radical critique of the governing classes and the threat they posed to 
‘English liberties’ and bolstered this critique with a strong Scotophobia. However, it is 
possible to see Wilkes’ radicalism as being little different to radicalism in other parts of 
Britain, but rather motivated by competition for positions of influence at home and 
abroad with a highly successful cadre of Scots within the British Empire (Davidson, 
2000: 80).
A contrast between England and imperial Anglo-Britishness also began to 
develop during the era of high imperialism. Bernard Porter identifies the 1870s as a 
moment when a split on attitudes to the Empire (at least in rhetoric) emerged between the 
Conservatives and the Liberals and their radical allies (Porter, 1996: 86). The Liberal 
landslide election victory of 1905 seemed to mark a shift away from the strident imperial 
policy of Cecil Rhodes and Lord Milner and towards a position expounded by the Little 
Englanders. The distinction between England and Britain surfaced again during periods 
of radicalism as a counterweight to imperial Britishness. One respondent to a Mass- 
Observation survey carried out in 1941 on attitudes to Britain replied ‘The term Britain is 
more easily associated in my mind with missionaries, gunboats and prestige than with 
any of the “good” qualities I should more easily associate with England’ (M-OA, FR878: 
2), whilst a young government employee picked up on the tension between the rhetoric of 
English liberties and governing an empire:
“Land of Hope and Glory, Mother of the Free.” Yes, mother of the free Indian 
people, of the free unemployed without a dog’s chance... and so on, the old, old tale... 
But I love England, her fields, her woods, her homes, her Wordsworth. I love her soil
95
and some of her cities. I love her rain and her sunshine (when I can get it). That’s all 
mine and I’m proud of it. “England” means home. But “Britain” conjures up another 
picture - the one I have tried to paint above (M-OA, FR878: 3).
The rural idea of England that emerged also provided a means of speaking about 
England and contrasting it with London and England’s industrial north (Howkins, 1986: 
64). From the late nineteenth century the imagery of England drew less and less on 
Engels’ Manchester, a city covered in ‘dirt and revolting filth’ (Engels, 1971 [1844]: 58) 
and more and more on an idealised version of the non-metropolitan parts of southern 
England. William Blake’s Jerusalem (set to music by Parry in 1915) directly contrasted 
‘the dark satanic mills’ with ‘England’s green and pleasant land’ (Davies, 1999: 1029), 
and it was in the latter setting where the New Jerusalem was to be built. William Morris 
combined his socialism with a notion of a futuristic, rural England where the horrors of 
nineteenth century city living had been banished (Morris, 1919: 17, 25). However, even 
this notion of rural England was itself greatly influenced by the imperial experience. 
Rural England with its green spaces, sense of community and imagined peace was in 
direct contrast with the tensions of colonial rule in sometimes isolated outposts (Fussell, 
1975: 281). When Rudyard Kipling was not writing about the Empire, it was to the 
Sussex of Puck o f Pook ’s Hill that he returned. The idea of rural England seemed to 
grow during the two World Wars, no doubt in contrast to the mechanised, industrial 
warfare experienced by the participants. Paul Fussell cites one correspondent based in 
Cairo during 1942, writing that ‘sweating in the sultry nights of this soulless, venal, 
cynical city, it is refreshing to be with Cobbet’s Rural Rides in the changing weathers and 
seasons of the English countryside’ (Fussell, 1975: 232). On a political level, the 
radicalism of the Little Englanders also stopped short of an outright anti-imperialism, but 
instead became disputes over what type of imperialism to pursue and the method of 
actualising imperial policy (Porter, 1996: 208).
This relationship between Empire and nation allowed certain English nationalists 
to appropriate non-English space and peoples when defining and promoting England. 
After the Union of the Crowns in 1603, the notion of a British monarch residing in
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England blurred the distinction between England and Britain somewhat at a time when 
the ideology of nationhood was beginning to emerge. It was the incorporating Union of 
the parliaments in 1707, however skilfully negotiated by the Scottish commissioners, that 
enabled the English to see England and Britain as coterminous. After 1707, and a result 
of the equation of state and nation in English nationalism, what A. V. Dicey and R.S. Rait 
referred to as ‘the united state of Great Britain’ (Dicey and Rait, 1920: 347) became the 
political expression of the English nation. With the British state representing England, 
Anglo-British nationalists developed an argument by which to resist the nationalist 
claims of other parts of Britain. Writing on Home Rule in 1886, Dicey argued:
If the parliamentary independence of Ireland threatened as little damage to England 
as the parliamentary independence of Victoria, an Irish legislature would meet in 
Dublin before the end of the year. Englishmen, it is true, do not believe that Ireland 
would in the long run gain by the possession of legislative independence. It is not, 
however, the doubt as to the reality of the blessing to be conferred on Ireland, but the 
certainty as to the injury done to England which causes their opposition to Home 
Rule (Dicey, 1886: 16).
The extension of self-government along Westminster lines to the colonies and 
dominions also allowed English nationalists to appropriate other nationalities in 
formulating definitions of the English. Viewing the Empire from the imperial centre, J. 
R. Seeley, a proponent of imperial federation, argued that Greater Britain ‘is a real 
enlargement of the English state; it carries across the seas not merely the English race, 
but the authority of the English Government’ (Seeley, 1971 [1883]: 38). The extension of 
the English state overseas allowed Seeley to overlook the developing nationalisms in the 
Dominions and consider Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians and South Africans as 
well as Scots and Welsh as part o f ’’Greater England” (Seeley, 1971 [1883]: 13). One of 
Seeley’s twentieth century successors, historian Arthur Bryant argued in a similar vein 
that the Empire and Commonwealth was ‘a worldwide union which English political 
ideas created [and represented] the living influence of English history’ (Bryant, 1961 
[1953]: 12). Like Churchill, the concept of an “English-speaking world” was important
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for Bryant’s understanding of history and as such he was able to attribute many of the 
important events of the past three hundred years to English influence, even finding 
triumph in defeat. For Bryant even the American Revolution was understood as ‘a very 
English thing to have done’ (Bryant, 1961 [1953]: 13).
Thus the slowest shift away from Britishness was to be found at the centre of the 
former Empire. London was slower than other Dominion governments to enact 
citizenship legislation, waiting until 1962 to restrict New Commonwealth immigration. 
But it was such immigration that was beginning to raise doubts and fears about racial 
understanding of Anglo-British identity. As Jonathan Rutherford has noted of the four 
hundred and seventeen Jamaicans who migrated to Britain onboard the SS Empire 
Windrush in 1948: ‘It was they, rather than the hundreds of thousands of Irish and 
European immigrants, who signified the coming post-colonial struggle over the meanings 
of English ethnicity’ (Rutherford, 1997: 110). Equally symbolic of these contested 
categories was the Conservative frontbencher, Enoch Powell. Powell entered politics just 
after the War to save India for the Empire. His disillusionment with the loss of India, and 
increasingly the entire Empire, forced Powell to replace Empire with “England” as his 
focus of concern, to which was later added a defence of Ulster for the Union. 
“Powellism”, with its emphasis on patriotism, economic self-sufficiency and individual 
hard work, became a forerunner of Thatcherism. But whilst Margaret Thatcher’s 
patriotism was “British”, Powell’s was much more explicitly “English”. For Powell, 
England was underpinned by three central elements: its unity under the Crown-in- 
Parliament; its supposed historical continuity and its racial homogeneity (Rutherford, 
1997: 125). The link between constitutional historiography, and racial homogeneity was 
a strong one for Powell. ‘The deepest instinct of the Englishman -  how that word 
“instinct keeps forcing itself in again and again! -  is for continuity;’ argued Powell. ‘He 
never acts more freely, nor innovates more boldly than when he is most conscious of 
conserving or even reacting’ (quoted in Rutherford, 1997: 125). What Powell wished to 
conserve was both the racial (or as he termed it cultural) unity of England and the 
integrity of the Crown-in-Parliament, that immigration from the Sub-Continent, the West 
Indies and Africa was undermining. Powell claimed that there was a denial of popular
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discussion on the issue of immigration, that the politicians wanted but the populace did 
not. His “Rivers of Blood” speech given in Wolverhampton in 1968 made him an 
overnight household name.
Powell’s questions about the “cultural compatibility” of different ethnic groups 
now living in Britain were taken up in a far more confrontational manner by the far- 
Right. The National Front (NF) was formed in 1967 out of a merger of the League of 
Empire Loyalists (who were opposed to decolonisation) and the (anti-Semitic) British 
National Party, plus the National Socialist Movement. Membership of the NF peaked in 
1972 with around 20,000 members. Its greatest support came between 1976-78 when 
disillusionment with the incumbent Labour government was high, but the Conservative 
Party had yet to launch its populist attack on immigration policies (Saggar, 1992). 
Powell’s Englishness and the racism of the far-Right, were articulated during a period of 
structural economic change. However, the nationalist sentiment that in Scotland could be 
channeled into calls for devolution or secession, could have no such outlet in England. 
Instead, Britishness was reinforced in England. Having abandoned consensus for free- 
market liberalism, new relationships between state and citizen had to be created. Charles 
Husband has argued that having facilitated the loss of national sovereignty through 
opening the country’s financial markets and selling off nationalised assets, “the nation” 
provided the Conservatives with a link between politics, economics and racism which 
with to maintain and develop electoral support. Successful military episodes were even 
more successfully turned into electoral gain for the Conservative Party. So by the 1990s, 
as British consciousness appeared to wane in Australia and came under threat in 
Scotland, it was encouraged and intensified in England, where the historical development 
of the British state and Empire left little political room for the articulation of a purely 
national, as opposed to state-based, consciousness.
Conclusion
Britishness was an ideology formed around the legitimation of Crown-in-parliament 
sovereignty, although subsequently modified to suit local needs. Nationalism in England, 
Scotland and Australia was formatively conditioned by the relationship of each potential
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nation to the development of a capitalist economy. In England, the transformation to 
such an economy occurred as a pre-condition for the development of nationalism. For 
Scotland, such a transformation occurred in the Lowlands, but the development of the 
British state, and of a Scottish consciousness within in, was the product of the extension 
of nationalism into the economically backward Highland region. Australia was colonised 
by the British at the beginning of the age of nationalism, and as such a nationalist 
ideology -  Britishness - was part and parcel of the development of the Australian 
continent. As a distinctive Australian nationalism developed, it had to be framed in such 
as way as to express emerging difference but not to alienate centre of development, 
Britain. Rather than having national consciousness preserved within Britishness, settler 
Australian consciousness developed entirely within its themes. However, for the 
indigenous population, this development involved dispossession and dislocation. 
Indigenous responses to the extension of British rule overseas required diverse survival 
strategies in the face of the overwhelming preponderance of the colonisers.
This relationship to development conditioned the content of nationalism in each 
place. Both Scottish and Australian nationalists could explain their support for Union 
and Empire respectively via a simple calculation of interests. It was in the economic and 
military interests of both sets of nationalists to maintain the British connection until the 
1960s. However, such support was not unconditional and in Scotland came at the cost of 
preserving a high degree of political autonomy. In Australia, such autonomy was given 
political expression by the devolution of powers over domestic affairs from the 
establishment of responsible government between the 1850s and 1890, the creation of 
the Commonwealth in 1901 and later legal independence between 1942 and 1986. 
Aboriginal consciousness emerged as a result of the imposition of colonial rule, and 
indigenous activists were forced to adopted the political methods of the colonisers even 
as they attempted to alleviate colonialism’s worst effects. For English nationalists, the 
early development of nationalism and the English state, followed by the extension of the 
English state’s jurisdiction throughout the British Isles and overseas, led English 
nationalists to articulate their nationalism in terms of the state. Maintaining the Union
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and Empire provided material and strategic benefits, although the impact on English 
consciousness was to conflate state and nation and imbue both with imperial discourses.
After the Second World War, the economic focus for Britain and Australia shifted 
away from each other and the imperial connection, and towards, respectively, the 
emerging European Union and the Asia-Pacific region. However, the content of 
nationalism in Scotland, Australia and England continued to be conditioned by the 
historical experience and legacy of Britishness. In Scotland, the threat to autonomy that 
developed in the 1980s, allowed a secessionist nationalist movement to develop. In 
Australia, national consciousness continued to be shaped by the deep British legacy. 
Aboriginal activists increasingly offset the numerical inferiority of the indigenous 
population in Australia by couching their demands in terms of moral questions posed 
about the Australian community in general. As such, indigenous affairs intruded into 
questions of Australian nationalism during the 1990s, pushing Australia’s British origins 
to the centre of nationalist debates. In England, the categories of Britain and England 
remain substantially merged, even after the devolution of powers to parliaments and 
assemblies in the other constituent nations of the United Kingdom. All these 
nationalisms were conditioned by Britishness and it was in this context that the 
nationalist movements of the 1990s in Britain and Australia were played out.
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chapter 3:
Nationalism and Devolution in Scotland
iven Gellner’s theory outlined in Chapter 1, we might have expected Scotland, with 
V J  its history of independent statehood, advanced industrial economy, developed 
bourgeoisie and popular ill-feeling towards its southern neighbour, to fit all the criteria 
for secession during the nineteenth century. Instead, Scotland’s commitment to the 
Union hardly wavered, from the latter half of the eighteenth century to the last third of 
the twentieth, when a separatist movement became a permanent feature of Scottish 
politics. Scottish participation in the British project was predicated on the maintenance 
of a significant degree of autonomy, guaranteed by the terms of the Treaty of Union of 
1707. Scottish nationalism should not only be understood as characterised by calls for 
independence, but should include demands for home rule nationalism also. Both types of 
nationalism were formed out of the tradition of Scottish autonomy, but sought to 
guarantee autonomy in new ways, somewhat outside the traditional arrangements of 
Britishness. The home rulers wished to guarantee Scottish autonomy by creating a 
sovereign Parliament within the United Kingdom; the separatists wanted Scottish 
autonomy within the European Union. Autonomy was the central issue around which 
diverse, anti-Conservative protests coalesced from the late 1980s. Protest in Scotland 
assumed a nationalist form because of the historic preservation of Scottish autonomy and 
Scottish consciousness since the Act of Union in 1707. But protest also occurred in order 
to preserve that autonomy. When Scotland’s autonomy was threatened during the 1980s, 
support for both home rule and independence grew. A subsequent anti-Conservative 
alliance between these two strands of Scottish nationalism resulted in a successful 
referendum campaign for the establishment of a parliament in 1997. Significant as it 
was, the return of a parliament to Edinburgh was not so much a complete rejection of 
Britishness, but a re-assertion of Scotland’s historic autonomy within the United 
Kingdom.
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New Forms of Autonomy: Home Rule and Independence
To speak of “Scottish nationalists” as solely those interested in establishing Scottish 
independence from Britain would be to misunderstand the phenomenon of nationalism in 
Scotland. Scottish nationalism ranged from appropriations of Highland culture to 
defence of Britain’s unitary system of government. Scottish nationalists could demand 
Scotland’s separation from the United Kingdom; measured reform of the relations 
between Scotland and Westminster; or be implacably opposed to any alteration of the Act 
of Union. All shades of political opinion in Scotland could be termed Scottish 
nationalism if the actors believed they were acting for the greater good of Scotland. 
However, in the interests of clarity, certain distinctions will be made. Throughout this 
chapter, the term “Scottish nationalism” will be used to refer to the relationship between 
the demands for Scottish self-determination and the ability to accommodate those 
demands within British nationalism and the British political system as it was prior to 
1999. “Nationalism in Scotland” will be employed less often, but will refer to all 
varieties of nationalism to be found in Scotland, including unreconstructed Unionism, 
home rule nationalist-Unionism and separatist nationalism.
Scottish nationalism at the turn of the millenium offered two solutions to what 
was perceived as a crisis in Scotland’s position within the Union of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. These two positions were firstly, a home rule nationalism, aiming at 
the creation of a Scottish assembly or parliament with control over domestic, Scottish 
affairs, firmly within the Union and a separatist nationalism, that aimed at the revocation 
of the Acts of Union of 1707 and secondly, the secession of Scotland from the United 
Kingdom. Whilst having different aims, both these strands of nationalist thought agreed 
that the British political system in Scotland had failed decisively and irrevocably during 
the 1980s and 1990s. Ultimately, it was the alliance of these two strands of Scottish 
nationalism, in the face of threats to Scotland’s autonomous status within the Union, that 
facilitated the creation of a Scottish Parliament via a successful referendum held in 1997.
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The growth in support for such Scottish nationalisms at the expense of an 
unreconstructed unitary conception of Britain derived crucial support from the perceived 
threat posed to Scotland’s autonomous status within Britain. This autonomy is central in 
understanding the national consciousness that developed in Scotland. This Scottish 
consciousness preserved in and since 1707, not only existed within and alongside a 
British consciousness, but also contributed to the development of Britishness itself as 
state-based, multinational and imperial ideology.
Neil Davidson links the rise of Scottish nationalism in the last two decades 
directly to the Conservative Party election victories of 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992 
(Davidson, 2000: 1). That is to say, he explains contemporary Scottish nationalism as a 
reaction to the exercise of power from Westminster by a party whose philosophy came to 
be regarded as un-, or even anti-, Scottish. That the Conservative Party’s neo-liberal 
radicalism seemed better suited to the City of London and its attendant economy in the 
south-east, than to Scotland was grist to the separatists’ mill. Such an interpretation was, 
however, a gross over-simplification. Andrew Marr points out that:
What became known as Thatcherism was viscerally and intellectually opposed to the 
post-War Scottish consensus, characterised by the domination of the public sector and 
quasi-socialist tone in public life generally. With its mass public housing, high union 
membership and struggling heavy industries, Scotland was a lot like England, only 
more so. But its subtly different intellectual and political climate made it much more 
resistant to the politics, if not the policies, of Thatcherism (Marr, 1995: 168).
It is true that the effects of the economic restructuring of the last quarter of the century 
were keenly felt in Scotland, whose economy was particularly dependent on heavy 
industry. Tom Devine estimated that Scotland’s manufacturing capacity declined by 30.8 
per cent - the largest decline in the UK -  between 1976 and 1987, whilst the textile 
industry lost no less than 64 per cent of its manufacturing capacity. Active coal pits in 
Scotland fell from 15 to 2 during the Thatcherite era, and whilst employed labour fell 
overall by 3 per cent in the UK between 1979 and 1986, it fell by 8 per cent in Scotland
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(Devine, 1999: 592-97). The effects of this restructuring and of neo-liberal policies in 
general were felt throughout Britain, in all of its constituent parts. However, it was the 
structure of the UK state, and Scotland’s autonomous position within it, that allowed 
discontent to be expressed in nationalist form, as a partial or total retreat from the British 
state. The years of economic restructuring also exacerbated the “North-South divide” in 
England, and the idea of a devolved assembly in the North-East was raised, as this region 
was, like Scotland, dependent on ship building and mining and was similarly effected. 
However, Scotland’s long experience of autonomy from Westminster was far more 
pronounced than that of Wales or the English regions, and permitted discontent to feed 
into Scotland’s pre-existing national consciousness. Guaranteeing this autonomy by 
establishing a Scottish assembly or through complete separation appeared to many as the 
solution to Scotland’s political and economic plight. Scottish nationalism was articulated 
as the defence of Scottish institutions of public life, that would in turn protect Scotland’s 
autonomy and thereby “Scottish culture”. In 1988, a Claim o f Right was issued, calling 
for the establishment of a Scottish assembly. The authors of the Claim of Right argued 
that ‘Either we advance to an Assembly, or we retreat to the point at which Scottish 
institutions are an empty shell and Scottish government is, in practice, indistinguishable 
from any other English region’ (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 3). In the same 
year the separatist Scottish National Party promised to ‘restore the Scottish dimension in 
politics, to restore Scottish influence in politics and to begin the drive towards 
independence’ (Scottish National Party, 1988: Introduction). Calls for constitutional 
reform became bound up with various types of Scottish nationalism, all of which aimed 
at some re-negotiation of Scotland’s relationship to the British state.
The idea of home rule, or the devolution of some of Westminster’s powers to a 
Scottish assembly or parliament, was not a new one in Scottish politics. But Scotland’s 
experience of Thatcherism and the economic restructuring of the 1980s ultimately 
exacerbated the demand for devolution. Whilst in 1979 constitutional reform appeared to 
be a distraction from more pressing affairs, by the late 1980s it began to be argued that 
this type of reform was the only way of ameliorating the effects of the economic and 
political climate that Scotland was now in. In the wake of the Conservative Party’s
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second landslide election victory in 1987, but combined with their poor showing in 
Scotland, the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC), a pressure group promoting 
constitutional reform, was established. By 1989 the Scottish Constitutional Convention, 
a centre-left organisation that gained its support and membership from the Labour and 
Liberal Democratic parties, as well as bodies such as the Church of Scotland and the 
Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC), was arguing that ‘The removal of decision 
making from Scotland has had a damaging impact on the economy, and the establishment 
of a Scottish Parliament would lead to a reversal of this trend’ (Scottish Constitutional 
Convention, 1989: 7). Calls for reform were frustrated by the Conservative Party’s 
strong commitment to Unionism. The matter of Scotland’s relationship to central 
government was given urgency and popular appeal by plans to introduce a flat-rate 
community charge, or poll tax, to replace the previous system of household rate payments 
that were deeply unpopular with Scottish Conservatives. For Scottish nationalists, the 
problem was becoming two-fold. The problem was not just the Conservative Party alone, 
but “Britain” too. Issues of anti-Conservatism and nationality had converged sufficiently 
by the end of the 1980s to make a nationalist solution to the political impasse seem both 
possible and desirable. In issuing the Claim o f Right, the Constitutional Steering Group 
of the Scottish Constitutional Convention argued that ‘we have a government which 
openly boasts its contempt for consensus and a constitution which allows it to 
demonstrate that contempt in practice’ (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 23).
The unitary structure of the British state was now contributing to the development 
of Scottish nationalism, whereas before it had been crucial in maintaining a sense of 
Britishness. Scottish representation at Westminster had helped forge a dual 
consciousness that was both Scottish and British. But during the 1980s, Scottish 
participation in the unitary British state appeared more and more to be delivering 
unpopular policies to Scotland, of which the poll tax was the most notorious example. 
Introduced at the behest of the Scottish Conservative Party, by February 1989, a Scottish 
petition protesting the poll tax, signed by about 300,000 people, was presented to 
Downing Street. In April, 15,000 people demonstrated in central Edinburgh. By 
September, the number of defaulters had reached an estimated 900,000 out of the 3.8
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million Scots eligible for the tax. In the largest region of local government, Strathclyde, a 
15 per cent rate of non-payment resulted in a shortfall of GBP60 million in local 
government revenue. In November, Scottish banks informed the government that they 
would be unable to cope with a large-scale freezing of defaulters’ bank accounts (Butler 
et al., 1994: 133-6). Allan McConnell referred to the anti-poll tax movement as ‘possibly 
the largest campaign of civil disobedience in modem British history’ (McConnell, 1995: 
197). Unpopular policies such as the poll tax exacerbated longer-term trends in Scottish 
politics. As the voting patterns between England and Scotland became markedly 
different from 1987 onwards (Browa Mcrone and Paterson, 1996: 146), it became easier 
for Scottish nationalists to portray the Conservatives as an “English” party, unresponsive 
to, or uncaring of, Scottish realities. Such notions ultimately fed off the economic 
situation in Scotland and fuelled calls for a re-assertion of Scottish autonomy. When 
issuing a declaration for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament, the Constitutional 
Steering Group stated that Scotland ‘regularly suffers from macro-economic policies 
designed to suit the economy of south eastern England, particularly, though not only, 
policies of restraint applied to the United Kingdom when capital and labour are 
underused in Scotland’ (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 8). In this climate, the 
survival of the massive Ravenscraig steel works ‘began to assume a totemic significance 
as the symbol of Scotland’s historic status as a great industrial nation’ (Devine, 1999; 
593). The closure of the plant was announced in 1992, shortly before the general election 
of that year, reinforcing fears in Scotland that the Conservative government was little 
concerned with Scotland’s economic situation. The Conservative Party fared little better 
in Scotland in 1992 than it had in 1987. However, the Tory majority in England once 
again delivered a Conservative government to Britain.
The continued divergence of voting patterns between England and Scotland 
allowed nationalists to argue for the existence of a “democratic deficit” in Scotland, 
whereby Scots voted overwhelmingly against the Conservative Party, but were ultimately 
governed by them anyway given Tory success in England. Nationalists argued that 
democracy in Scotland was entering crisis because link between “nation” and “state” was 
no longer being reflected in the electoral process. The idea of the democratic deficit was
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only possible given the multi-national nature of the British state and a general nationalist 
assumption that nations deserve representation by “their own people”. Strictly speaking, 
none of the constituent nations of the United Kingdom prior to 1999 was governed by 
“it’s own” state. However, to popularise their claims for reform, it suited the nationalists 
to treat Britain as an institutional expression of English power and dominance. The 
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly endorsed the idea that ‘the United Kingdom is a 
political artifact put together at English insistence. If it is to continue, it must work for its 
living and justify its existence’ (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 6). Nevertheless, 
this link between Scottish nationalism and the notion of democratic deficit provided the 
reformers with powerful language through which to channel their demands. Thus the 
authors of the 1988 Claim o f Right argued that they were making their report ‘against the 
background of a drive to diminish democracy -  to reduce the range and influence of 
representative institutions’ (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 10). It was not the 
electoral situation alone that caused concern amongst the political classes of the 
opposition parties and other representatives of public bodies. The growth of extra- 
governmental organisations (EGOs) and quasi-autonomous non-governmental 
organisations (quangos) was also seen as a matter of concern for democratic scrutiny 
throughout Britain. Quangos are semi-autonomous, un-elected governing bodies, 
appointed by the government of the day to run a diverse range of public services, from 
utilities, to official ombudsmen, to the BBC. Again the problem was seen as one running 
deeper than just bad policy. In 1994, London-based reformist group Charter88 reported 
that ‘the spread of EGOs is a symptom of a systematic disease. The body politic itself 
has to be cured if they are to be brought under democratic control’ (Weir and Hall, 1994: 
45). By 1994, it was estimated that there were 70,000 appointed and self-appointed 
quango positions, more than the total number of positions for elected local councilors 
(Barnett, 1997: 61). The method of appointment to such organisations, and the potential 
for jobbery, also raised concerns amongst the political elites. Anthony Barnet quoted one 
chair of a quango from his organisation’s newsletter:
I became chairman as a consequence of sharing a cab with a stranger. Another
Quango chairman was appointed following a pheasant shoot at which the Secretary of
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State was a fellow gun; the subsequent chairman of a water authority bumped into a 
Cabinet minister whilst birding on a Greek island. It is a splendidly capricious way of 
doing things (Barnett, 1997: 62).
Concerns about the development of an unelected “quango state”, and general criticism of 
Conservative mismanagement of government, were used by Scotland’s reformers as an 
argument for the creation of a parliament with powers of scrutiny in Scottish public life. 
Having drawn up a blueprint for a Scottish Parliament in 1995, the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention promoted the case for change as such:
The first and greatest reason for creating a Scottish parliament is that the people of 
Scotland want and deserve democracy... But present constitutional circumstance 
denies Scotland responsive and effective democracy... Scotland approaches the new 
millenium facing a stark choice. It has a distinguished and distinctive structural 
heritage, evident in Scotland’s legal system, its educational system, its social, cultural 
and religious traditions. These things are the very fabric of Scottish society, yet 
Scotland has come to lack democratic control over them. Their conduct is determined 
by a government for which few Scots voted, operating through a dense tangle of un­
elected quangos’ (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995: 6).
The Scottish Constitutional Convention, a body determined on a ‘settlement based on a 
new relationship between Scotland and Westminster with a substantial and fundamental 
shift of power to the people of Scotland’ (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1989: 3). 
At its inaugural meeting of 30 March 1989, the Convention adopted the following 
declaration:
We, gathered as the Scottish Constitutional Convention, do hereby acknowledge the 
sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of Government best 
suited to their needs, and do hereby declare and pledge that in all our actions and 
deliberations their interest shall be paramount.
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We further declare and pledge that our actions and deliberations shall be directed to
the following ends:
• To agree a scheme for an Assembly or parliament for Scotland;
• To mobilise Scottish opinion and ensure the approval of the Scottish people for 
that scheme; and
• To assert the right of the Scottish people to secure then implementation of that 
scheme (quoted in Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995: 10).
By 1995, membership of the Convention included MPs and MEPs from the Liberal 
Democrats and Labour, local authority representatives, political parties, trade unions, 
Scottish churches, women’s groups, ethnic minority representatives, Gaelic speaking 
groups, the Law Society and observers from small business organisations and the Scottish 
Council for Development and Industry (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995: 
Appendix II). The two main political parties which remained apart from the Convention 
were the Conservative Party, advocating an unreformed Unionism and the Scottish 
National Party whose stated aim was the removal of Scotland entirely from the British 
state. Thus between the Conservative Party UK election victories of 1987 and 1992, 
support for some sort of an assembly coalesced within the anti-Tory left in a way that had 
not been possible during the 1970s, when constitutional reform was seen as something of 
an irrelevancy by the electorate. Far from being a distraction, constitutional reform was 
now seen as the only way to improve everyday life experience in Scotland. The STUC 
linked its demands for constitutional reform to the improvement of living and working 
conditions. ‘Our recent economic history, and particularly the last decade, has left many 
Scots unemployed and with little hope, many others impoverished and imprisoned in jobs 
which deny the dignity and creativity of labour, and entire communities and industries 
decimated’ (Scottish Trades Union Congress, 1987: 9) and that ‘the establishment of a 
Scottish assembly is essential if all the energies of the Scottish people are to be harnessed 
to build a better future’ (Scottish Trades Union Congress, 1987: 5). In 1995 Scottish 
Labour argued that a Scottish Parliament would ‘give Scotland the power to adopt a fresh 
and distinctively Scottish approach to our domestic needs. It will enable Scotland to 
fulfill its potential as an advanced European industrial nation. It will have powers to
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revitalise Scotland’s economy, to rebuild our health service and reform our education and 
criminal justice systems’ (Scottish Labour, 1995: 6).
Situating itself with a Scottish unionist-nationalist tradition outlined in Chapter 2, 
the formation of the Constitutional Convention was preceded with the proclamation of a 
Claim of Right. Placing the 1988 Claim within the context of two previous Claims in 
1689 and 1842, the chair of the Constitutional Steering Group, Jim Grieve argued that 
‘we hold ourselves fully justified in registering a General Claim of Right on behalf of 
Scotland, namely that Scotland has a right to insist on articulating its own demands and 
grievances, rather than have them articulated for it by a Government utterly 
unrepresentative of Scots’ (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: Prologue). This move 
was a challenge not only to the Conservative Party, but to the British system of 
government itself. The Claim o f Right called the validity of the British state into 
question: ‘the failure to provide good government for Scotland is a product not merely of 
faulty British policy in relation to Scotland, but of fundamental flaws in the British 
constitution’ (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988; 1). In the view of the authors of the 
Claim o f Right, the state had ceased to adequately represent the nation. The multi­
national structure of the British state, Conservative support for unreformed Unionism and 
a background of economic restructuring led, in Scotland to a nationalist solution to the 
political impasse -  if change could not be enacted under the present constitutional 
arrangements then Scottish autonomy would have to be enhanced through the re­
negotiation of these arrangements and their enshrining in the establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament. That is to say that in order to protect Scottish autonomy the home rule 
nationalists demanded a measure of secession from the current British constitution. 
‘Many Scots would invoke the doctrine of self-determination... The present English 
constitution, or at least its manner of operation, denies that and thereby calls into question 
the Scots’ obligation to abide by that constitution’ (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 
10).
As party-political support for this scheme came principally from the Labour Party, 
any political solution would have to be made within the existing constitution. Another
ill
consequence of the divergence of voting patterns in the 1980s meant that the Labour 
Party now drew a considerable proportion of its Westminster MPs from Scotland and 
Wales. Devolution had therefore to be designed to strengthen the Union rather than be 
the beginning of its demise. Thus the aim of the Constitutional Convention was ‘a 
directly elected Scottish Parliament offering democratic control over at least Scotland’s 
own domestic affairs within the framework of the United Kingdom’ (Scottish 
Constitutional Convention, 1989: 3). As in the 1970s, devolution was promoted as a way 
of averting the separatist threat. However, this time it was also bound up with ideas 
about the state of democracy in Britain after almost two decades of rule by one party and 
was presented as an attempt to provide a ‘more effective democratic framework’ within 
the British state (Scottish Office, 1997: 3). In the preface to the White Paper on 
Devolution, recently elected Prime Minister Tony Blair claimed that the establishment of 
a Scottish Parliament (subsequent to a referendum) was part of New Labour’s plans to 
‘clean up and modernise’ British politics (Scottish Office: v). Blair’s Secretary of State 
for Scotland, Donald Dewar, argued that ‘the settlement will be good for both Scotland 
and the United Kingdom. The Scottish Parliament will strengthen democratic control and 
make government more accountable to the people of Scotland’ (Scottish Office: vii). The 
language of the home rule nationalists, therefore reflected the language of previous 
Scottish nationalists, negotiating Scottish demands within a British framework. The 
Constitutional Convention presented this partial secession as a middle path between the 
status quo and separatism. ‘Scotland’s Parliament is the means of taking back control 
without turning our backs on our neighbours; of determining our own strategies; of facing 
the challenges of a new age in our own way’ (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995: 
6). Maintaining the British link was important for the home rule nationalists. Just prior 
to the elections to the new Scottish Parliament in 1999, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Gordon Brown and New Labour MP Douglas Alexander praised the SCC for maintaining 
this British link. If the nationalist language was no longer exactly that of Sir Walter 
Scott’s “Silent Way”, then it was certainly that of the unionist-nationalists of the mid­
nineteenth century. Brown and Alexander argued that, ‘if the issue is what best advances 
the well-being of the Scottish people, the case for the British political connection in the 
age of the global economy is even stronger than in the age of empire (Brown and
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Alexander, 1999: 25). After devolution, home rule nationalists were able to present 
Britishness as a ‘mature patriotism’ (Brown and Alexander, 1999: 27) in contrast to the 
separatism of the SNP. Brown and Alexander went on to argue that ‘if in the nineteenth 
century political nationalism arose in the face of the uneven development of capitalism, 
late twentieth century Scottish Nationalism [separatism] can now be seen as a misguided 
retreat from and response to modem forces of change’ (Brown and Alexander, 1999: 25).
Despite Brown and Alexander’s dismissal of separatism, it played an important 
role in developing the debate about Scotland’s position within the UK and provided much 
of the motivation for home rule nationalists anxious to prevent Scotland’s withdrawal 
from Britain. There are points of similarity between these two types of Scottish 
nationalism, that will be discussed below. However, where these two nationalisms differ 
most evidently is in separatism’s complete rejection of the British state and Scotland’s 
place in it. Much of the justification for this separatism comes from an understanding of 
Scotland’s relationship to England, the language of which is perhaps more stereotypically 
“nationalistic” than that of the home rule movement. In the early 1960s the language was 
still that of the right of nations to self-expression, rather than on the perceived need to 
alter or opt out of the British state for democratic reasons as would later be the case. The 
Scottish National Party argued in 1962 that ‘Scottish nationalism is based primarily on 
spiritual values, on the recognition of the needs of the individual and on his right to 
express himself fully and freely within the framework of a community knit together by 
the ties of an enduring tradition’ (SNP, 1962: 5). In 1964, Sandy McIntosh argued that 
‘The Treaty of Union of the Scottish and English Parliaments was signed by a handful of 
Scottish Quislings against the wishes of the Scottish people... What England had failed 
to do by centuries of attempted military conquest, she had now accomplished by the 
stroke of the pen’ (McIntosh, 1964: 5).
Evidently, competition over resources played a role in motivating Scottish 
separatism. The Aims and Policies o f the Scottish National Party stated that the ‘land and 
all its natural resources and accumulated wealth rightly belong to the people of Scotland 
from whom they may not be alienated’ (SNP, 1962: 6). This argument is still advocated
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by the SNP today with regard to oil revenues. In fact, the idea that Scotland either 
contributes more than its fair share, or underachieves as a result of policies designed 
without consideration of Scottish needs or particularities is central to the SNP’s argument 
for independence. Former SNP leader Alex Salmond stated that ‘the central economic 
argument of the SNP is that because Scotland is part of the Union we do not achieve our 
full economic potential. We are constrained by policies which are inappropriate for 
Scotland and directly harm our people and their prosperity’ (Scottish National Party, 
1995b: 1). According to the SNP, independence would then turn the Scottish economy 
‘from an underachieving region of the UK to one of Europe’s wealthiest and most 
dynamic “tiger” economies (Scottish National Party, 1995b: 12).
The latter argument, however, was a relatively recent addition to the SNP policy 
platform. One lesson of the party’s performance at the 1992 General Election was that an 
economic case for independence had to be made more clearly in order to gain support 
(Scottish National Party, 1995b: 3). As with the home rule nationalists, however, it was 
the issue of Scottish autonomy that truly motivated the separatists in their nationalist 
solution to the crisis of Scotland’s relation to the British state. A rhetoric of “freedom” 
was easily added into this notion of resisting the encroachment of central government. 
This rhetorical tradition explained some of the popularity of Mel Gibson’s Brave heart 
(1995) in Scotland, to which the SNP readily attached itself (Salmond, 1995). During the 
1997 referendum campaign, SNP Chairman Mike Russell wrote that ‘if he [William 
Wallace] were here with us today then he would be campaigning with the SNP for a 
positive vote and encouraging all Scots into the polling booths for a massive YES-YES 
vote’ (Scottish National Party Press Release, 30 August 1997).
The counter-narrative to the British version of liberty expressed in the Declaration 
of Arbroath permitted the Scottish separatists to attack the Union of 1707 as an ultimately 
repressive act, rather than an act laying the foundations of the current form of democracy 
in England and Scotland, as in the British version. Ex-diplomat and SNP member Paul 
Scott wrote that ‘there are many admirable things about the English, although usually not 
the things on which they generally pride themselves. They have a great literature, for
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example, but their much vaunted form of parliamentary democracy is a sham and an 
absurdity. The most objectionable thing about English influence is quite simply that it is 
forced upon us whether we like it or not’ (Scott, 1991: 212). This narrative also 
simplified the Acts of Union and the relationship between Westminster and Scotland’s 
machinery of governance into a contest in power between England and Scotland. Again 
speaking on an SNP platform, Sean Connery interpreted the vote on a Scottish parliament 
in these terms, arguing that ‘the relationship between Scotland and England must be one 
of equality, for nothing less will do’ (SNP Press Release, 12 September 1997a).
Fortunately for the separatists, the political disenchantments of the 1980s fed 
easily into this understanding of Scottish history and helped revive the SNP’s electoral 
fortunes during this decade. The SNP also benefited from allying itself with the anti-poll 
tax campaign. Unhindered by Labour’s commitment to the sovereignty of Westminster, 
in September 1998, the SNP launched a campaign of open defiance of the legislation and 
non-payment of the tax, hoping to enlist 100,000 people to this cause (John, 1989: 8-9). 
In this they were aided by the Militant-led Scottish (later British) Anti-Poll Tax 
Federation, under the leadership of Tommy Sheridan. The campaign of non-registration 
and non-payment quickly developed. Although resistance to the poll tax did not turn 
violent as in England, the tax was particularly resented, not only for and what was seen as 
its unjust nature, but in particular its early introduction in Scotland, one year ahead of the 
rest of the United Kingdom. For the separatists it could be easily pinned on the English 
Conservative majority in Westminster. Iain Lawson described the poll tax as ‘a bad tax, 
unwanted in Scotland, rejected by our people and Scots MPs, but imposed on us by 
English MPs who enjoy lower rates, who have no knowledge of the plight facing many 
Scots, forcing unwanted experiments on us rather than treat us with equality’ (Lawson, 
1987: 5). The SNP’s non-payment stance appeared to be vindicated in November 1988, 
when the SNP vote increased five-fold at the Govan by-election and former Labour Party 
member Jim Sillars overturned a Labour majority of 19,500 to win the seat for the 
separatists.
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However, these developments alone cannot explain the rise in the support for 
separatism from the late 1980s onwards. A significant development has been the growth 
of the debate about European political integration. This development is crucial in any 
understanding of contemporary Scottish nationalism. The issue of oil did not prove as 
decisive as may have been believed in the 1970s. The SNP made much of this issue at 
the height of their Westminster representation between 1974-79, campaigning on slogans 
such as “Rich Scots, Poor Britons” and “It’s Scotland’s Oil” (Marr, 1995; 132). The oil 
issue does remain alive even today, with the SNP noting that whilst the UK government 
had ring-fenced 75 per cent of any oil discovered in the South Atlantic for the Falklands 
Islands, no oil revenues go directly to Scotland (Scottish National Party Press Release, 4 
November 1998). However, it has been the debate on European integration that has 
driven the Scottish separatism from the late 1980s onwards, but not in opposition to it, as 
in England, but in favour of the possibilities for autonomy which it opens up. As with the 
Labour Party, the 1980s were a time of transition for the SNP. Prior to the 1980s they 
could be mockingly described as the “Tartan Tories” and displayed a residual imperial 
consciousness. During the 1960s it was argued that for an independent Scotland ‘the ties 
of kinship and the influence of history require the closest direct political and economic 
relations with the self-governing Dominions’ (Scottish National Party, 1962: 6). 
Following the collapse of SNP Westminster representation from eleven MPs to two in 
1979 an internal debate started in the party that was eventually won by a group who 
wished to push the party to the centre-left. In some sense, this task was made easier by 
the SNP’s lack of power in all but a few local authorities. As Gerry Hassan noted out ‘at 
every opportunity [the SNP] support public sector demands for more funding and 
resources; they uncritically support every wage demand from teachers, nurses and doctors 
in an attempt to outflank Labour; and they cuddle up to institutional Scotland in order to 
capture intact the old Labour order, rather than critique and campaign against it’ (Hassan, 
1999: 26). Whilst this criticism is valid, anti-Conservatism during the 1980s pushed the 
party to the left almost by default, and at the same time pushing a significant proportion 
of the left towards nationalism. In 1985 the editorial of the Nationalist Left Review 
argued that:
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there is no doubt the SNP lacks a developed theoretical base. There is also no doubt 
that the theoretical basis for Scottish nationalism is both sound intellectually sound 
and honorable. There is nothing inherently evil about nationality. On the contrary, it 
is an important facet of the human condition. When nationality becomes nationalism, 
its quality is not lost but is given a political cutting edge. Events in the twentieth 
century have tended to create a climate in which nationalism is dismissed as an 
anachronism or backward, whereas it plays a major role in every nation’s politics in 
the present day {Nationalist Left Review, 1985: Editorial).
This adoption of separatism by the left in Scotland continued throughout the late 1980s 
and 1990s. During the 1997 referendum campaign, Mary Ward, member of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain and former leader of Dundee District Council headed 
the Campaign for Genuine Self-Determination. The CGSD complained that Blair’s New 
Labour was ‘trying to buy off our democratic aspirations with a talking shop, and 
demanded ‘a parliament with full powers -  a republic with the right to decide our 
relationship with the rest of Britain’ (CGSD Press Release, 21 July 1997). Whilst on the 
margins of the debate, the position of the CGSD as separatist nationalists foreshadowed 
the divide in the new Scottish Parliament between the unionist parties of new Labour, the 
Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, opposed to the separatist parties of the SNP, 
the Scottish Socialists and the Greens.
Assuming a position to the left of the Conservatives forced a rethink on the 
separatists’ attitude towards the European project. Whilst some separatists initially 
viewed European integration as another form of encroachment on Scottish autonomy, the 
SNP eventually came to embrace the development of the EU as central instrument of 
their separatist aspirations, an attitude ultimately embodied in the policy of 
“Independence in Europe”. Up until the late 1980s, SNP Annual Conferences passed 
motions preserving the right of an independent Scotland to opt out of the EEC if the UK 
joined. In 1982, Conference passed with a substantial majority the motion that ‘that 
membership of the European Economic Community is incompatible with Scotland’s 
national interests’ and that ‘at the next General Election the Scottish National Party must
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campaign on a policy of all out opposition to continued membership with a pledge to 
withdraw Scotland from membership on the attainment of independence, subject to a 
referendum of the Scottish people’ (Scottish National Party Annual Conference 1982, 
Resolution 35). This attitude was bom of the perceived extra layer of threat posed to 
Scottish autonomy that the EEC posed to Scottish autonomy. But during the 1980s, 
former Labour MP Jim Sillars, turned that argument around into a reason for working to 
protect Scottish autonomy within the EEC/EC and for focusing hopes for independence 
onto the development of European integration. In 1988 Conference passed a motion 
stating that ‘unless Scotland achieves independence within the Community, and is thus 
able to project Scottish interests, the single market of 1992 will have a devastating 
consequences for what is left of Scottish control and our economy,’ adding that the 
Scottish people ‘have the responsibility of determining whether Scotland flourishes as 
part of that wider partnership or fades away to become some backwater province of the 
English state governed by Thatcherite values’ (SNP Annual Conference 1988, Resolution 
29). From this time on ‘Independence in Europe’ became the SNP’s central policy and 
campaigning slogan. In 1995, the SNP claimed that:
The context of Scottish independence lies within the Europe which has developed 
since the end of the Second World War. The continuing development of European 
institutions, and the powers that have already accrued to them, provide an ideal forum 
for Scotland to work within as a free nation, and can define clearly the relationship 
between Scotland, England, Wales, Northern Ireland and other parts of Europe’ 
(Scottish National Party, 1995a: 15).
Arguably, adherence to this policy may seem to lack coherence as Scotland would 
be swapping ultimate control from one Union, that of Great Britain, for another, the 
European. However, the policy is essentially an argument for the viability of small 
nations within the European Union. For the SNP, the common market that exists 
between Scotland and England is now guaranteed by the Treaty of Rome and the Single 
European Act, rather than by the Treaty of Union (Scottish National Party, 1992). 
“Independence in Europe” has the further advantage of providing an alternative centre of
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power and decision making (Brussels) at the expense of Westminster. The policy states 
that Tn today’s global economy, where environmental, social and security problems cross 
political boundaries, the European Union provides the ideal framework for cooperation 
between nations -  making the Westminster Parliament increasingly irrelevant for the 
people of Scotland’ (Scottish National Party, 1996). Much of the ‘Independence in 
Europe’ policy rested on notions of greater Scottish influence at the European level, and 
the economic benefits of such direct representation. For the SNP, Scotland may be a 
small nation, but if it had its own representation at the EU it would be ‘small in size but 
not in influence’:
Like other small nations in the European Union, as a full member state, Scotland 
would have her turn at the 6-month EU presidency, be represented at all Council of 
Ministers meetings -  rather than the one in fifteen which Scottish Office ministers 
attend -  and enhance our representation on the Committee of the Regions and in the 
European Parliament (Scottish National Party, 1996).
The SNP argued that such direct representation would be of benefit to Scotland’s 
economy. Firstly, Scottish trade with a free market of 370 million people in the 
European free-trade area would not be jeopardised by Conservative Eurosceptics or 
Labour equivocation on the single currency, and secondly, it is noted that ‘Ireland saved 
its steel industry by arguing its case within Europe -  as a member state, while Scotland 
lost Ravenscraig because it was betrayed by the British government and British 
Steel’(Scottish National Party, 1996). The debate about the comparative weakness of 
sovereign states in the “global era”, became an enabling moment for Scottish separatists 
by weakening certain existing states and allowing separatists to advance arguments about 
the viability of certain potential smaller ones. But even the separatism of the SNP was a 
re-assertion of Scottish autonomy, only it was aspiring to an autonomy within the 
European Union rather than the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
119
Old Forms of Unionism and the Defence of Britishness
Prior to 1997, it was the Conservative Party that allied itself most strongly with an 
unreformed Unionism, although this ideology could still be found in the amongst certain 
members of the Labour Party. In responding to the nationalist challenges, features of 
Britishness were brought out by its defenders, illuminating the salient features of this 
ideology in Scotland.
Thatcherite economic reforms came with a heavy dose of British nationalism. 
Whilst claiming to roll back the powers of the state, the borders of the British state itself 
were seen as inviolate, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 notwithstanding. Notions of 
“unity” played and important part in the Thatcherite project, and the concept of unity 
guided Conservative approaches to Scottish nationalism. Even before coming to power 
in 1979, Thatcherite Conservatism in Scotland had dropped Edward Heath’s brief 
flirtation with devolution and set itself against both socialism and separatism. The 
alternative to these “-isms” was ‘the Conservative path towards One Nation -  a nation 
where prosperity and security for all are founded on the re-assertion of traditional 
standards and values and on individual enterprise, freedom, responsibility and initiative’ 
(Scottish Conservative Party, 1978: 1). Thus part of Britishness in Scotland had to be the 
denigration of nationalism and separatism as malign phenomena, that had already 
reduced the Britain’s “greatness” by denuding it of an empire. For the Conservative 
Party of the late 1970s, the SNP ‘stand for a Scottish state as separate from Britain as Sri 
Lanka or Singapore with its own controls at the border with England’ (Scottish 
Conservative Party, 1978: 2). Another strand of Britishness in Britain came in the form 
of an understanding of Britain’s role in world history and development:
We reject separatism because we are proud of our British heritage. United together in 
the past, the British have extended civilisation to the far comers of the globe and have 
twice this century alone taken a leading part in the defence of the civilised free world. 
As we look around the world today, we believe that our traditions of tolerance and our 
healthy respect for the freedom, rights and liberties of the individual, still make Great
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Britain -  despite our recent economic problems -  one of the finest countries in which 
to live’ (Scottish Conservative Party, 1978: 2).
Such rhetoric was also employed during the referendum campaign during August and 
September 1997 when Margaret Thatcher herself intervened with a defence of the Union 
and Britishness. She stated that ‘over the centuries in the UK, we have created something 
of which we should be proud, a history to which the Scots have made a special 
contribution and from which they -  like the English -  have received enormous benefits’ 
(Thatcher, 1998 [1997]: 301). Whilst she was correct about the role played by Scots in 
the creation of Britishness, the intervention of the architect of the poll tax in the 
referendum debate was an enormous fillip for the “Yes” campaign.
As the nationalist challenges developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Conservative Party intensified its appeals to the history and qualities of Britishness. Part 
of what right-wing journalist Michael Fry has described as ‘Toryism’s retreat into the 
laager’ (Fry, 1997) was the result of the merging of historical rhetoric and received 
wisdom about the development of democracy in Britain into a single story, with the 
British state as its centre piece. At the Annual Centre for Policy Studies lecture at the 
Conservative Party Conference in 1995, Charles Moore addressed the subject of 
Britishness. Moore acknowledges that Britishness was perceived less as an attachment to 
a homeland, but more as an allegiance to a state:
My observation of our history is that the British nation state is a coherent, working 
entity which has not been seriously disrupted for nearly three hundred years except in 
relation to Ireland. Our capacity to be British, our idea of ourselves and our sense of 
worth are built round this history. And it follows that our Parliament is crucial to our 
sense of worth as the Bundestag is not for the Germans or the Assemblee Nationale 
for the French (Moore, 1995: 18).
It is this ideology that equates the British state so closely with British history and 
the British constitutionalism, that helps explain the Conservative reaction to separatism of
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any sort in Britain. For the Conservative Party, allowing parts of the UK to secede was 
unthinkable, as any erosion of the sovereignty of Westminster would weaken the British 
state and the ideology attached to it. John Major made the defence of the Union an 
election issue in both 1992 and 1997. In 1997, he declared in Parliament that the 
devolution plans adopted by the Labour Party from the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention were ‘a blueprint that would undermine the unity of the United Kingdom and 
erode the authority of this Parliament’. He added that ‘Our constitution is the foundation 
of our democracy, our freedoms and our economic prosperity. That is why I defend it -  
and would change it only cautiously and after careful examination. It should not be a 
political plaything for party gain’ (Major, 1997). Drawing comparisons with the fate of 
other multi-national states in eastern Europe, the Scottish Conservative Manifesto 
referred to the devolution proposals as ‘chilling portents of disintegration’ (Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Party, 1997: 2).
Conservative defence of the Union also had to rest on, not only the malign effects 
of reform on the underpinnings of Britishness, but also the possibility of an English 
backlash and a questioning of Scotland’s status as a nation. Former Scottish Secretary 
Ian Lang rejected the notion of a ‘democratic deficit’ in Scotland, arguing, with 
justification, that the Scottish population was in fact over represented by MPs at 
Westminster. He attempted to counter the democratic deficit argument, by appealing to 
British sentiment and tarring the notion with the separatist brush. ‘The democratic deficit 
argument we hear in Scotland from time to time is essentially a separatist one, amounting 
as it does to a rejection of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament’ (Lang, 
1998 [1994]: 232). However, in denying the existence of a democratic deficit and 
asserting the sovereignty of Westminster and Britain, Lang implicitly denied the 
existence of Scotland as a nation. This was something his successor, Michael Forsyth 
could see was not a vote winner. In making the continued existence of Britain a 
contentious political issue, as the Euroscpetics were making it in London, Conservatism 
in Scotland needed to situate Scottishness within its version of Britishness. Whilst 
Scottish nationalists spoke of Scotland as the nation and Britain as the state, the 
Conservatives used the term nation ambiguously. John Major argued that ‘Only the
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Conservative and Unionist Party has the consistent purpose to... preserve our United 
Kingdom that came into existence nearly three centuries ago on 1 May. Let us make this 
anniversary a reaffirmation of national unity’ (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, 
1997: 3). Ian Lang had similarly appealed to Scottish pride by arguing that as a “junior 
partner” in the Union, Scotland’s international influence was greatly increased; ‘the 
Union has led to Scotland having a front row seat in the councils of the world -  the EU; 
the G7; the UN -  instead of being stuck in the gods’ (Lang, 1998 [1994]: 232). Michael 
Forsyth reverted to Scott’s “Silent Way”, arguing that Scotland’s national interests were 
best served by a continuing Union, and that Scottish nationalism was best channelled into 
a unitary Britishness. ‘Our country, Scotland, is strong and influential in the Union’ 
(Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, 1997: 3). Furthermore, ‘During nearly 300 
years of political union, Scotland has enjoyed freedom and security as an equal partner in 
one of the most successful and enduring associations in history -  a country united against 
aggressors and progressively more prosperous’ (Scottish Conservative and Unionist 
Party, 1997: 46). Another response was to attempt to ‘solve’ the political tensions without 
altering the sovereignty of Westminster. This led Forsyth to declare that ‘What the 
people of Scotland want... above all is government accountable to the Scottish Grand 
Committee which can thus assume and increased role in the parliamentary government of 
Scotland, bringing government closer to the people and in underpinning the Union’ 
(McLaughlin, 1995). However, such appeals to the arcane structures of Westminster 
were bound to weak when compared to the home rulers’ rhetoric of democracy and the 
separatists appeal to a nationalist interpretation of Scotland’s relations with England.
Even after the election defeat, the Conservative Party repeated its calls to 
Britishness during the referendum campaign in an attempt to derail the devolution 
proposals. At the first Scottish Conservative conference following the defeat of 1997, 
Michael Forsyth again attempted to accommodate Scottish consciousness within Britain, 
arguing that ‘We are the Scottish party, Scottish to the core, and confident in that 
indestructible Scottish identity, we are proudly British too -  Scotland’s pride, Britain’s 
glory’ (Dinwoodie, 1997). However, British glory was a commodity in short supply 
during the summer of 1997. Three days after the Conservative conference, the Glasgow
123
Herald reported that it was to be a soldier in one of the Highland regiments who would 
lower the Union Flag in Hong Kong, reporting that the parents of the chosen Gerard 
Rattray ‘could not hide their joy.’ In contrast to the tears of the Governor-General, Chris 
Patten, Mr and Mrs Rattray appeared to treat the end of British rule in Asia as something 
of a spectacle. Mr Rattray said, ‘We are so proud. We wish we could be there 
ourselves, but thank God for television. It is such a historic moment and we are over the 
moon that our son will play a part.’ Mrs Rattray added that the lowering of the flag is a 
job to which Gerard was ideally suited. ‘Tidiness has always been very important to him, 
so the demands of military life were never a problem for him. He even irons his 
girlfriend’s clothes when he is on leave.’ (Glasgow Herald, 30 July 1997). Appeals to 
this conception of Britishness were no longer a vote winner in Scotland. By the time a 
weak “No” campaign got off the ground in the devolution referendum, defence of the 
Union was only placed third out of three reasons to vote “No” (Think Twice, 1997).
The Nationalist Alliance
A Scottish Parliament was established in 1999 after a successful referendum held on 12 
September 1997. In some respects, the arguments for change had been won long before 
the issue was brought to a referendum. But the success of the referendum was in large 
measure due to the possibility of a temporary alliance between the two main strands of 
Scottish nationalism; home rule nationalism and separatism. In the lead up to the 
devolution referendum in September 1997, it was this alliance formed against the 
Conservative Unionists and the defenders of unreformed Britishness, that resulted in 
popular endorsement for the re-establishment of a Scottish Parliament.
Although the SNP remained outside of the Scottish Constitutional Convention 
formed 1989, the sentiment that the Union and the British constitution was not operating 
to Scotland’s benefit was something upon which they and the home rulers could agree. 
In 1995, SNP leader Alex Salmond drew on the lessons of Braveheart to send a message 
out to Scotland’s Unionist parties, stating that ‘anyone who knows the story and has seen 
the film will know, the real villains are not the English but the establishment leadership in 
Scotland who bought and sold their country for personal advancement’ (Salmond, 1995).
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The Constitutional Convention made less reference to figures from Scottish myth-history, 
but it too viewed the Union as the chief malefactor in Scottish history and politics, 
although here, “England” rather than the landowning class, is to blame:
the Union has always been and remains, a threat to the survival of a distinctive 
culture in Scotland... What is beyond dispute is that the impetus for Union came 
from the English and it was brought about for English reasons of state. Likewise 
the form of the Union was not what the Scots would have chosen but what the 
English were prepared to concede (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 2).
The historical development of the Constitution is thus seen as merely a continuation of 
English sovereignty with Scotland added on as a result of early eighteenth century 
realpolitik. The continued operation of English sovereignty in the guise of the British 
state was in itself tolerable for the home rulers until the advent of a government unwilling 
to abide by the Constitutions unwritten rules. The Claim o f Right stated:
The English Constitution provides only for one source of power; the Crown-in- 
Parliament... Historically, the power of Parliament evolved as a means of curbing 
the arbitrary power of Monarchs. We have now reached the point where the Prime 
Minister has in practice a degree of arbitrary power few, if any English and no 
Scottish Monarchs have rivaled. Yet he or she still hides behind the fiction of royal 
sanction and the pretense of deference to Parliament to give legitimacy to a 
concentration of power without parallel in western society (Constitutional Steering 
Group, 1988: 4).
The Constitutional Convention also viewed Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty as ‘a 
constitutional fiction that cloaks the effective exercise of sovereign power by the 
governing political party (or parties)’ (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1989: 16). 
The Convention set itself against this Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty as it meant that 
no government was bound by the decisions of the previous one, leading to fears that any 
Scottish parliament might be abolished by a future government.
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With this in mind, the Constitutional Convention rejected ‘Parliamentary 
sovereignty in favour of the sovereignty of the Scottish people. Popular sovereignty, not 
government sovereignty, is the fundamental tenet of [our] faith’ (Scottish Constitutional 
Convention, 1989: 17). Similarly, the basis of the SNP’s plans for a written, Scottish 
constitution was the ‘right of the Scottish people to self-determination and sovereignty 
over the territory and resources of Scotland’ (SNP, 1995a: 6). In an open letter to Tony 
Blair during the general election campaign of 1997, Moira Craig of the Campaign for a 
Scottish Assembly, argued that the Scottish constitutional tradition of popular 
sovereignty had existed in parallel with the English notion of Crown-in-Parliament 
sovereignty since 1707 (Scotland Forward Archive: 5). The recourse to popular 
sovereignty was a necessary move for the reformers if they were to obtain legitimation 
for their actions in the eyes of the people they ultimately needed to convince -  the 
Scottish electorate. This meant that the potentially dry subject of constitutional reform 
could be offered to the people of Scotland in populist terms and couched in the language 
of a Scottish consciousness that could easily be linked to political reform and a nationalist 
understanding of history and politics. This link was strengthened when the Constitutional 
Convention made the establishment of a Scottish parliament into an issue of minority 
rights. According to the CSG, the abuse of the Constitution represented ‘a hazard to the 
rights of minorities. Within the United kingdom the Scots are a minority which cannot 
ever feel secure under a constitution which in effect, renders the Treaty of Union a 
contradiction in terms, because it makes no provision for the safeguarding of any rights 
or guarantees and does not even require a majority of the electorate to override such 
rights and guarantees as may once have been offered’ (CSG, 1988: 5). This is not to 
overlook the important gains made in female representation in the new parliament, 
campaigned for strongly by “50/50” on a platform of equal numbers of male and female 
MPs elected through party lists. But once again, political reform converged with a 
nationalist interpretation of Scottish history. This discourse not only inverted the British 
narrative of the Constitution as the basis of individual freedom, but also implicitly made 
the establishment of a parliament into a conflict between a Scots minority struggling to
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establish what other nations have by right, and an English majority indifferent or hostile 
to such aspirations.
What also made the task of the reformers easier when it came to advocating a 
Scottish parliament in a referendum, was that, unlike in Australia, they did not feel 
obliged to make an alliance with conservatives in order to win their case. Robert 
McAlpin wrote to Nigel Smith, Chairman of the pro-devolution campaigning group 
Scotland Forward that ‘Perhaps the biggest problem a Yes campaign will face is apathy. 
The Scottish people are generally supportive of the devolution project -  the settled will is 
there -  but it has become too settled’ (Scotland Forward Archive: 3). Scotland Forward 
was the umbrella organisation for the “Yes” campaign and was supported financially by a 
GBP40,000 donation from two of Scotland’s largest unions, UNISON and EIS 
(Educational Institute of Scotland). It also enabled the referendum campaign to be 
fronted by a non-party organisation. But given the way that politics in Scotland had 
played out since 1979, the popular will had become settled in an anti-Tory alliance. 
Peter Kellner wrote to Smith in December 1996 with the advice that ‘The strategic task 
for the campaign is to preserve the current ‘yes’ majorities. I see little point in seeking to 
convert the 20-25% who currently oppose the idea of a Parliament with tax-varying 
powers on essentially Unionist grounds’ (Scotland Forward Archive: 3). Additionally, it 
was possible to neutralise the potentially negative business opinion on devolution by just 
keeping quiet on the subject and not pressing business too hard (Scotland Forward, 1997: 
22). Thus, whilst in Australia during the republic referendum, class politics were turned 
against the reformers who were portrayed as a group of political elites out of touch with 
the electorate, this did not happen in Scotland, where the electorate voted 74-26 per cent 
in favour of creating 129 more politicians. The Think Twice “No” campaign attempted 
to play the anti-politician card, warning that ‘more jobs for the boys and the risk of 
separation are too high a price’ for the establishment of a parliament in Edinburgh, but 
the vote in favour was convincing (Think Twice, 1997). Ultimately, a vote for the 
Scottish Parliament in the referendum became a further manifestation of the rejection of 
the Conservative Party in Scotland.
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The main concern for the “Yes” campaign was not what to do about the 
Unionists, but what to do about the separatists. Alex Salmond had declared the SNP’s 
position to the STUC in 1992, pointing out that the SNP was keeping out of the 
Constitutional Convention because it was ‘not in the business of saving the Union, but of 
saving the Scottish nation by ending our participation in that arrangement’ (Salmond, 
1992). The sticking point for the separatists was the fear that devolution might take the 
wind out of the SNP’s sails, as the granting of a Scottish Parliament was after all intended 
to strengthen the Union and prevent is dissolution, the stated aim of the SNP. One SNP 
member wrote to Smith before the referendum began on the subject of SNP support for 
the establishment of a Edinburgh parliament. ‘Government must refrain from any 
statement’ he wrote, ‘to the effect that the present Bill is the beginning and the end of 
devolution, or that the Scottish parliament will never be allowed to increase its powers’ 
(Scotland Forward Archive: 1). But again the nationalist alliance was stronger than the 
mutual suspicions. The threat to Scotland’s autonomy over the previous eighteen years 
of Conservative government were too great for the separatists to ignore, particularly in 
the light of the overwhelming New Labour majority gained in Westminster on 1 May 
1997. In July 1997 the SNP agreed to lend its support to the referendum campaign 
through the Scotland Forward umbrella. The SNP was able to offer several reasons for 
their about-face, from ‘any changes are better than complete London control of Scotland’ 
to ‘devolution will open the door to further constitutional change, and thus to 
independence’, which remains the official line on the SNP’s participation in the new 
parliament (Scottish National Party Research Department, 1997). However, in 
supporting the Constitutional Conventions plans for a Parliament, the separatists admitted 
that a reformed Britishness remained part of Scottish consciousness and that 
independence for Scotland was still some way off:
Scotland needs a Parliament. The SNP believes that such a Parliament should be 
independent, free to take all of Scotland’s decisions and to use Scotland’s wealth to 
invest in our future. But we recognise that we must move at the same pace as the 
people and believe that any progress towards a Scottish parliament should be 
welcomed and helped (Scottish National Party, 1997).
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One important strand of Britishness that was barely raised during this period was the 
monarchy, even though the death of Diana and the fleeting anti-Monarchical sentiment 
attendant to it, occurred right in the middle of the devolution referendum. Thus, unlike 
Australia, republicanism has little popular support in Britain and certainly far less of an 
organised presence. Occasionally, republican, or at least anti-monarchical sentiment 
would manifest itself. In January 1997, a Carlton TV poll on the monarchy, suffering its 
worst period of popularity since the 1870s, found that whilst out of 2.5 million calls, the 
general trend in the UK was to retain the Monarchy by 66 per cent to 34 per cent, in 
Scotland, 56 per cent of respondents had voted to abolish the monarchy (Gray and Parker, 
1997). The result was explained away as a miscalculation several days later, but initially 
the parties were free to draw their own conclusions. Conservative Allan Stewart said that 
T think the Scottish people have been more sort of generally “anti” things -  anti the 
monarchy, anti the system. There may be an element of that.’ The SNP’s (republican) 
Roseanna Cunningham argued that ‘Scotland really is looking critically at the whole of 
the constitutional set up and that the different political debate that exists north of the 
border is not confined to just one aspect of our constitutional future, but the whole of it’, 
whilst New Labour and the Liberal Democrats agreed on the need for change. Labour’s 
Malcolm Chisholm stated that ‘Labour supports the monarchy, but it clearly needs to 
change with the times’ (Gray and Parker, 1997). Despite Cunningham’s interpretation 
the official SNP policy on the monarchy in an independent Scotland envisages ‘a limited 
constitutional monarchy, with executive power exercised on the advice of and by a 
Cabinet led by a Prime Minister elected by the Parliament of Scotland’, adding that ‘the 
Queen and her successors shall remain head of state in an independent Scotland as long 
as the people of Scotland so wish’ (Scottish National Party, 1995a: 6-7). Thus if 
Scotland were to secede, there would not necessarily be a republic run from Edinburgh, 
but more a return to the status quo ante of 1603, with the monarch governing two 
independent kingdoms, much as is the case in Australia.
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Conclusion
The establishment of a parliament in Edinburgh in 1999 was both contingent and 
historically structured. That is to say, contemporary Scottish nationalists achieved a 
Parliament when they did for reasons of economic change and party politics specific to 
the 1980s and 1990s. However, that a reaction to these changes and policies took a 
nationalist form was the result of the historical creation of the multi-national British state 
and Scotland’s autonomous status within it. As the economic and political events of the 
1980s and 1990s appeared to Scotland’s left-leaning elites as a threat to Scotland’s 
autonomy, nationalist solutions were proposed to the perceived crisis in Scottish politics, 
varying from devolution to outright independence. Furthermore, the somewhat dry 
subject of constitutional reform was refracted through this nationalist prism, and it was 
this successful alliance between a political reform agenda and nationalist sentiment that 
resulted in the re-establishment of a Scottish parliament. The result was a rejection of the 
unitary notion of Britishness predicted on the defence of Westminster’s sovereignty. The 
Edinburgh parliament did, however, represent some continuity with Scotland’s nationalist 
traditions. It was a product of the perceived threat to Scotland’s autonomy posed by the 
growing powers of the British state. The outcome of the nationalist agitation of the 1980s 
and 1990s was not an independent Scotland, but a re-assertion of Scotland’s autonomy 
within the United Kingdom.
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chapter 4:
Republicanism and Nationalism in Australia
T n  the immediate aftermath of the defeat of the republic referendum of November 1999, 
XMalcolm Turnbull blamed the Australian public’s level of education on constitutional 
issues for the failure of the Yes campaign:
Unpalatable, unfashionable, politically correct or whatever, there is no point kidding 
ourselves. The biggest differentiator of Yes or No was knowledge. Of course plenty 
of Ph.D.s voted no and plenty of high school drop-outs voted yes. Not all educated 
people have a clue about the issue, and not all those who left school at fifteen are 
constitutionally illiterate... We must not let the desperate desire not to be “elitist” 
lead us into imagining that the voters always get it right. There is nothing elitist in 
pointing out that most Australians know nothing about their Constitution (Turnbull, 
2000: 249).
In fact it was the charge of “elitism” that was far more damaging to the republican cause 
than a lack of popular understanding about Australia’s constitution. Indeed this supposed 
“elitism” was derived in part from the conservative, minimalist position of the Australian 
Republican Movement (ARM) and its political allies that committed them to the 
sovereignty of Parliament, a central tenet of Britishness. This commitment to 
Parliamentary sovereignty inhibited the formation of a successful nationalist alliance 
between elites and masses. Ultimately, the minimalist position, wedded as it was to 
Parliamentary sovereignty, actually enhanced the legacy of Britishness in Australian 
public life, despite seeming to challenge its most visible pillar, the Queen. This failed 
republican attempt came at a time when other manifestations of nationalism in Australia, 
such as Anzac Day and the xenophobia and economic nationalism of One Nation, 
impacted on political debate. These competing articulations of Australian nationalism 
made the task of the minimalists harder, but ultimately it was the Britishness of the
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minimalists, as much as that of the monarchists, that led to the defeat of the proposed 
republic in nineteen ninety-nine.
Republicans and Monarchists
An Australian republic was presented during the 1990s as the best solution to the decline 
of the military and trading links with Britain that had provided Australian nationalism 
with its guiding rationale. As the pattern of immigration shifted away from the 
dependence upon migrants from the United Kingdom and Ireland, demographic shifts 
were also used as a justification for establishing a republic. The dominant republic 
movement, however, was far from radical. The conservative approach adopted by these 
republicans, and the long development of Australian nationalism within the ideological 
traditions of Britishness, meant that the republicans had more in common with the 
monarchists than either of the two camps’ rhetoric allowed. The minimalist republicans’ 
denial of popular sovereignty permitted the monarchists to turn their campaign into a 
popular protest against those seeking to remove the Queen as head of state in Australia.
Central to understanding the wider political debate of the 1990s was the re­
structuring of the Australian economy by the Labor governments that came to power after 
1983. These governments (led by Bob Hawke, with Paul Keating as Treasurer until 
December 1991 when Keating became Prime Minster) faced the need to control large 
foreign debt as well as integrate the Australian economy into emerging Asian economies. 
As such, the Australian economy was re-structured along “global”, neo-liberal lines. The 
financial sector was de-regulated in December 1983 with the floating of the Australian 
dollar. The Accord between the Australian Labor Party and the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions agreed upon in the same year, also opened up Australian business and 
industry to similarly de-regulated overseas competition and imposed more “competitive” 
wage structures (Bryan and Rafferty, 1999: 83). Tariff reduction plans were announced 
in 1988, to reduce the tariff from 15-10 per cent over four years. For Paul Kelly, the 
Hawke-Keating governments were crucial in dismantling the economic aspects of the 
post-Federation “Australian settlement”, based upon wage arbitration, industry 
protection, state paternalism, imperial benevolence and White Australia (Kelly, 2001:
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257). As Carol Johnson argues, given that neo-liberalism involves de-regulation and the 
development of free market economies, the state begins to play a somewhat different role 
in shaping the behaviour of its citizens. It encourages new forms of self-management 
whilst at the same time relying on the operation of the market in spheres that were once 
regarded as political (Johnson, 2000: 100). Australian republicanism of the 1990s should 
be seen in this context. The republic, it was hoped, would provide a new form of national 
unity at a time when older forms were being replaced or denigrated as “irrelevant” to 
Australia’s modem condition.
At one level, the idea of a republic provided Paul Keating with an issue with 
which to divide and distract his Liberal and National Party adversaries during the 
economic downturn of the early 1990s. In a similar fashion, Keating made a connection 
between his vision of a republic and his notion of Australia’s “Asian engagement”. One 
of Keating’s expressed motives for establishing a republic was to encourage both ‘long­
term national cohesion and sense of ourselves’ (Keating, 1996: 8). The economic 
reforms of 1980s and the republic were linked and portrayed in the same nationalist light: 
‘Much the same desire to preserve Australia’s egalitarian values and traditions and 
maintain cohesion and harmony led us, as we made the structural changes to intensify our 
efforts to strengthen Australia’s social fabric’ (Keating, 1996: 8). But for Keating, the 
older symbols and cliches of Australian nationhood could be made more acceptable to an 
idealised, “Asian”, audience. Speaking in Singapore, he argued that:
Indeed the word most Australians would very likely choose to describe as the core 
Australian value is “mateship” -  and “mateship” expresses an ethic of 
communitananism and mutual obligation which in other contexts is called “Asian” 
(Keating, 1996: 11) .
Although, the concept of engagement with Asia belonged particularly to Paul 
Keating, such rhetoric entered into the arguments of other republicans as they presented 
their arguments for changing Australia’s head of state. In his first letter to Australian 
Republican Movement members as president of the ARM, Malcolm Turnbull wrote that:
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As Australia seeks to resolve critical questions of identity, as we seek to understand 
our history and our relationship with our indigenous people, and as we seek to 
establish more and tangible regional relationships, the republic will act as a unifying 
symbol of a new era we are entering (Turnbull, 1994c).
Whilst Australia’s relations with its Asian neighbours figured in justifications for 
establishing a republic, it was just one of several influences motivating the republican 
camp. George Winterton identified four main sources of republican support. Such 
sources were opposition to the hereditary principle, adherence to Australian notions of 
popular sovereignty that ran counter to the social inequality inherent in the concept of 
Monarchy, and a desire to hitch the push for a republic to a wider programme of 
constitutional reform. However, perhaps the most significant concept driving Australian 
republicanism was what Winterton referred to as that of ‘national identity’; the basic 
desire that Australia should have its own head of state and not have to share that head of 
state with any other country (Winterton, 1994 [1986]: 23-6).
The idea that the monarchy in Australia was a sort of “colonial anachronism” that 
in no way properly reflected Australia’s status as an independent state emerged forcefully 
in the wake of Whitlam’s dismissal in 1975 (see Chapter 2 above). Such arguments 
were also used by the Australian Republican Movement during the 1990s. For Malcolm 
Turnbull, it was not the dismissal of Gough Whitlam by Sir John Kerr that inspired his 
republicanism, but the Royal presence at the celebrations of the Bicentenary of the First 
Fleet’s landing at Sydney Cove. Turnbull saw royal participation in the celebration of 
Australian nationhood as a matter of national humiliation. He wrote that ‘the Bicentennial 
year was a year of shame. Every major event was presided over by a member of the 
British royal family. When the world was looking at Australia in a way that it never had 
before, we demonstrated to the world that we were not yet a nation’ (Turnbull, 1994a: 3). 
However, republicanism was truly placed on the political agenda in 1991 when a 
constitutional convention convened in Sydney to commemorate the centenary of the 1891 
Australian Convention that had originally met to discuss proposals for federation of the
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colonies (including New Zealand and Fiji). The 1991 Convention concluded with 
majority support for an Australian republic (McKenna, 1996: 248). In June of that year, 
the Labor Party conference in Hobart adopted a move towards a republican form of 
government as part of its party programme, whilst two weeks later in Sydney the 
Australian Republican Movement was launched. Describing republicanism as ‘an 
avowedly nationalist enterprise,’ Turnbull argued that the Queen was no more an 
Australian institution than the House of Lords or the College of Heralds and that the 
English monarchy in Australia represented ‘the last vestige of colonialism’ (Turnbull, 
1991: 6). Through such rhetoric, it appeared that Australian republicanism was indeed a 
rejection of Britishness.
The logic developing out of such rhetoric was akin to that of a basic “liberation 
nationalism”, where Australians would at last be truly independent of foreign elements in 
their system of governance. For the republicans, removing the Queen as head of state in 
Australia represented the last step in the journey from colonies, to dominion status to full, 
independent statehood. Turnbull argued that ‘A nation defines itself by being different’ 
(Turnbull 1994a: 4), but the difference that had emerged over the course of Australian 
history since 1788 was compromised by sharing a monarch with Britain, the former 
“Mother Country”. Australia, along with many other nations within Britain and the 
British empire, had long negotiated its sense of national difference within the context of 
the empire. The monarchy itself had evolved in form and function to be a symbol of this 
imperial unity and national diversity. However, during the 1990s, the Australian 
republicans portrayed the monarchy as the institution that denied the Australian nation its 
difference. Again, Turnbull attempted to subvert what was once an incredibly popular 
institution into a matter of national shame. ‘Only colonies continue to borrow the 
monarchies of other lands’, he wrote, adding that ‘the monarch in Australia is a colonial 
institution whose time has passed’ (Turnbull, 1994a: 4).
The idea that the monarchy in Australia was a phenomenon both out of time and 
place was an import part of the wider republican rhetoric. In 1992, Keating argued that 
republicanism, despite being “inevitable”, still encountered ‘deep, if irrational responses
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including unyielding resistance’ from sections of the Australian community (quoted in 
The Age, 26 February 1992). Minimalist republicans attempted to play down the impact 
of the proposed changes in order not to alienate those demonstrating “irrational 
resistance”. The Republic Advisory Committee was established by Keating in 1992, and 
reported the following year on ‘the means of introducing into our successful system of 
representative parliamentary democracy an entirely Australian office of Head of State 
which will enhance our national democratic institutions without diminishing the authority 
or legitimacy of our Parliament, or the Government which is responsible to it’ (Republic 
Advisory Committee, 1993: 1). In 1995, Keating described the republican initiative as 
asserting ‘nothing more than our unique identity. It expresses nothing more than our 
desire to have a Head of State who is truly one of us. It changes nothing more than what 
is required to make clear and unambiguous our independence and responsibility for our 
own affairs’ (Keating, 1995: 3).
Nevertheless, sentimental links between Britain and Australia were still 
sufficiently strong for republican spokespeople to spend time countering the view that 
they were anti-British. Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating’s attitudes towards the 
Monarchy caused consternation in both countries. When Keating supposedly touched the 
royal person during one of the Queen’s visits to Australia and then asserted in front of 
Her Majesty that ‘sometime early next century Australia should complete an inevitable 
historical evolution towards republican government’ (quoted in Sydney Morning Herald, 
29 February 1992), the British tabloid The Sun dubbed Keating the ‘Lizard of Oz’ and ‘a 
thoroughly rude blighter’ (quoted in The Age, 26 February 1992). To counter such 
portrayals, Keating argued in Parliament that ‘the creation of an Australian republic is not 
an act of rejection. It is one of recognition: in making the change we will recognise that 
our deepest respect is for our Australian heritage, our deepest affection is for Australia 
and our deepest responsibility is for Australia’s future’ (Keating, 1995: 2). In 1996, 
Australian Republican Movement national committee member Michael Fullilove won a 
Rhodes scholarship to Oxford University and defended his decision to go in the following 
terms: T like many things about Britain. I am interested in British history, I admire
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British institutions and I like the British people. I just don’t think that we need a British 
head of state’ (Fullilove, 1996).
Questions about the nationality of Australia’s head of state became bound up 
debates about demographic change and national consciousness in post-War Australia. At 
his Australia Day Address in 1999, republican Steve Vizard asked rhetorical questions 
about the basis of Australian national consciousness: ‘Do we find this common bond of 
‘belonging”, of “Australianess”, in some common ethnicity? Clearly not. We are a 
manifestly diverse society represented by over a hundred different racial, ethnic or 
national groups. Do we find it in a common place of birth? Clearly not. Nearly a quarter 
of our people were bom overseas’ (Vizard, 1999). This diversity led some republicans to 
adopt a definition of nationhood that was predicated on loyalty to an Australian head of 
state. New South Wales judge, Irene Moss, argued that Australia was undergoing a form 
of “identity crisis”, given the levels of non-British migration since 1947. Her solution to 
this perceived crisis was an Australian republic. But this called for a redefinition of 
Australian consciousness by invoking an Australian nationalism that by her own 
admission could no longer be taken for granted. She argued that:
Israel has a population as diverse as Australia’s but it has a unifying national religion 
which provides its culture, its history and its mores. Australia does not. We are 
going to have a multicultural Australia whose only unifying thread is its 
Australianess. This is why we have to resolve our identity crisis and decide what 
Australianess is going to be. It would seem inevitable that this nationalism will find 
its formal expression as a republic... (Moss, 1994: 139).
Thus justifications for removing the British monarch as head of state became 
bound up with an understanding of Australia as a society whose position as one of the 
most demographically diverse countries in the world was advanced as its defining 
feature. Not all republicans, however, were keen to ally themselves with multicultural 
Australia, and some explicitly rejected it. Conservatives republicans such as historian 
John Hirst, were not attracted to a republican position by issues such as cultural diversity,
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gender equality, partnership with Asian and Pacific countries or reconciliation with 
Aboriginal Australia; instead it was the very unity of Australia that was at stake. For 
John Hirst, the integrative functions of Australian nationalism and civic culture were 
weakened by the continuing use of a distant Monarch. As early as 1991, Hirst argued 
that the Monarch had lost its role in Australian civic life: ‘it is not in our interests to offer 
migrants a symbol which we don’t take seriously ourselves’ (Hirst, 1991: 9). Hirst went 
on to argue that naturalisation ceremonies were the only place in civic culture where the 
Monarchy still had a role, but ‘While the oath at naturalisation ceremonies is 
monarchical, the dignitaries speak the mumbo-jumbo of multiculturalism’ (Hirst, 1991: 
9). Thus the monarchy should be abandoned as its hollow appeal was being replaced by 
the doctrine of multiculturalism, that in itself represented a threat to the cohesiveness of 
the Australian nation. For Hirst, the republic would provide a meaningful symbol for 
Australian citizenship and nationality that was being undermined by the absent monarch 
and replaced by the divisive practice of multiculturalism.
For some republicans, the issue was a very narrowly defined one; replacing the 
Monarch with an Australian president, elected by a two-thirds majority of parliament. 
From the outset, Malcolm Turnbull argued against widening the debate. ‘Inevitably,’ he 
said, ‘other constitutional issues will arise in the course of this debate, but as Republicans 
we must be careful not to allow our focus to be clouded’ (Turnbull, 1991: 6). For other 
supporters, however, the republic became associated with much wider and more diverse 
issues, one that would reconcile the religious, ethnic, racial and gender diversity of 
Australian society within a continuing, albeit modified, sense of nationhood. It would do 
this by providing a figurehead that did not have such deep symbolic resonance with 
Australia’s colonial and dominion history as the Windsor monarchy did. In Labor Prime 
Minister Paul Keating, the republic issue found a prominent and committed supporter, 
particularly during times of economic recession. Nevertheless, Keating’s commitment to 
the republic was profound, and in this issue he found a neat summation of many the 
directions he wished to steer Australia. In The Way Forward, presented to Parliament in 
1995, Keating outlined his reasons for supporting the republic. For Keating, the change
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from monarchy to republic would present a general opportunity for change and an 
opportunity to ally the republic with a wide variety of “progressive” issues:
An Australian Head of State can embody our modem aspirations -  our cultural 
diversity, our evolving partnership with Asia and the Pacific, our quest for 
reconciliation with Aboriginal Australians, our ambition to create a society in which 
women have an equal opportunity, equal representation and equal rights. In this 
decade we have a chance few other countries have; in declaring ourselves for an 
Australian republic, we can give expression to both our best traditions and our current 
sensibilities and ambitions (Keating, 1995: 3-4).
The idea that the Australian head of state should be an Australian was central to 
the ARM’s argument, but it was supported by other sentiments. George Winterton 
argued that opposition to the hereditary principle, although secondary in importance to 
the question of the head of state’s nationality, was still a motivating factor in support for 
the republican cause (Winterton, 1994: 23). The non-meritocratic nature of the hereditary 
principle only added to the sense that the monarchy was more than a colonial 
anachronism and was indeed an anachronism in general, utterly out of step with 
community values in Australia. Liberal Senator Maris Payne caricatured the monarchical 
system:
POSITION VACANT FOR AUSTRALIAN HEAD OF STATE
Wanted: a natural leader, in tune with the community, committed to the Australian
way of life and the progress of the Australian People, preferably not a politician.
Applicants should possess the following attributes: eldest male in the family, but in 
the event none is available will consider a woman; member of the Church of England; 
member of the Royal House of Windsor, resident of the Umted Kingdom.
Australians need not apply. (Payne, 1999: 56)
For some republicans, not necessarily linked to the ARM, the republican cause 
was a means by which to strike a blow at conservatism in Australia. For Timothy Doyle 
it was the continuing dominance of conservative mythology that was not only manifested
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in the continuance of the monarchy, but also contributed to a non-critical analysis of the 
role of the monarchy in Australia (Doyle, 1993: 122). For Doyle, and attack on the 
monarchy was an attack on conservatism and vice versa, the result of which would 
ideally be a ‘new Australian republican mythology’ to replace ingrained notions of 
conservatism (Doyle, 1993: 133). For independent New South Wales politician, Ted 
Mack, republicanism was inseparably linked with a rejection of the hereditary principle 
and the notion of popular sovereignty. During the Constitutional Convention of February 
1998, Mack argued that monarchy was:
incompatible with democracy where any citizen should be able to aspire to the 
highest office in the land. We have moved away from the concept of subjects loyal to 
a monarch. In a democracy it is our leaders who should bear exclusive allegiance to 
the people... The people are sovereign, not the monarch and not the parliament. 
That is the definition of a republic and that is what should be entrenched in our 
constitution (Mack, 1998).
However, not all republicans were of this mind. Many supporters of the republic were 
“conservatives”, not in the sense that they wished to preserve everything as it was, but in 
the sense outlined by Locke, Burke and Bagehot. Republican Greg Craven situated his 
outlook within this tradition; ‘The genius of the British constitution... has lain not in a 
refusal to change, but rather in an ability to make continually relevant basic governmental 
values through a willingness to alter the constitutional prism through which they are 
reflected’ (Craven, 1999). Craven described himself as ‘a rabid constitutional 
reactionary’ and distanced himself from any change other than was absolutely necessary 
in order to preserve ‘not the incidents and detail of the constitutional order, but its 
fundamental essence (Craven, 1999). Thus even those who wished to remove the Queen 
often retained this part of the British legacy.
In Keating’s view, it was just these British origins that were alienating the 
Australian populace from the constitution of the Commonwealth. In 1993 he addressed 
an audience gathered in Corowa to commemorate the centenary of the unofficial
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gathering of the federal leagues and Australian Natives’ Association that was credited 
with re-invigorating the process of federation after the economic and social disruptions of 
the early 1890s. Drawing heavily on Manning Clark’s interpretation of Federation, 
Keating attempted to close a chapter on the 1901 Constitution and argued that the 
torthcoming constitutional debate would re-invigorate public engagement with the 
political process:
The Constitution was the foundation of a new national entity. Read in 1993, it 
is an uninspired and uninspiring document: complex, legalistic and virtually 
impossible to relate to contemporary Australian life. It was framed as a routine 
piece of nineteenth-century British imperial legislation ... We want Australians 
to consider the strengths and weaknesses of their Constitution. We want them 
to debate the advantages and disadvantages of making our constitution more 
closely reflect Australian reality, Australian values, Australian hopes. In the 
end we want an Australian constitution in which Australians believe (Keating, 
1993b: 63-4).
For Keating, it was the republican push that was to be ‘very much the precursor to 
enabling the people to reclaim the Constitution’ (Keating, 1993b: 64). As the market 
driven reforms of the 1980s reduced the privileged role of the state in shaping a 
collective consciousness, it was issues of “national identity” that republicans hoped 
would re-legitimate the state and bring people closer to their government. The people of 
Australia were invoked as part of this nationalist project to remove the British monarch 
as head of state in Australia. Echoing the rhetoric that surrounded the movement for 
Federation a century earlier, Malcolm Turnbull concluded The Reluctant Republic stating 
that, ‘Australia’s destiny is in the hands of its people -  and it is to the Australian people 
that we must commit the cause of the republic’ (Turnbull, 1994a: 265). But it was here 
that the minimalists failed, and this failure to make the minimalist cause a popular one 
resulted in the defeat of the referendum proposal in 1999.
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However much its detractors tried to portray the monarchy as an anachronism at 
the end of the twentieth century, the demise of the monarchy in Australia was by no 
means inevitable. Whatever their reasons for supporting the abolition of the monarchy, 
the republicans had pitted themselves against an ideology embedded in Australian 
political consciousness since the invasion, conquest and settlement of the continent from 
1788 onwards. It would be wrong to see the failure to remove the monarch as head of 
state from Australian constitution as a victory for monarchist sentiment. This being said, 
there was some evidence of a section of the Australian community who valued the 
continuing link with the monarchy. Polls suggested that around one-quarter of the 
Australian electorate wished to retain the monarch and the governor-general in an 
unchanged form (McAllister, 2001: 256). Although the ARM went to great lengths to 
suggest that it was not the Queen herself to which they objected but the monarch’s role in 
the Australian constitution, this perceived attack on the person of Her Majesty drew some 
scorn from those sections of the community who supported the idea of the Queen as Head 
of State. On the eve of the referendum vote in 1999, a letter writer from Queensland 
argued that ‘the orgy of narrow nationalism being advocated by the republicans over this 
issue is sickening -  patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels. Long live the Queen.’ 
{WeekendAustralian, 6-7 November 1999).
However, such direct support of the monarchy as an explicit form of Britishness 
in Australian nationalism was not the main reason for the failure to establish an 
Australian republic in 1999. The Australians for Constitutional Monarchy (ACM) 
distanced themselves from such argument, at least in public. Instead, the institutions of 
Britishness were merged into the monarchists’ version of Australian nationalism and 
consciousness, much as they had been throughout Australia’s modem history. In this 
way, the monarchists began to counter the notion that it was the republicans who were the 
true Australian patriots whilst the monarchists were trapped in obeisance to the British 
Crown. One time executive director of Australians for Constitutional Monarchy, Liberal 
politician Tony Abbott, explicitly stated that the ACM’s campaign was ‘an attempt to 
justify keeping the Crown in the Australian system of Government without relying on 
any appeal to “British-ness” (Abbott, 1995: 6). For Abbott, Australian consciousness and
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monarchy were entirely compatible, even if Australian and British nationality were 
utterly distinct:
For Australians, “Britishness” did not mean wearing bowler hats to work or speaking 
with fruity accents. It meant belonging to a mutual self-help society bound together 
by ties of trade and defence in the strongest alliance of different nations the world had 
ever seen. It meant participation in a supra-national association with common bonds, 
a common language and the common law system -  the finest and fairest yet evolved 
(Abbott, 1997: 101).
Thus during the 1990s, the monarchists recapitulated the evolutionary notion of 
Britishness and Australian nationalism that, they argued, explained a lot about the 
contemporary form of Australian consciousness. As in Britain itself, this consciousness 
was a mixture of Whig history and a defence of a conservative social order. . It’s themes 
were the rule of law and constitutionalism combined with some local content in national 
myths and symbols. In an address to the Australian Constitutional Foundation on 13 
August 1996, Justice Michael Kirby argued that:
So far as the government is concerned, many of the blessings we enjoy derive not 
from the written text of the Constitution, as such, but from centuries of heroic 
struggles in England which preceded Federation. By those struggles, the people 
asserted, eventually, their own paramountcy over the Crown and other powerful 
interests. Our Constitution is part of this lineage of the constitutional struggles of the 
people of England... The political conventions by which we live are part of our 
heritage as an English-speaking nation. The text of the Commonwealth Constitution 
Act may be uninspiring and austere for some readers... [However,] its forebears 
include the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the Act of Settlement of 
1701, the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the United States 
Constitution... (ACM, 1996: 33).
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While the defenders of the role of the Crown in Australian politics were labeled 
“monarchists” during the debate, few in the “No” campaign argued in support of the 
monarchy as such, or for Australia as part of a wider British consciousness. Instead, the 
constitutional history of England was presented as an essential component of the current 
“Australian character”. In this sense, it was asserted that the institutional expression of 
Australian nationalism, the Constitution of 1901, founded and guaranteed the mythical 
egalitarian and democratic tendencies in Australian nationalism. In a speech on 
‘Australian Culture and Identity’ in June of 1994, Vice-Chancellor of Sydney University 
Dame Leone Kramer argued that ‘as a people perhaps our most significant attributes have 
been our tolerance, our sense of equality, our sense of fair play. All these have been 
fostered under our existing constitution’ (ACM, 1996: 34).
As with the republicans, nationalism was invoked by the monarchists as a way of 
addressing the alienation created by the economic restructuring of the Hawke-Keating- 
Howard years. In the case of the monarchists, however, defending the status quo was 
equated with social stability, despite the cross-party consensus on economic rationalism 
and neo-liberalism. Tony Abbott argued that the monarch’s continuing position as head 
of the Church of England was ‘a powerful reminder of enduring values which should 
transcend the “them and us”, “what’s in it for me?”, noting counts except the bottom 
line” approach that often threatens to dominate government and degrade contemporary 
society’ (Abbott, 1997: 124). So rather than a defence of the person of the Queen and her 
role in Australia, what emerged during the debate was a defence of the role of the Crown 
in politics along the lines of Edmund Burke and Walter Bagehot, preserving the 
“efficient” part of government from “extreme’ political doctrines and actions. Whilst this 
ideology had been “nationalised” for Australian purposes, this type of argument had been 
at the centre of notions of the sovereignty of Crown-in-Parliament and institutional 
expressions of Britishness for over two centuries. In this way, the monarchists made 
Britishness an essential foundation of Australian national consciousness.
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Anzac, One Nation and the Failure of Republicanism.
Republicanism was not the only type of nationalism in Australia that became politically 
salient during the last decade. The resurgence of Anzac Day, the subsequent popularity 
of the Anzac myth and the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party all impacted on the 
republican debate in adverse ways for the republicans. The British, imperial heritage 
bound up with the Anzac myth made it difficult for republicans to link the two nationalist 
themes, while the “anti-elite” rhetoric of One Nation carried over into a populist critique 
of the minimalist republicans.
The growth in attendance at Anzac Day parades around the country and the re- 
emergence of the Anzac legend became an important component of Australian 
consciousness after the relative decline of Anzac during the 1970s and ‘80s (Macleod, 
2002). Each side on the republican debate attempted to appropriate the symbolism of 
Anzac for their own ends. But more crucially, attempts by members of the republican 
camp such as Keating, who crucially helped to re-popularise Anzac, failed to decisively 
link republicanism with the Anzac Legend and its potential to mobilise opinion. Despite 
being bom of a putatively anti-British founding moment around the debacle in the 
Dardenelles in 1915, the custodians of the Legend, the Returned and Services League of 
Australia, remained resolute defenders of Britishness in Australia. In this sense it was 
impossible for republicans to link their campaign for change to this important form of 
Australian nationalism in the lead up to the republic referendum in 1999.
Attendance at Anzac Day appeared to be increasing during the 1990s. The 
popularity of Anzac reached a low point during the 1970s and 1980s after Australia’s 
involvement in the war in Vietnam made the commemoration of Australia’s military 
exploits a contentious issue. By the 1990s, however, this had changed. In 1991 the 
Canberra Times was not reporting the crowd figures at the dawn service or parade at the 
Australian War Memorial, even given the return of personnel who’d seen active service 
in the Gulf War. The following year, only an estimated 4,000 people attended the parade, 
but after that the crowds became ‘unusually large’. From 1993, attendance at the parade 
increased from 6,000, through 15,000 and onto 20,000 people by 1997, in addition to
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increased turnouts for the chilly dawn service. By the year 2001, the Canberra Times 
estimated 7,000 people attended the dawn service at the War Memorial and that there 
were 25,000 at the parade later in the day (Canberra Times, 26 April 1991-2001). 
Newspapers stressed the high youth attendance at parades, ‘providing the nourishment to 
ensure the Anzac legend thrives’ (Chesterton, 2001). Commentators such as Ken Inglis 
and Gerard Henderson put this down to the assumption of the absence of major 
international conflict and the ability of young Australians to travel to Gallipoli, usually 
whilst travelling in Europe (Inglis, 1999; Henderson, 2000). However, Bruce Ruxton, 
controversial head of the Returned and Services League (RSL) in Victoria, and outspoken 
conservative tribune, argued differently. He put the popularity of Anzac Day down to 
Australia’s active participation in military campaigns, particularly involvement in East 
Timor (quoted in Herald Sun, 25 April 2000). Although this deployment came at the end 
of the 1990s, that decade had also seen Australian participation in shooting wars such as 
the Gulf War of 1990-91 and peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Bougainville.
That this particularly strong form of Australian consciousness could be still bound 
up with Britishness, even if in an attenuated form, is explained by the origins of 
Australian nationalism. Undoubtedly, the part played by the Australian military in the 
First World War and the manner in which this participation was reported in Australia, did 
contribute to a consciousness that was “uniquely Australian”. Nevertheless, this national 
consciousness was the product of a war fought with an imperial power, rather than 
against it. Australian nationalists such as Billy Hughes in the Commonwealth 
government, had to steer a fine line between asserting a difference that would help 
legitimate the newly formed Commonwealth with a commensurate and encompassing 
“Australian” identity, whilst not alienating centres of capital investment or integral parts 
of Australia’s forward defence strategies. The Anzac consciousness achieved just that, 
and the Commonwealth and the returned servicemen’s organisations entered into a 
mutually beneficial relationship (Kristianson, 1966: 17). However, the dominant 
message of the myth was not Keating’s sense of betrayal at by the British at Singapore or 
the powerful, if erroneous, notion in the Peter Weir’s Gallipoli (1981) that it was the 
British generals who sacrificed the Light Horse at the Nek. Instead, the message was one
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ot a combined British-Australian endeavour overcoming tyranny, repeating a theme of 
Britishness that had developed since Burke’s attack on the French republic, that of the 
defeat of extremism.
The RSL were and are the self-appointed guardians of the Anzac Legend and this 
idea of Australian nationhood. ‘The League assumes the right to speak out on any issue,’ 
it wrote in its 1991 Handbook. ‘Naturally, men who bear arms to preserve a way of life 
believe they have a special right to have their say in peace’ (RSL, 1991: 17). This 
organisation was established during the First World War and was organised by returnees 
from the outset (Kristianson, 1966: Chapter 1). The RSL was not part of government, 
although it had developed close links to Canberra as it was the federal government 
through which it had to pursue claims for returnees’ reparations and widowed 
dependents. From the end of the Great War onwards, the RSL has described itself as a 
pressure group and uses governmental support where it furthers its aims. Its membership 
base is predominantly male, and tends to be older, less educated and more rural than 
other organisations in Australian society (RSL, 1991: 14). It explained its continuing 
appeal by way of a ‘simple code of mateship and nationalism’ (RSL, 1991: 14).
The RSL stated its views on the origins and contents of Australian national 
consciousness and its relationship to Britishness in 1991. The vision was a conservative 
one where the monarchy and Australian flag were defended as symbols of stability in a 
changing Australia.
The national identity developed and sustained by the returned soldiers rested very 
heavily on the British connection... The coveted badge is topped by a Royal Crown 
and the floral emblems the rose, thistle, shamrock and leek share pride of place with 
the wattle... Returned men and Australians generally saw national identity flowering 
within the borders of Empire (RSL, 1991: 22-23).
The RSL adopted the position that ‘the British Connection is an undeniable and desirable 
part of Australia’s heritage... The links with Britain and the symbols of loyalty -
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monarchy, flag and [royal] anthem - are to be defended and sustained (RSL, 1991: 23). 
For the RSL, any move to Australia becoming a republic was to be resisted (RSL, 1991: 
Standing Order, 17.18). Similarly, the flag was to be defended too, and the inclusion of 
the Union flag in the upper canton was not a source of shame. ‘The Union Jack not only 
symbolises the truth that the overwhelming majority of people who explored, pioneered 
and developed Australia were of English, Irish, Scots and Welsh background, but that 
every aspect of cultural, social, constitutional, legal and religious life had its roots in the 
United Kingdom’ (RSL, 1991: 84). The RSL also set itself against some of the very 
demographic changes that some republicans publicly used to justify making the head of 
state an Australian citizen. Multiculturalism, said the RSL ‘when pursued as an end in 
itself is a specious philosophy and is adamantly rejected,’ and one which ‘reacts 
unfavourably against proper integration and can lead to instability and destruction of the 
“fabric” of the nation (RSL, 1991: Standing Policies, 16.1,iv).
The Returned and Services League was not the only organisation encouraging the 
continuing presence of the Anzac myth in Australian public life during the 1990s. The 
promotion of Anzac Day received bi-partisan support from federal governments. On 9 
May 1990, Bob Hawke moved a motion in House of Representatives that was endorsed 
and supported by John Hewson, leader of the Liberals and Tim Fischer as head of the 
National Party. This motion gave official endorsement and expression to Anzac myth 
and spirit, stating that ‘from the deeds and sacrifices of the Anzacs at Gallipoli there 
emerged a powerful sense of Australian national identity (quoted in RSL, 1991: 12). On 
1 February 1995, a bill was enacted by parliament to declare Anzac Day, 25 April, to be a 
national day of commemoration. The day was given official recognition as part of a year 
of official remembrance for the end of the Second World War. During the passing of the 
bill Liberal MP for Indi in Victoria, Lou Lieberman, linked the passing of the Bill not 
only to the 50th anniversary of the end of the War, but also the inevitable passing away of 
those who actually fought in these wars, particularly those who were at Gallipoli. He 
added that 25 April was one day when the Australian community could explicitly 
recognise its own nationalism:
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Our nation is very young. We are not the sort of people generally to go out and 
parade as do some other nations. We do not have the characteristics of extroverts; 
sometimes Australians are a bit reticent about things. But without a doubt there is 
one day in the year throughout the whole of Australia when we notice the intensity of 
feeling, community, fellowship, friendship and remembrance manifested by 
Australians individually, and that day of course is Anzac Day (Lieberman. 1995).
Unlike republicanism after the election of John Howard in 1996, this version of 
Australian nationalism enjoyed continuing official sanction. The Commonwealth 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs employed and perpetuated Charles Bean’s argument that 
‘in may ways, our sense of ourselves and our sense of place in the world has been defined 
by our actions under fire’ (Commonwealth Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 1999: 
foreword). Sciacca cited at length a ‘newspaper editorial of the time’ that expressed the 
national consciousness that very quickly developed around the events at Gallipoli back in 
Australia;
Before the Anzacs astonished the watching nations, our national sentiment was of a 
flabby a sprawling character. We were Australians in name... but we had been taught 
by our politicians not to trust ourselves - we were constantly admonished by our daily 
journals to remember that we were nothing better than a joint in the tail of a great 
Empire. There were patriots who protested against [this] slavish and sycophantic 
doctrine. But, generally speaking, it was assumed that Australia lived by the grace of 
England, and the Empire Day orators had a better hearing than the faithful souls who 
clung to Australia Day and gave special honour to their own starry banner. Anzac 
Day has changed all that... No matter how the war may end - and it can end in only 
one way - we are at last a nation, with one heart, one soul, and one thrilling aspiration 
(quoted in Sciacca, 1995).
When this Bill was presented to the Senate the following week, South Australian Labor 
Senator, Chris Schacht commented on the significance of this day in Australian 
consciousness in comparison with other important foundational anniversaries. Schacht
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claimed that ‘irrespective of the argument about the republic... it may well be that if we 
are looking for a national day that unites Australia, Anzac Day may be a more 
appropriate day than 26 January, which celebrates the establishment of the colony of New 
South Wales rather than the establishment of the Australian nation’ (Schacht, 1995).
In contrast, as a nationalist myth, republicanism had even less to offer than the 
events surrounding Federation. The rhetoric of republicanism in Australia was so future 
oriented, so full of references to the future and notions of Australia “maturing” as a 
nation, because it had to be. There was little in minimalist republicanism, with its 
deliberately narrow focus on constitutional reform, that could mobilise people in the way 
that Anzac, with its tales of mateship, heroism and sacrifice, could. Keating, however, 
attempted to attach ideas about Anzac to his wider nationalist rhetoric. In 1993, the 
Unknown Australian Soldier was recovered from the First World War battlefields of 
France and enshrined in the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. In his speech at the 
ceremony, Keating linked the Anzac myth to notions of governance and egalitarianism in 
Australia:
[Anzac] is a legend of free and independent spirits whose discipline derived less from 
military formalities and customs than from the bonds of mateship and the demands of 
necessity. It is a democratic tradition, the tradition in which Australians have gone to 
war ever since... We have gained a legend; a story of bravery and sacrifice and with 
it a deeper faith in ourselves and our democracy, and a deeper understanding of what 
it means to be Australian (quoted in Ryan, 1995: 288)
For Keating, it was Labor Prime Minister John Curtin who’s actions in 1942 in turning to 
the United States for aid in the Pacific War, ultimately removed the Anzac legend out of 
the realm of a wider, imperial allegiance, and gave it a meaning which was purely 
Australian. Speaking in Australia’s former colony of Papua-New Guinea on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the repulse of Japanese forces in the Owen-Stanley ranges, Keating argued 
that ‘The Australians who served here in Papua New Guinea fought and died not in 
defence of the old world, but the new world. Their world. They died in defence of
150
Australia, and the civilisation and values that had grown up there’ (cited in Ryan, 1995: 
280). Republican Steve Vizard attempted to link Anzac and republicanism in his 
Australia day speech of 1999. He argued that ‘at one level, the sprit of the Anzacs is 
about sacrifice... But on another level, the lesson of the Anzacs is about active 
citizenship, the willingness to participate, the ready desire to perform a public duty, to 
define by action my nation, my community and myself.’ For Vizard, the modem day test 
of this citizenship was to make Australia a republic (Vizard, 1999).
Any attempt to link Anzac to republicanism, however, stumbled on the strong 
British roots, as opposed to the Australian content, of the Anzac legend. As noted above, 
the custodians of the Legend, the RSL, remained opposed to Australia severing its 
remaining ties with the British Crown and as such were one of the main advocates of 
Britishness in Australia. The message coming from the custodians of the Anzac myth 
about Australian national consciousness was one that was very jealous of the place of 
Britishness in Australian culture, particularly, the flag, military connections and above all 
the monarch. Such conservatism aided the “no-change” conservatives in the monarchist 
ranks and allowed them to criticise the republicans who by arguing that Australia could 
never be truly free with a British monarch on the throne, denigrated everything that 
Australia had achieved in its history (Abbott, 1997: 97). Monarchists were able to attach 
themselves far more effortlessly to the Anzac myth, although the alignment of these two 
versions of conservatism meant they had little need to do so explicitly. Nevertheless, 
Geoffrey Partington developed Abbott’s theme when he wrote that ‘recent republicans 
have tried to convert the Anzac experience from Australia’s time of greatest solidarity 
with Britain to a source of suspicion and hatred’ (Partington, 2000). Similarly, the issue 
of changing the Australian flag, occasionally part of the republican debate, was one on 
which the monarchists could easily draw support from the RSL. The September 1994 
issue of Australian Constitutional Monarchy carried a piece entitle ‘The Flag in Verse’ 
that neatly encapsulated the monarchists’ and RSL’s shared views on the 
Commonwealth’s flag:
.. .And you who are shouting to change it,
151
You don’t seem to understand,
It’s the flag of our law and our language,
Not the flag of a far away land.
Though there are plenty of people who’ll tell you,
How when Europe was plunged into night,
The little old flag in the comer,
Was the symbol of freedom and light.
It doesn’t mean we owe allegiance,
To a forgotten, imperial dream.
We’ve the stars to show where we’re going,
And the flag to show were we’ve been (Australian Constitutional Monarchy, 1994)
Anzac consciousness also proved useful to John Howard, actively hostile to the idea of 
Australia changing to a republic. Unlike republicanism or Reconciliation, Anzac was a 
version of Australian nationalism that he wholly embraced, making visits to Gallipoli and 
the battlefields of France. Despite being uncomfortable with links between past and 
present in other instances of Australia’s history, this was not the case with the Anzac 
myth. For Howard, the contemporary Australian character was forged at Gallipoli. 
Howard’s adoption of the Anzac legend as the foundation of Australian national 
consciousness, was part of a wider strategy, associating him with issues of national 
identity, but not those of his Labor predecessor, or those that involved any change that 
was not economic in origin. On the issue of the republic Howard declared himself to be a 
‘Burkean conservative -  if you have a system or an institution that works, then there’s no 
need to examine changing it’ (quoted in Rundle, 2001: 14). Writing in the Australian 
Financial Review, Louise Dodson remarked that Howard’s performance at Gallipoli in 
the year 2000 ‘gave him the chance to show his empathy with issues of national identity 
and unity’ whilst ‘setting about recasting his image, reaching out to the post-Vietnam 
generation and nurturing a national identity which is not predicated on Australia 
becoming a republic’ (Dodson, 2000). By the end of the 1990s, the potential for Anzac
152
nationalism to feed into republicanism had been successfully co-opted by the monarchist 
Prime Minister.
To portray the debate over republicanism in the Australia of the 1990s as a contest 
between republicans on one side and monarchists on the other would be simplistic. The 
resurgence of Anzac demonstrated the way in which additional versions of Australian 
consciousness complicated the task of the republicans. However, minimalist 
republicanism failed in 1999, not so much as a result of the strength of monarchist 
sentiment in Australia, but because it also fell foul of criticisms of the political system 
that became more vocal as the decade progressed into its second half. The opponents of 
the minimal republican model on offer were able to harness an anti-elite” rhetoric 
developed by politicians such as Graeme Campbell and Pauline Hanson, whilst rejecting 
their racism and hostility to economic rationalism, and turn this rhetoric against the 
minimalists. If the charge that the ARM was “elitist” might have been true inasmuch as 
most of their spokespersons were drawn from the political classes or the better off in 
Australian society, then it was just as true of the monarchists. However, given the 
prevailing political climate from the middle of the decade onwards, the monarchists and 
direct election republicans were able to exploit this class-based charge much more 
effectively than the republicans could counter it.
The neo-liberal shift of the Australian economy, initiated by the Labor party in the 
1980s, was beginning to cause disquiet and resentment amongst sections of Australian 
society. This resentment was directed by critics, not only into a racism against 
Aborigines and recent immigrants, but also as a nationalistic resentment directed towards 
those perceived as “Elites”, whose actions were deemed to be opposed to the interests of 
the national community. In 1992, Labor MP from Western Australia, Graeme Campbell 
argued that the ALP had become distanced from its blue-collar roots, instead becoming 
pre-occupied with feminism, multiculturalism, anti-discrimination and what he called a 
wooly internationalism’. As a result of this shift, solidified during the Hawke-Keating 
governments, Campbell maintained that the ALP was ‘more concerned with status and 
power and superficial but largely irrelevant expressions of compassion, than with what
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socialism should still be about, in an affluent society as much as any other, namely the 
equitable distribution of wealth’ (Campbell, 1992: 29-30). In 1995 Campbell teamed up 
with Mark Uhlmann to produce the book Australia Betrayed. In it they argued that:
the elites, while they may mouth concern for the country, have given up thinking in 
terms of the national interest to pursue an internationalist agenda. This agenda is 
eroding the foundations of our nation and marginalising the majority, which has less 
and less say in its own destiny’ (Campbell and Uhlmann, 1995: vii).
The authors’ scorn was vented on multicultural!sm as an expression of “progressive” 
Australia and the effects they claimed it had on a unitary sense of Australian nationhood.
4 Multiculturalism is much more than the welcoming of diversity', it seems to be the path 
not only to extinguishing not only the original sin of Anglo-Celtic occupation of 
Australia, but to extinguishing the Anglo-Celtic cultural base of the country itself 
(Campbell and Uhlmann, 1995: 171). As for the republic itself, the authors derided it as 
a sort of “false nationalism”, a nationalism by and for the “elites”, obscuring more 
important issues facing the Australian people:
[Keating] is effectively promoting the hollowing out of the substance of nationalism, 
while pretending that his window dressing of a Republic would deliver us 
independence. Although the push for a republic has been given an enormous amount 
of publicity, the deep and serious problems facing Australia are all but ignored in the 
public debate. Unless these problems are confronted, our national sovereignty will 
continue to be eroded. Whether we are called a Republic or not will make little 
difference’ (Campbell and Uhlmann, 1995: ix).
Campbell was expelled from the ALP in 1996, but by then, proponents of such 
“anti-elite” politics had a tribune in the House of Representatives after Pauline Hanson’s 
election victory in the federal Queensland seat of Oxley. When Hanson delivered her 
maiden speech on 10 September 1996, she declared that ‘I come here not as a polished 
politician, but as a woman who has had her fair share of life’s knocks.’ (Hanson, 1997:
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2). Hanson’s populism was, like Campbell’s, a rejection of the social, economic and 
political consensus of multiculturalism and indigenous affairs, economic rationalism and 
the management of politics by professionals that had emerged since the 1970s. A major 
source of support for One Nation was the effects of neo-liberal restructuring of the 
Australian economy. Towards the end of his term as Prime Minister, Paul Keating made 
the link between the neo-liberal markets and domestic politics clear in a speech delivered 
in Singapore. Diplomatic and trade relations within the Asia-Pacific region, argued 
Keating, can no longer be considered as ‘largely unconnected with the domestic policies 
which are needed to build a society which is both open and competitive and cohesive and 
strong’ (Keating, 1996: 7). However, it was the need to be open and competitive, as well 
as cohesive and strong that was fuelling much of the support for Hansonism in Australia. 
Her maiden speech was an attack on what she perceived as the undue privilege awarded 
to Aborigines and organisations representing different national and ethnic communities 
within Australia. She also spoke of the dangers of multiculturalism, which she claimed 
had never worked anywhere in history, would undermine the concept of Australian 
nationhood and should therefore be abolished. She invoked a familiar theme in 
Australian populism when she argued that Australia was in danger of being “swamped” 
by Asians. Her concept of the Australia nation was one based on the assimilation of 
newer migrants into a nationhood that was left undefined. ‘To survive in peace and 
harmony, united and strong,’ argued Hanson, ‘we must have one people, one nation, one 
flag.’ She also admonished Australian governments for ‘kowtowing to financial markets, 
international organisations, world bankers investment companies and big business 
people’ (Hanson, 1997: 5-9).
Aspects of One Nation’s Australian nationalism were firmly in the British 
tradition, emphasising the rule of law and the Westminster system. It was this view of 
the role of Britishness that underpinned Australian nationalism that fed into Hanson’s 
attacks on multicultural and indigenous Australia. In a speech at the Australian Reform 
Party in Melbourne in October 1996, Hanson described the Australian “mainstream” and 
its links with the past. ‘Mainstream Australia,’ she argued, ‘is firmly based on its Anglo- 
Celtic European heritage, Judeo-Christian beliefs, English law and [the] Westminster
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parliamentary system. It is a blending of these elements with the unique Australian 
environment that has produced a nation of people who are tolerant and are prepared to 
give others a “fair go” (Hanson, 1997: 12). As such, Hanson’s apologists decried 
Manning Clark’s view of Australian history, claiming that Clark viewed ‘Australian 
traditions and values as worthless’ and that this Clark-inspired understanding of Australia 
survived in Keating’s ‘anti-Anglo and anti-English view of history’ (Hanson. 1997: 88).
Despite being an MP, Hanson could not be considered an “elite”. The One Nation 
Party posed a problem for both the major mainstream parties, because it challenged the 
very legitimacy of these groups to rule, portraying them as organisations with interests 
divorced from the concerns and lives of “ordinary Australians”. For Hanson, the elites 
came in two main guises, who although they might clash on certain issues, were united in 
their programme of change for Australia. The first group of the elites was the left-liberal 
intelligentsia, many of whom were categorised as student radicals from the 1960s, whilst 
the second group was the neo-liberal economic rationalists who now controlled federal 
parliament, to the detriment of the predominantly rural constituency of One Nation’s 
support (Hanson, 1997: 88). Hanson’s claim that she was not a ‘polished politician’ was 
certainly borne out by the performance of the One Nation Party in the 1998 Federal 
Election (Kingston, 1999). The ONP certainly lacked any sort of sophisticated economic 
policy, other than a rejection of neo-liberal economics. However, in the climate of anti­
elitism. this unpolished quality gave her and her party a certain appeal amongst the 
disaffected. Between nineteen ninety-six and 1998, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party 
rose in popularity, gaining 11 seats in the Queensland Parliament in the elections of 1998 
based on almost 23 per cent of the vote (Electoral Commission of Queensland, 1998). Its 
popularity rested primarily on racism and a rejection of neo-liberal economic doctrines 
and policies. This response from the far-right was beneficial for the monarchists and 
those opposed the ARM’s minimal republic as it strengthened both the appeal of the 
“anti-elitist” message and Britishness in Australian discourse.
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The People’s Monarchy?
It was in this context of class tensions and a conservative myth of national consciousness 
that it became necessary for the republicans to create an alliance between the reformers 
and the populace. In adhering to the sovereignty of parliament, not only did the 
republicans betray their British hen tage, but they denied themselves a means of 
mobilising the popular support necessary to win the 1999 referendum. Crucially, those 
politicians who didn’t agree with the idea of Australia changing to a republic were able to 
ally themselves with, and manipulate, anti-elite sentiment. By 1996, a Liberal 
government was back in control in Canberra, led by John Howard, who was actively 
opposed to the republic. Howard was a self-declared conservative when it came to ideas 
about the nation, although he was quite un-conservative in his economic philosophy. 
Since the late 1980s, the Liberal party he (intermittently) led between 1988 and 2001 was 
shorn of its “wet” elements and had become more akin to Thatcher’s Conservative Party 
in Britain of the 1980s. Howard’s monarchism, in conjunction with stances on other 
issues such as the “Stolen Generations” and asylum seekers, enabled him to place himself 
on the side of “ordinary Australians” in the republican debate, and begin to win back 
support lost by the Coalition to One Nation from 1996.
The attempt to marginalise the republicans as out of touch with popular opinion 
had been a feature of the monarchist campaign from the outset. As the motion for a 
republic was first speared-headed by Labor MP John Dawkins at the party’s national 
conference in Hobart in 1991, the idea of the republic was denounced by then Liberal 
leader Dr John Hewson as the work of the ‘loony left’ (quoted in McKenna, 1996: 249). 
Portraying the republicans as elites was a tactic adopted from the early days of the ACM. 
At the foundation of the Victorian Branch of the ACM, several members ‘drew loud 
cheers when they said that Australians would never be frog-marched into republicanism 
by a few discontented intellectuals of the Chardonnay set’ (Australians for Constitutional 
Monarchy, 1993 (3)). Tony Abbot, one-time leader of Australians for Constitutional 
Monarchy, and later a Liberal minister, also initially targeted the republicans as left­
wingers. Picking up on Keating’s attempt to link the republic with all sorts of worthy 
causes, Abbott argued in 1995 that ‘For the footsoldiers of the republic, constitutional
157
change is a way of combining political correctness with the anti-establishment dreams of 
the 1960s’ (Abbott, 1995: 64). However, soon the republic, and in particular the 
Australian Republican Movement, was being portrayed as something dreamed up by 
Sydney intellectuals over a long, boozy lunch, not least by its own leaders and chroniclers 
(Keneally, 1993: 77). It wasn’t long before the “Chardonnay set” label began to stick to 
the republican movement and not without some justification. In 1994 Republic 
Newsletter carried an advert for:
Republican wine -  red, white and delicious -  is now available... which provides and 
opportunity to enjoy a good general drinking wine while contributing to Australia 
becoming a republic. ...the wines are a smooth, mellow ’92 Cabernet with fresh 
berry flavours and a light, crisp and dry ’93 Semilion... reasonably priced at S8.50 
{Republic Newsletter, 25 March 1994).
The republicans’ identification with the wealthy urban classes of Sydney and Melbourne 
was not politically astute. Nevertheless, the same newsletter also carried an article from 
Malcolm Turnbull, newly appointed as Chair of the ARM. Turnbull drew an analogy 
with the events surrounding the drive for the federation of the Australian colonies during 
the 1890s:
The republican movement must now become a people’s movement. We must, in the 
years that follow, develop a mass membership. We must demonstrate that our cause 
springs from the people. Just as the movement to federation foundered in the hands 
of politicians and was rescued by thousands of Australians in citizens’ movements, so 
too must the people carry the republican goal to completion (Turnbull, 1994c).
Despite this need to win a mass following, the origins and membership of the ARM were 
not ones that leant themselves easily to such a task. The ARM was not set up as a 
democratic movement like Citizens for Democracy, but instead as a company initially 
operating out of a Sydney legal office pursuing a marketing strategy to promote its aims 
(Hirst, 2001b: 302). Tom Keneally, the first chairman of the ARM wrote that the initial
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ARM strategy was ‘to put together a small committee of visible and markedly Australian 
people who would enunciate the republican credo’ (Keneally, 1993: 79). Such celebrity 
association initially appeared to gain positive responses from the electorate, but towards 
the end of the referendum campaign, this strategy began to backfire.
The support of a broad range of politicians, although seemingly essential for the 
success of the minimal republic, also backfired on its advocates. Section 128 of the 
Australian Constitution stipulates that any proposed changes to the Constitution have to 
be ratified by a majority of states and be supported by an overall majority of the 
electorate. The minimalist republicans can hardly be blamed for seeking bi-partisan 
support for their proposal. Eight out of the forty-two proposed changes to the 
constitution put before the Australian electorate since 1901 had been rejected; only those 
with bi-partisan support had succeeded. Mindful of the failure of referendum proposals 
that had not enjoyed bi-partisan support in the past, the republican strategists sought an 
alliance not directly with the populace, but with politicians and opinion formers whose 
conservatism did not include monarchism. From the start, the republican movement 
courted centre-right, conservative opinion, as well as that of the left. John Hirst argued 
that conservatives had a duty to join the republican camp. ‘Conservatives should cease 
being reactionary on this issue and fulfill their proper role managing change so as to 
preserve what is of enduring worth’ (Hirst, 1991: 10). But in the populist atmosphere of 
Pauline Hanson’s Australia, the emergence of a cross-party group of minimalist 
republicans weakened the minimal models’ chances of success.
Having invoked “the Australian people” in order to carry their proposed change, 
the minimalist republicans proved unable to form the necessary alliance with “the 
people” itself. Even prior to the Constitutional Convention of February 1998, the 
majority of republicans adopted a minimalist approach, designed to be compatible with 
the traditions of the Westminster system and to avoid frightening the conservative horses. 
Keating was insistent on the sovereignty of parliament throughout his custodianship of 
the republican issue up to 1996. ‘Parliament alone’ he argued, ‘can formally decide what 
is put in a referendum. At most, any suggested convention can only be a consultative
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device and, in obvious ways, an elitist one’ (Keating, 1995: 14). He was particularly 
keen not to see a directly elected figure that might challenge to legitimacy of parliament:
The desire for a popular election stems from the democratic sentiment which all 
Australians -  including all of us in this place -  share... It should be recognised that a 
Head of State, whose powers derived from a general election, would be the only 
person in the political system so elected. His or her powers would be nominally 
much greater than those of all other Commonwealth office holders, including the 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, who are, without exception, indirectly elected via 
large elected parties. With a popularly elected President, potential would exist for the 
representative and democratically elected parliamentary chambers, the repositories of 
the diffuse power of Australian democracy, to be gradually diminished, while the 
embodiment of the nation and great powers were invested in one person. That would 
constitute a very dramatic -  and undesirable -  change to a system which all of us 
agree has served us well (Keating, 1995: 10-11).
This argument was adopted by the ARM also, and had emerged from the Republic 
Advisory Committee’s brief to examine the minimal changes necessary to achieve a 
republic (Republic Advisory Committee, 1993: Terms of Reference). The ARM aimed to 
get rid of one feature of Britishness, the monarchy, but entrench another feature, the 
sovereignty of parliament. ‘The most troubling aspect of a popularly elected President, 
from an Australian perspective, is that the President may well regard him or herself to 
have a mandate from the people no worse, and perhaps a little better, than that held by the 
Prime Minister’ (Turnbull, 1994a: 127).
By sticking to this minimalist approach and denying a popularly elected president, 
the ARM was stripping their cause of potential populist appeal. Given that the cause of 
the republican was being challenged by individuals and organisations that did not shy 
away from populism, the minimal republicans were given little room in which to 
manoeuvre. The conservatism of the proposed change became self-defeating as 
minimalist republicans set up the rejection of the Crown as the means to achieve full,
160
independent nationhood, whilst stressing the irrelevancy of the British Crown to everyday 
life and politics. Having declared that ‘The Queen is a symbol, a symbol without 
substance’, the ARM then went on to advocate ‘a head of state chosen by Australians 
who would fulfill exactly the same role as the Governor-General does today’ (Turnbull, 
1994a: 9). But if the Queen was a symbol without substance, then this raised questions 
about what was actually going to change if the referendum was carried. Opponents and 
supporters alike began to question if it was worth the effort of a referendum to alter the 
nationality of the head of state.
As the referendum vote neared, and the mainstream republicans ran out of 
populism, they could be easily portrayed and denigrated by their opponents as “elitist”. 
Even massive support from the majority of the print media did not necessarily help the 
minimalist cause. By the eve of the vote, all newspapers bar the West Australian were 
heavily advocating a Yes vote. Philip Adams wrote in The Weekend Australian, on the 
day of the November referendum itself:
It’s time to thank Britain for all it’s done for us. To thank the Queen for all the royal 
tours and the kind loan of her national anthem. But she knows it’s time for 
Australians to sing our own songs, to tell our own stories. To make our own 
mistakes. It’s time to head off on our own direction, no longer dependent on the 
approval of the palace... (Adams, 1999).
But such support from the media led to a backlash in itself. One contributor’s letter to the 
letters page of the Australian stated bluntly, ‘One reason for voting no to a republic is that 
the media is for it’ {Weekend Australian, 6-7 November 1999).
In the months leading up to the referendum, the No Campaign increased its anti­
elitist attacks on the minimalist republicans, now joined by left-leaning elites who 
rejected the ARM’s minimalism. Kerry Jones, ACM Executive Director, spoke to the 
Coffs Harbour “No Republic” branch, arguing that:
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My initial response to the public YES Case is they don’t trust the Australian people. It 
is very sad that rather than take an opportunity to provide a serious case to argue 
change to their republic they present a slick symbolic argument which reveals their 
determination to hide the details of their model from the people (Jones, 1999b).
Some of the most stinging attacks on the “elitism” of the ARM came from other 
republicans who favoured the direct-election of the president in a popular vote. Former 
independent MP Phil Cleary argued on the day of the referendum that ‘No matter what 
[ALP leader] Kim Beazley says, every commentator knows that a yes vote today is all the 
political parties need to bury the exciting prospect of a democratically elected present 
(Cleary, 1999). His fellow traveller in the “Real Republican” camp, Ted Mack, stated 
that ‘This model of a republic should be rejected because it reeks of elitism... A yes vote 
is supported by the political elite, corporate Australia and big media, who always prefer 
centralised power, and those blinded by sectarianism, sectarianism and xenophobia’ 
(Mack, 1999). The damage to the republican cause had been done by the time the 
referendum was held on 6 November 1999. At the conclusion of the count, it was left to 
the leader of the Australians for Constitutional Monarchy, the defenders of the hereditary 
principle in Australia to portray the vote as ‘a victory for our democracy’. The result, 
claimed Kerry Jones, was genuinely a ‘people’s protest’ and whilst she eschewed 
triumphalism, she said that the no campaign was greatly relieved ‘that the people have 
finally had their say on the issue’ (Jones, 1999a).
Conclusion
At the beginning of the 1990s, it appeared that Australian republicans were ready to 
remove the most visible pillar of Britishness in Australia, the monarchy. However, the 
conservatism of the minimalists led to them re-capitulating an important element of 
Britishness, the sovereignty of Parliament. The language of Britishness was ideally 
suited for Australian conservatism, whether republican or monarchist. But this was not 
the only way in which the development of settler nationalism of the 1990s reinforced 
Britishness in Australia. The resurgence of Anzac Day’s popularity was significant in 
this regard too. While the content of this nationalism was Australian, the Britishness
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inherent in Anzac cancelled out any possibility that Anzac mythology could be 
effectively attached to the republican platform, despite containing a large degree of anti- 
British content. Further to this, as the decade entered its second half, the notion that the 
Australian political system was run by and for “elites”, an idea popularised by Pauline 
Hanson, began to be directed at the minimalists and their political allies. The 
commitment of the minimalists to British-derived notions of parliamentary sovereignty 
were far more significant in reducing their populist appeal than any call to nd the 
Australian system of a foreign monarch. Committed to the sovereignty of parliament, the 
monarchists and direct-electionists were able to portray their own campaigns as a 
“people’s protest” and mount a strangely credible case that voting to retain a monarchy 
was an act of popular, democratic resistance. It was in this manner that Britishness 
remained an important constitutive element of Australian consciousness at the turn of the 
century.
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chapter 5:
Reconciliation, Britishness and Australian Nationalism
I  X  uring the 1990s, the politics surrounding Reconciliation between indigenous and 
J L /  non-indigenous Australians forced interpretations of Australian history to the 
centre of political debate. In the case of the reconciliation movement, issues of 
continuing indigenous disadvantage were addressed through a politicising of the origins 
of that disadvantage, the dispossession of indigenous people. That questions of 
indigenous disadvantage and the history of Australia’s British, imperial origins became 
bound up in Australian nationalism, was a result of the political tactics of indigenous 
activists and their sympathisers. Given the relatively small numbers of indigenous 
peoples in Australia, any attempt by indigenous leaders to address causes of disadvantage 
would have to be made in alliance with sections of the settler population. In order to 
offset their numerical disadvantage, moderate activists framed their demands in language 
that appealed to the “tolerant” rhetoric of Australian nationalism that had been stressed in 
imperial and settler narratives. In the case of reconciliation, the movement’s supporters 
hoped that by incorporating indigenous histories into popular Australian history, that not 
only would the atrocities of the colonial past be atoned for, but a new historical 
understanding would help create a public mood conducive to addressing indigenous 
disadvantage. However, the survival of indigenous cultures in the face of British 
invasion and Australian colonialism, and the re-assertion of indigenous identity through 
revisionist history, potentially de-legitimised the Australian state and the Australian 
nation. Attempts by the conservative right to counter such revisionist narratives, resulted 
in a re-assertion of notions of “Progress” and “Civilisation” originally developed in the 
imperial discourses that justified expropriation and dispossession from 1788 onwards. 
The defence of a unitary notion of Australia and the territorial integrity of the Australian 
state led back into a defence of particular, “Whiggish” version of Australian history, one 
that privileged British imperialism as the bearer of “Progress” to the Australian continent 
and the indigenous people.
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Reconciliation
Indigenous activism from the 1960s resulted in a re-assertion of indigenous sovereignty 
as part of wider demands for rights and justice for indigenous people. This rejection of 
the Crown’s sovereignty over much of Australia marked a significant shift away from 
Britishness in indigenous politics. An important part of this re-assertion of sovereignty 
was growing acceptance of indigenous histories of Australia which stressed the 
experience of dispossession and survival in the face of British imperialism and Australian 
colonialism, promoted by new understandings of Australian history coming from the 
academy. This history of dispossession and resistance was central to indigenous 
consciousness, but potentially de-legitimating for settler society. Reconciliation, a ten- 
year process begun in 1991, was an attempt to incorporate the emerging indigenous 
consciousness into settler society in order to create a political atmosphere conducive to 
addressing issues of indigenous disadvantage, but without de-legitimating the Australian 
nation and was in fact made through an alliance between settler and indigenous 
Australians.
Unlike in Scotland, where a measure of sovereignty was preserved by the signing 
of a treaty, in Australia indigenous sovereignty was denied from the outset of British 
colonisation. Furthermore, this continent-wide dispossession and denial of sovereignty 
made a secessionist solution to Aborigines’ disadvantaged position under various 
Australian governments neither viable nor popular. This was despite the establishment of 
the separatist Aboriginal Provisional Government (APG) in 1992 advocating ‘a nation 
whose land base is at least all crown lands, so called’ (Aboriginal Provisional 
Government, 1992). Support for indigenous autonomy also came from influential figures 
within settler society, such as public servant H. C. “Nugget” Coombs (1994), and 
historian Henry Reynolds (1996). Instead, the more moderate indigenous leadership 
decided on a strategy to forge an alliance with liberal opinion within settler Australia to 
achieve a political climate favourable to the redress of indigenous disadvantage and 
historical grievances over the loss of land. The ten-year process of Reconciliation was 
central to this moderate approach. Through reconciliation, moderate indigenous leaders
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sought to accommodate their demands within Australian consciousness rather than 
separate to it. Thus “the Australian nation”, became a key referent in the reconciliation 
process. In this process, understandings of Australian history became a crucial element 
in the debate about settler Australians relations with Aboriginal Australians. At stake 
was not only a moral view of the Australian nation, but as the debate developed and 
merged with issues such as native title and former child removal policies, but the 
legitimacy of settler control of land and resources. In this sense, the debate about history 
went to the very core of the legitimacy, not of the Australian state, but of the Australian 
nation itself.
In May 1991, Commissioner Elliot Johnston concluded the Royal Commission 
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody with the call that ‘all political leaders and their parties 
recognise that reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities in 
Australia must be achieved if community division, discord and injustice to Aboriginal 
people are to be avoided’ (Johnston, 1992). The following month, the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation Act was passed unanimously in the House of Representatives 
and the Act passed unanimously through the Senate in August. The process, directed by 
the government-appointed Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) was to last ten 
years and culminate in 2001, the year of Australia’s centenary of Federation. At the end 
of the ten-year process the Council hoped to achieve a ‘united Australia which respects 
this land of ours; values the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage; and provides 
justice and equity for all’ (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 2000a). The language 
used for reconciliation was one of national unity, albeit that the nation envisioned was a 
heterogeneous one that accommodated and celebrated indigenous cultures. To realise 
these goals, the CAR adopted a four-pillared strategy to be promoted beyond the formal 
end of the reconciliation process during the Centenary of Federation. The Council’s aims 
included government Accountability for service provision, Legislation on rights self- 
determination, customary law and constitutional reform, continued leadership to address 
indigenous disadvantage through Reconciliation Australia. Most significantly ‘an honest 
and deep understanding of the truth our shared history’ was the pillar on which popular 
support for reconciliation was based (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 2000a).
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At the outset of the reconciliation process two issues were prominent; the 
immediate material concerns of most members of the indigenous community and the 
systematic discrimination that caused and compounded such material affects. 
Commissioner Johnston had argued in his report that, ‘The Commission’s most 
compelling finding was that the real lives and deaths it examined were symptomatic of 
the conditions faced generally by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
throughout Australia today’ (Johnston, 1992). Pat Dodson, former Chair of the Council 
for Aboriginal Reconciliation, argued in 1997: ‘A father who is unemployed, living in a 
shack with no hot water, worried about schooling his kids has his mind on the immediate 
day to day issues and rightly so. If that man is also alienated, oppressed, aching from a 
life of being abused for being at the bottom of the pile, he will not be able to see his way 
clear to change his circumstances’ (Dodson, 1997). The government body responsible 
for the administration of indigenous policy, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC), also linked these two concerns of the reconciliation process:
It is quite clear that the process of reconciliation is inextricably linked with the 
achievement of social justice. Reconciliation can only be achieved in this context. 
Until there are substantial improvements in the well being of indigenous Australians, 
until disadvantage is adequately redressed, and until equitable structures and legal 
frameworks are in place, there can be no reconciliation. It is therefore most important 
that implementation of reconciliation and social justice initiatives should continue in 
a parallel and associated way (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, 
1994).
Unlike republicanism, the reconciliation process did become bound up with other 
distinct, but related, political issues; notably the Mabo (1992) and Wik (1996) decisions 
in the High Court and the 1997 Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission’s 
report on the Stolen Generations. These distinct but related issues highlighted modem 
Australia’s relationship with its colonial past and the legacy of British imperialism in 
Australia’s history. Even conservative Aboriginal Leader Noel Pearson argued that: 
‘Reconciliation can only happen with the repudiation of colonialism. Not repudiation in
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the sense of denying what has happened in the colonial past, but a repudiation of 
colonialism’s continued operation in the present’ (Pearson, 1995: 4).
As CAR’s supporters sought to influence and alter opinion within the settler 
Australian nation, rather than seceding from it, a language of unity had to be stressed. A 
particular vision of the Australian nation was important for the supporters of 
reconciliation, but it was a version that distanced itself from the triumphalism and settler 
dominance of past Australian narratives and rejected assimilation. One-time chairman ot 
the CAR, Pat Dodson, argued that ‘Aboriginal peoples have the right to maintain and 
develop our distinct characteristics and identities, whilst taking part in the life of the 
country as a whole. This includes the right to identify as indigenous’ (Dodson, Pat, 1999). 
Indigenous culture, far from being something reserved for tourist attractions and national 
commemorations, had become essential to the advancement of indigenous rights and 
resistance to settler domination. What was being demanded now was that equality be 
accorded to the indigenous people, as indigenous people and not only as Australians, and 
on their own terms, not those of the colonisers. Wenton Rabuntja, a member of the 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, argued that ‘We have to work out a way of 
sharing this country, but there has to be an understanding of and respect of our culture, 
our law’ (quoted in Brennan, 1992: 20). Peter Yu, Director of the Kimberly Land 
Council, linked the effects of the condition of many Aboriginal people and communities 
with an appeal to the conscience of the settler nation. ‘The key issue is that colonisation 
has left Aboriginal society economically, culturally and socially ravaged. The cost of this 
continued marginalisation is a cost not only to Aboriginal people, [but] to the nation as a 
whole’ (quoted in Hughes and Pitty, 1994: 21).
There were other, strategic reasons for moderate indigenous leaders to seek an 
alliance with settler Australia and speak a language of Australian nationalism. CAR 
chairwoman Lowitja O’Donoghue argued that:
In a sense, our political strength lies in our weakness; our 1.5per cent of the national
population. We present no threat to mainstream Australia, as on the pastoral frontier
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we once did. As in 1967, our influence is largely based on an appeal to abstract 
matters -  social justice, equality, righting the wrongs of history (O’Donoghue, 1992: 
13).
The tactic of linking the condition of indigenous people to a moral judgement about 
Australian attitudes had been adopted in the activism of the 1960s, and as O’Donoghue 
states, appeared to pay high dividends in the 1967 referendum. However, Scott Bennett 
argues that after the passing of the Northern Territory Land Rights Act in 1976, 
indigenous interests lost their “special aura” with the wider Australian public and have 
since been unable to wield as much influence as they had in the past (Bennett, 1989: 15). 
Reconciliation was again an attempt by moderate indigenous leadership and their allies 
from settler Australia to link the conditions of Aboriginal people to a moral statement 
about the condition of the Australian nation as a whole. The more moderate Aboriginal 
leaders chose to make an alliance with moderate leaders within the settler community in 
order to further the goal of the betterment of conditions for the Aboriginal community by 
altering the language and symbolism of the existing settler nationalism, that unsettled 
existing narratives of the Australian past.
The Past in Australia’s Present
A revision of dominant versions of settler history, and a highlighting of the legacy of 
conflict, violence and assimilation in settler-indigenous relations was seen as essential to 
the creation of creating a wider political atmosphere in Australia, conducive to addressing 
contemporary indigenous disadvantage. However, this revision of history potentially 
had the power to de-legitimate the settler presence in Australia, by challenging the 
beneficent imperial, British narratives of “Progress” and “Civilisation” on which 
Australian consciousness was founded with histories of invasion, murder, oppression and 
genocide. This engagement with, and challenge to, dominant settler narratives, forced 
understandings of the British origins of the modem Australian nation, and Australian 
colonial practices, into the realm of contemporary politics. During Corroboree 2000, the 
symbolic culmination of the reconciliation process held in Sydney in May of that year, 
Evelyn Scott, one-time chairwoman of the CAR, asked the rhetorical question; ‘what is
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the basis of this struggle with our collective conscience?’ She identified two main 
elements within Australian nationalist discourse as the basis of this ‘struggle’, the first of 
which was dispossession:
The First Fleet arrived on these shores nearby in 1788 with the instruction to “take 
possession of the continent with the consent of the Natives”. Consent was not sought 
and never given. For all that land that was taken, there has never been any redress 
except those pieces of land rights legislation that today are seen as having given away 
too much to the Indigenous peoples (Scott, 2000).
The second source of what Scott’s ‘struggle’ was the previous policies of assimilation 
employed with regard to Australia’s indigenous peoples:
Well-meaning Australians participated in taking children from their families, 
destroying Indigenous languages and cultures, and banishing whole populations from 
their traditional lands to alien lands on missions and reserves. This period of 
assimilation continues to have a devastating impact on the lives of Indigenous peoples 
(Scott, 2000).
The twin issues of native title and the Stolen Generations added partisan political 
attitudes to the otherwise unitary language of reconciliation. The Mabo (No. 2) decision, 
handed down by the High Court of Australia on 3 June 1992 ruled that native title could 
not be bought or sold but continued to exist on Crown land where traditional laws and 
customs had been maintained. However, the High Court maintained that native title was 
extinguished on privately owned land such as houses and farms, residential and 
commercial possession leases and government-built roads. Common law, adopted from 
English practice, operates on the principle of first possession in regard to ownership of 
land and property, thus native title was deemed to be compatible with common law. 
Native title could thus be understood as ‘a traditional right based on occupancy which 
continues after the imposition of colonial sovereignty’ (Pitty, 1993: 24). The 1996 Wik 
decision stated that pastoral leases did not extinguish native title either, and that native
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title could be claimed through the courts on this type of lease also. Significantly, the 
1992 decision put an end to the legal assumption of terra nullius. This notion was first 
tested in the courts in 1971 (Milerrpum v. Nabalco), but the political climate had changed 
since that time as a result of the political activity of indigenous activists, trade unionists, 
communists and church leaders. ‘The reason for the High Court’s refusal to explicitly 
endorse all the old racist assumptions of terra nullius should be sought not in legal 
niceties, but in the moral strength of the growing Aboriginal political challenge to the 
historical foundations of modem Australia’ (Pitty, 1993: 26). Whatever the reason for 
the Mabo decision, the British claim of sovereignty over Australia dating from the late 
eighteenth century had been legally and politically rejected.
The Mabo decision became immediately contentious and boosted demands for 
indigenous sovereignty. ‘One of the most absurd situations in Australia,’ wrote APG 
spokesman Michael Mansell, ‘is that a legal system which was designed in England 
should apply to Aborigines everywhere, including those who live in remote areas under 
traditional laws and practices’ (Mansell, 1993b). Following the decision, it appeared to 
the mining industry and their conservative political allies, that the sovereignty of settler 
Australia was under threat. However, the Mabo decision was not as fundamentally 
challenging in a legal sense as its detractors made out. Customary law was not 
recognised in the Mabo ruling as equal to common law, but was only seen as acceptable 
if it could be incorporated selectively into Australian law (Pitty, 1993: 25). Pat Dodson 
wrote that ‘Even in Mabo, the constitutional sovereignty and its arrangements were never 
under attack or threatened. The result of the Court's ruling was that Aboriginal peoples 
would still only have whatever rights the Parliaments of Australia choose to bestow on 
us’ (Dodson, 1999).
But what Mabo did do was politicise the debate about Australian history that had 
been conducted in academic circles for some time, challenging the legitimating 
historiography of colonialism. One side of the debate was summed up by indigenous 
activist, Loretta Kelly. She argued that it should be ‘alarming to white people that their 
Commonwealth’s sovereignty is a fraudulent claim, illegal and completely untenable in
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international law’ (Kelly, 1993: 11). The motives of the judges were questioned by 
unsympathetic participants and observers on the other side of the debate too. 
Conservative lawyer, P. D. Connoly argued that ‘It is difficult to resist the conclusion that 
the “native title” invented by the majority of the [High] Court is bogus. It may indeed 
give a warm inner glow to the inventors, but no lasting good can arise from a spurious 
foundation’ (Connoly, 1994: 7).
If the history of dispossession was disconcerting, then the issue of assimilation 
proved just as politically challenging. The Bringing Them Home Report to Parliament 
was published in 1997 by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission 
(HREOC). The Report demonstrated that the past was a contentious political issue in 
Australia. It questioned the assimilationist policies carried out by State and 
Commonwealth governments during the twentieth century (Wilson, 1997: 37). In 
particular it documented the forced removal of so-called “half-caste” children from their 
indigenous families and their placement in either government institutions or with white 
families. The authors stated that ‘Nationally we can conclude with confidence that 
between one in three and one in ten Indigenous children were forcibly removed from 
their families and communities in the period from approximately 1910 until 1970’ 
(Wilson, 1997: 37). Whilst former Quadrant editor Robert Manne argued that the 
Bringing Them Home report failed to make a distinction between the pre-War eugenicist 
justification for child removal in order to “breed out the colour”, and the post-War 
situation where racist and welfarist motives were intertwined in complicated ways 
(Manne, 2001: 30), the Report nevertheless shocked parliamentarians and public opinion 
alike:
Official policy and legislation for Indigenous families and children was contrary to 
accepted legal principle imported into Australia as British [sic] common law and, 
from late 1946, constituted a crime against humanity. It offended accepted standards 
of the time and was the subject of dissent and resistance. The implementation of the 
legislation was marked by breaches of fundamental obligations on the part of officials 
and others to the detriment of dependent and vulnerable children who parents were
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powerless to know their whereabouts and protect them from exploitation and abuse 
(Wilson, 1997: 275).
Australian Labor Party leader Kim Beazley called the findings of the Report “a temble, 
terrible record,’ (Beazley, 1997). The idea that Australia could be ranked amongst 
regimes that had committed crimes against humanity jarred with the notions of progress 
and enlightened attitudes that had previously permeated narratives of the British and 
Australian past. Robert Manne noted that, ‘This story had the power to change forever 
the way they [the public] saw their country’s history’ (Manne, 2001: 104).
One of the Bringing Them Home Report’s recommendations was that ‘the first 
step in any compensation and healing for victims of gross violations of human rights 
must be an acknowledgment of the truth and the delivery of an apology’ (Wilson, 1997: 
284). The following year saw the introduction of “Sorry Day”, the signing of “Sorry 
Books” and apologies from State and Territory parliaments (with the Northern Territory 
passing a motion in 2001). On 17 September 1997, the Parliament of Victoria passed the 
motion, typical of the tone of apologies from the state parliaments:
That this house apologises to the Aboriginal people on behalf of all Victorians for the 
past policies under which Aboriginal children were removed from their families and 
expresses deep regret at the hurt this has caused and reaffirms its support for 
reconciliation between all Australians (Parliament of Victoria, 1997: 3).
In supporting the motion, then Labor opposition leader John Brumby called the removal 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children ‘a shameful part of Australian history 
which occurred in every state and territory’ (Parliament of Victoria, 1997: 5). Liberal 
Premier Jeff Kennett also endorsed the motion, adding that ‘the report also reminds us 
that this practice did not occur in the distant past, but during our lifetimes and in our 
state’ (Parliament of Victoria, 1997: 3). All other states and territories issued similar 
apologies between 1997 and 2002 to the Stolen Generations and those suffering from the 
consequences of past removal polices.
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However, again it was the contest over history, and the link between the past and 
the present, that became the issue around which ideas concerning social justice and 
restitution would be fought. Prime Minister John Howard refused to apologise on behalf 
of the Commonwealth of Australia and the nation for something that he maintained the 
current generation of Australians had not done and could not therefore been responsible 
for. But it was not just such intervening political issues that made the past a contentious 
yet essential part of the debate about indigenous rights and the character of Australian 
nationalism. The revision of dominant settler narratives was a fundamental aspect of the 
CAR’s overall objectives. Section 6(b) of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 
(1991) spelt out an educative endeavor for the CAR, namely ‘to promote by leadership, 
education and discussion, a deeper understanding by all Australians of the history, past 
cultures, dispossession and continuing disadvantage of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islanders and the need to redress that disadvantage.’ The CAR also interpreted the 1991 
Act as a chance to alter the prevailing understanding of Australian history, ‘providing 
Australians with an historic opportunity to build a nation that lives out the values it 
proclaims’ (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 2000b).
Debates about history began to reach a wider audience through their political 
salience. Historian Inga Clendinnen used the 1999 ABC Boyer Lecture to argue for “true 
stories”, not “bad history” as the basis of a national imagination. Clendinnen claimed 
that the examination of history and past events was ‘conducive to civic virtue, and 
therefore to the coherence of a democratic liberal state’ (Clendinnen, 1999: 7). For 
Clendinnen, discussion of history would help realise what she called ‘the ambition of 
civic nationalism: for citizens to be sufficiently informed factually and exercised morally 
to be competent to make decisions for themselves’ (Clendinnen, 1999: 17). She 
continued:
Teach grown men and women a nursery version of their history and you will make 
babies of them when it comes to grasping the actual workings of their own society, 
and of their nation in the wider world (Clendinnen, 1999: 10).
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However, separating “true stories” from “bad histories” proved extremely difficult in the 
political atmosphere that developed around the issue of indigenous rights in the latter half 
of the 1990s. Australia’s colonial past had become part of a political debate that made it 
crucial for popular understandings of indigenous-settler relations.
Attempts were made by the reconciliation movement to graft Aboriginal history 
on to existing forms of Australian historical consciousness, by writing indigenous 
experiences more fully into the settler story. This was a strategy recommended to the 
CAR by independent opinion pollsters Irving Saulwick and Dennis Muller (Saulwick and 
Muller, 2000: 20). In particular, attempts to build indigenous histories into the Anzac 
legend were emphasised. Regarding the Torres Strait Islander Light Infantry, the CAR 
described the unit as ‘once Island warriors fighting for their families, they became 
soldiers fighting for their country’ (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation. 2000d). 
Furthermore, it was emphasised that serving in the army hastened the Islanders’ 
appreciation of Australian citizenship:
A mutiny by the Battalion in December 1943 highlighted the men's frustration at the 
different treatment of Indigenous and non-Indigenous soldiers, including the fact that 
their wages were one-third that of the other soldiers... Prior to the conflict, the people 
of the Torres Strait were seen as colonial subjects and the Director of Native Affairs 
controlled their economy. Post war, however, the situation was vastly different. After 
serving alongside non-Indigenous Australians, the Torres Strait men gained an 
appreciation of themselves as Australian citizens. (Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation. 2000d).
Margaret Iselin, Quandamooka elder also adopted the attempt to shift Australian 
consciousness by combining indigenous and non-indigenous histories. She argued that 
‘the history of our shared experiences brings together two different time lines, two 
different cultures and two different laws. All Australians can share in the pride and 
knowledge that this country is home to the oldest living culture in the world’ (quoted in
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National Native Title Tribunal, 2000: 2). However, the re-working of Australian history 
proved to be somewhat more challenging to the established narrative of Australian 
history then a mere joining of two different historical experiences into one extended 
story. Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating adopted the issue of this re-working of the 
popular narrative of Australian history in his speech at Redfem Park in Sydney in 
anticipation of the International Year of Indigenous Peoples in 1993. For Keating Mabo 
established ‘a fundamental truth and [laid] the basis for justice’ (Keating, 1993a [1992]: 
5). Keating portrayed the re-working as a test of national self-knowledge that would 
begin with an act of recognition:
Recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing. We took the traditional lands 
and smashed the traditional way of life. We brought the diseases. The alcohol. We 
committed the murders. We took the children from their mothers. We practised 
discrimination and exclusion. It was our ignorance and our prejudice. And our 
failure to imagine these things being done to us (Keating, 1993a [1992]: 4).
Keating’s stated motivation was that Aborigines should not be ‘denied their place in the 
modem Australian nation’ (Keating, 1993a [1992]: 4). Bain Attwood has argued that by 
the mid-1990s Aboriginal history and Australian national consciousness became closely 
connected. ‘The importance of the new Australian history and Aboriginal history might 
be relatively limited were it not for the fact that presently many Australians believe that 
the past which is signified by Aborigines and/or Aboriginality holds the key to 
Australia’s future’ (Attwood, 1996: xxiii). Whereas before, Aboriginality was 
constructed as an absence (as in Australia’s “whiteness”), by the middle of the last 
decade it was constructed more positively, and even idealised particularly for 
international audiences, such as during the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney 
Olympics.
What was at stake in such a historiographical shift however was a certain 
conception of the Australian nation based on an understanding of the Australian past. 
The recognition of dispossession and assimilation profoundly challenged the Whiggish
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version of Australian history that told the story of the creation of a new civilisation in an 
empty land. Former Mabo judge, William Deane, in his role as Governor-General, 
argued that:
It should, I think, be apparent to all well-meaning people that true reconciliation 
between the Australian nation and its indigenous peoples is not achievable in the 
absence of acknowledgement by the nation of the wrongfulness of the past 
dispossession, oppression and degradation of the Aboriginal peoples. That is not to 
say that individual Australians who had no part in what was done in the past should 
feel or acknowledge personal guilt. It is simply to assert our identity as a nation and 
the basic fact that national shame, as well as national pride, can and should exist in 
relation to past acts and omissions, at least when done or made in the name of the 
community or with the authority of government. Where there is no room for national 
pride or national shame about the past, there can be no national soul (Deane, 1996).
Deane’s notions of “guilt” and “shame” may have made some uneasy, but it was 
clear that the national narrative of the settler nation was going to have to shift profoundly 
in order for wider support for restitution and indigenous rights to coalesce. Malcolm 
Fraser made an explicit plea to the settler nation:
Here let me appeal again to my fellow non-indigenous Australians. It is hard to 
realise that the history we were taught of a great empty land being settled by brave 
explorers was largely false. It is hard for us to understand that the real history of 
Australia was quite different from that which we were taught as children. It might be 
harder still for some of us who have known people of influence and respect, who 
participated in policies which today we regard as outdated, barbarous, cruel and racist 
(Fraser 2000).
In order to counter any resistance to the notion that the they were promoting some 
sort of “collective guilt” onto the settler nation, the CAR adopted the language of 
“healing”, “journey” and reinforced notions of a unitary nation. An engagement with the
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past treatment of indigenous peoples would make the nation a “better” and “more just” 
place. ‘Our nation’ argued the CAR, ‘must have the courage to own the truth, to heal the 
wounds of its past so that we can move on together at peace with ourselves... As we 
walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologises and expresses its sorrow 
and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so the other part accepts the apologies and 
forgives' (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 2000a).
Thus the stress in the CAR’s strategies was on an alliance between two parts of 
the Australian people, to form a more complete and just Australian nation. The 
discrimination and disadvantage experienced by the indigenous community was 
contrasted with the rhetoric surrounding democracy and the “fair go” in dominant 
national narratives. Through reconciliation, a new national consciousness was to be 
formed, although not through the class alliances of previous nationalist movements, but 
instead a racial alliance between the indigenous people of Australia and the settler nation. 
ATSIC Chair, Mick Dodson emphasised the centrality of the settler nation to the 
reconciliation process at Corroboree 2000:
Although issues of the health, housing and education of Indigenous Australians are of 
key concern to a nation, they are not issues that are at the very heart or the very soul 
of reconciliation. But they are - quite simply - the entitlements every Australian 
should enjoy... Reconciliation is about far deeper things to do with nation, soul and 
spirit. Reconciliation is about the blood and flesh of the lives we must lead together, 
not the nuts and bolts of the entitlements as citizens we should all enjoy (Dodson, 
2000) .
Counter-challenges: Settler Sovereignty and “Black Armband” History
The type of historical revision desired by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation was 
contested by conservatives. For them, the assertion of indigenous identity as something 
distinct from Australian identity, outwith the British traditions of sovereignty, and the 
promotion of differing views about the Australian past, threatened both the unity and 
legitimacy of the Australian state and nation. By denying indigenous sovereignty and the
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legitimacy and veracity of so-called “black-armband” history, conservatives resorted to 
the language of Britishness, vaunting its stated ability to accommodate different peoples 
under one political identity and its association with notions of “Progress” and 
“Civilisation” used to justify imperial expansion. Britishness was re-asserted in Australia 
by the conservative response to the politics of reconciliation.
Henry Reynolds suggested in 1993 that with the handing down of Mabo decision, 
colonialism in Australia came to an end (quoted in Hughes and Pitty, 1994: 13). But 
political and popular opinion was much less unanimous than Reynolds allowed. 
Imperatives in Australian nationalism to justify the appropriation of land remained as 
mining companies continued their development of the interior and pastoralists and 
indigenous land owners struggled to come to some accommodation over land issues 
following the Wik decision. These imperatives were in turn were augmented by more 
immediate political strategies adopted by radical conservatives. Hughes and Pitty warned 
that ‘there is a danger that the dominant actors in Australian politics will resort to the 
rhetoric of division, not reconciliation, misrepresenting self-government for indigenous 
peoples as “apartheid”, not as a humane and sensible resolution of this country’s 
founding tragedy’ (Hughes and Pitty, 1994: 22). In this they were proved quite right.
The Howard government that was elected in 1996 was hostile to the issue of 
reconciliation and indigenous issues. ‘At the core of this hostility,’ argued Lowtija 
O’Donoghue, ‘lies a dispute about history. Many of today’s indigenous Australians see 
themselves as survivors. We base our identity in part on reminding other Australians that 
this country was built not just on egalitarianism and hard work, but also on theft and 
murder’ (O’Donoghue, 1997: 2). As O’Donoghue correctly claimed, the idea that 
Australia was founded on theft and murder was profoundly unsettling to the established 
legitimating narrative that Australia was a free and democratic society, wedded to the 
Rule of Law. The indigenous challenge required Australia’s ruling elites to re-legitimate 
the centre of sovereignty, countering claims of racism, torture and genocide. 
Reconciliation was one approach, co-opting the settler nation in the struggle for 
indigenous rights and shifting national consciousness accordingly. However,
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conservative politicians and their fellow-travelers resisted this approach, re-asserting their 
own claims for ownership and control of the Australian continent and re-asserting 
Britishness as they did so.
Alarmed by indigenous demands for economically valuable land, conservatives 
countered with historical narratives and criticism of their own, particularly over the 
Stolen Generations, frontier history and what was labelled “black-armband history” in 
general. Intellectuals provided conservatives with political arguments. This intellectual 
counter attack began in the mid-1980s. British conservative philosopher Roger Scruton 
defended the legitimacy of the occupation of Australia. Scruton had been invited to 
Australia by a group of New Right think tanks, who had also paid his expenses. Whilst 
in Western Australia, Scruton met with Hugh Morgan, executive director of the Western 
Mining Company who was himself launching a public affairs campaign attacking land 
rights on behalf of the mining interests. Scruton employed the veneration of the virtues of 
British civilisation prevalent in British conservative narratives to the Australian context. 
His intervention was also significant in that it prefigured the attempt to firstly deny the 
legitimacy of the past as an area grievance, and then replace the narrative of 
dispossession with an older one concerning “progress”. Such arguments developed by 
the New Right anticipated John Howard’s promotion of what he referred to as “practical 
reconciliation”, that did not frame the debate in terms of past injustice or a shift in 
Australian national consciousness.
During his seminar on the legitimacy of Australian settlement, Scruton argued 
that ‘If we look too closely at the past every arrangement presently existing will prove to 
be illegitimate. We must look at the present, or at least if we look at the past, it must be 
the past as we perceive it from our present condition’ (Scruton, 1985b: 76). Scruton’s 
argument claimed that the way to overcome any potential illegitimacy was to assert the 
‘present condition’ which was one of political process, by which Scruton meant 
democracy. The justification and legitimation he gave in the case of Australia was a re­
statement of Britishness. ‘We regard this process as integral to our legitimacy [and] is 
something that we have inherited from the British Parliamentary tradition and the British
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common law tradition, which goes back to our Anglo-Saxon ancestors’ (Scruton, 1985b: 
76). For Scruton “Progress” inevitably crushed people under its wheel. ‘This is what 
happens. It would have happened anywhere, whatever the intentions of the original 
settlers. It couldn’t but have happened because of the inevitable fate of one of a weak 
culture faced with a strong one’ (Scruton, 1985b: 77). These arguments were developed 
by the New Right and eventually emerged in Hansonism in the mid-1990s. Hanson 
stated ‘lands with a sparse occupation of people without a single recognised leader and 
government and no legal system of land tenure, could be acquired by effective settlement. 
Lands that were not conquered were acquired in this way. That is what human history, 
perhaps until very recently was about. The British claim on Australia was made on this 
basis’ (Hanson, 1997: 123).
One year prior to Scruton’s arrival in Australia, a race debate had been sparked by 
historian Geoffrey Blainey. Blainey had questioned the levels of migration from Asian 
countries into Australia, and the supposed incompatibility of migrants from Asian and 
European backgrounds. For Blainey, multiculturalism endangered the existence of the 
Australian nation, threatening it with disintegration. Ten years later, Blainey wrote in his 
short national history that ‘Australia was now said to be a noble experiment for the world 
to observe, an example of strength through diversity, a celebration of human differences, 
a nation of all the nations... It will be many decades before the experiment can be safely 
pronounced as a triumph, or moderate success, or a begetter of a nation of tribes’ 
(Blainey, 1994: 233). He concluded his book with a warning about the break up of 
Australia, contrasting his present fears with the optimism one hundred years ago. ‘This 
charmed and unique combination [Australia] has now survived one century. Whether it 
will last for two centuries is not certain. In the sweep of human history no political 
boundary is permanent’ (Blainey, 1994: 239). As with Roger Scruton, Blainey’s 
arguments provided some crucial common ground between, the New Right, the far-right 
and John Howard’s “mainstream” constituency, particularly over understandings of 
Australia’s past. As Carol Johnson has pointed out, the promotion of the “mainstream” in 
Australian politics is not only about policing “ethnics”, but is also about policing the 
“mainstream” itself. By stressing the unquestioned centrality of a certain version of
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Australian identity and consciousness, the New Right and John Howard were able to re­
assert a particular social order that he and his supporters felt had been dangerously 
undermined (Johnson, 2000). Furthermore, it was over the issue of race that John 
Howard’s government successfully straddled the seemingly contradictory positions of 
economic internationalism and chauvinist nationalism, winning back support from 
sections of the Australian community threatened by the neo-liberal economic policies of 
the 1980s and 1990s (Markus, 2001: 221).
As with the defeat of republicanism, the development of the idea that the 
supporters of reconciliation were elitist and out of touch was an important part of the 
conservative reaction. “Anti-elitist” rhetoric had already been aimed at certain attitudes 
towards multiculturalism and indigenous affairs by members of the New and far-Right. 
P.P. McGuinness, editor of the influential right-wing monthly journal Quadrant, argued 
that the movement for reconciliation had been ‘poisoned by exactly the same intolerance 
of popular feeling which has become the hallmark of the nagging progressives’ 
(McGuinness, 2000: 238). He added that:
This marked separation of community opinion from that of the soi-disant 
progressives also ensured that the republican referendum was defeated. It now seems 
that those who claim to have the right opinions, and the right to influence policy, are 
as far removed from general electoral opinion as was the aristocracy in pre- 
Revolutionary France (McGuinness, 2000: 236).
Pauline Hanson expressed similar sentiments in Parliament when she was elected to the 
House of Representatives in 1996. While republicanism was derided as pushing 
mainstream Australia further away from its own “ethnic” roots (Hanson, 1997: 88), issues 
of race, reconciliation and indigenous affairs were much more threatening. Like Blainey, 
Hanson’s underlying concern was for the cohesiveness of the national community. She 
argued that, ‘a truly multicultural country can never be strong or united. The world is full 
of failed and tragic examples, ranging from Ireland to Bosnia to Africa and closer to
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home, Papua New Guinea. American and Great Britain are currently paying the price’ 
(Hanson, 1997: 7).
Multiculturalism was attacked by people like, Blainey, Howard and Hanson in 
order to preserve the racial unity of the Australian nation. But indigenous sovereignty 
and expression of indigenous difference threatened the very legitimacy of the Australian 
nation. Crucial to Hanson’s understanding of the cohesive national community was the 
denial of indigenous sovereignty in Australia, that, following the Mabo decision, was 
‘spreading like a cancer to attack family homes’ (Hanson, 1997: 49). This desire to 
preserve settler sovereignty, or at least not to accommodate indigenous sovereignty 
resulted in a sharp battle over the legitimacy of settlement and the legacy of 
dispossession. In her maiden speech, Hanson stated:
I am fed up with being told “This is our land”. Well where the hell do I go? I was 
bom here and so were my parents and children. I will work beside anyone and they 
will be my equal but I draw the line when told I must pay and continue paying for 
something that happened over 200 years ago. Like most Australians I worked for my 
land: no-one gave it to me (Hanson, 1997: 4).
Both Blainey and Hanson argued that the different technical capacities of the 
British and the Aborigines at the moment of contact was crucial in explaining Aboriginal 
disadvantage to the present day. Said Blainey:
The fact that the British, rather than the Indonesians, were the intruders meant that the 
confrontation was all the more bewildering... Here were the inhabitants of the land 
which had just invented the steam engine meeting people who, making no pottery and 
working no metals, did not know how to boil water. Here was an utter contrast in 
peoples... even with goodwill on both sides they were incompatible (Blainey, 1994: 
22) .
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This argument maintains that it was the technological development of each people at the 
moment of contact that can explain current indigenous disadvantage, a view advanced by 
the minister assisting the prime minister on reconciliation, Philip Ruddock, and defended 
in Parliament (Senate Hansard, 5 October 2000). In particular, military disparity 
between the British and the Aborigines, sealed the fate of the original Australians. 
Rejecting the notion that Australia was acquired peacefully, Hanson argued, ‘We took 
this land by appropriation; we took it because, in the words of Professor Blainey, the 
Aborigines could not defend it’ (Hanson, 1997: 230). One Nation also employed a crude 
analysis of Aboriginal and British military development in order to refute claims that 
genocide had taken place in Australia. ‘The essential ingredient of genocide,’ claimed 
Pauline Hanson, ‘remains having a plan to systematically annihilate some group of 
people and to actually carry it out. In the Australian case no such plan existed. We can 
say this with certainty because with the superior weapons and numbers of the whites, 
then the Aborigines would not have lasted for long.’ Hanson concluded that ‘since the 
Aborigines still exist, the idea that a holocaust occurred is nonsense’ (Hanson, 1997: 137- 
9).
Former media academic, Keith Windschuttle’s interventions in the debate were 
also underpinned by a desire to counter the claims of indigenous sovereignty and 
separatism. Importantly, Windschuttle linked history with politics, arguing that the type 
of history used in the reconciliation process was inspired by post-colonialism in 
intellectual circles. He argued that among the academy’s post-colonial strategies ‘are the 
most far-reaching proposals for the reorganisation and the eventual break-up of the 
Australian nation. A central part of this program is the creation of an Aboriginal state’ 
(Windschuttle, 2000a: 8). In resisting Aboriginal demands for sovereignty and 
autonomy, a historiography stressing the old imperial notion of “Progress” was re-stated 
by the intellectuals of the right. In this situation “the past” became a crucial sight of 
struggle when defending the legitimacy and sovereignty of the settler nation, and it was 
here that the Britishness of Australian conservatives was revealed.
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Promoting the historiography of Britishness in Australia meant countering the 
revisionist histories of Australia that had developed since the 1960s in general and the 
histories of settler-indigenous relations in particular. Coined by Geoffrey Blainey in 
1993, the term “black armband history” was applied to any view of history that the New 
Right and conservatives deemed unduly negative about Australia’s past. Some versions 
of black-armband history were indeed quite simplistic, although no more so than some 
more triumphal Australian narratives. Such anti-triumphal versions of Australian history 
were at their worst where authors attempted to turn historical findings into political 
rhetoric. Journalist Bruce Elder wrote in 1988 of the British landings at Sydney Cove 
that:
One side respected the land; the other side exploited the land. One side was basically 
peaceful and benign; the other was essentially sadistic and autocratic. One sought 
harmony; the other was driven by aggression and competitiveness (Elder, 1998 
[1988]: 2).
These versions of history with their simplistic and romantic views of Aboriginal culture 
could easily play into the hands of the critics of “black armband history”. However, the 
issues raised by historical research into the frontier killings and the removal policies of 
children were distressing and entirely germane to the current plight of many in the 
indigenous communities. Henry Reynolds, perhaps the historian most associated with the 
writing of “black-armband” history, linked the past and present in his own writing: T 
thought from the beginning of my career that historical writing was inescapably political 
-  the history of race relations especially so’ (Reynolds, 1999: 244). In this political 
contest over the past, Reynolds’ conclusions adopted an openly partisan position (in 
opposition to the covert one assumed by earlier narratives). He stated that black-armband 
historians:
do not feel the need to be correct themselves as much as desiring to correct the history 
distorted by several generations of nationalist and self-congratulatory writing, which 
had banished the Aborigines from text to melancholy footnote and thereby
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expurgated most of the violence and much of the injustice... Black-armband history 
is often distressing, but it does enable us to know and understand the incubus which 
burdens us all (Reynolds, 1999: 258).
Peter Read, the historian who himself termed the phrase the “stolen generations”, wrote 
the type of history that challenged longer established national narratives in Australia.
‘White people,’ wrote Read, ‘seem seldom to have realized, let alone acknowledged, that 
the battle for Australia was the same kind of war of dispossession which was fought by 
Europeans anywhere in the world. Nor have they realized that military conquest did not 
necessarily imply psychological defeat’ (Read, 1982: 14). His research into the Stolen 
Generations also raised the unsettling idea that genocide was part of the Australian story, 
and that the claims made by the organisers of the Centenary of Federation that Australia 
was created ‘with a vote and not a war’ was deeply inaccurate (National Council for the 
Centenary of Federation, 2000). ‘Genocide does not simply mean the extermination of 
people by violence but may include any means at all’ (Read, 1982: 2). At the height of 
the policy of separating Aboriginal people from their parents the Aborigines Welfare 
Board pursued genocidal policies as an eventual means of solving the “Aboriginal 
problem”. Read’s concluding remarks in his 1982 public information pamphlet on the 
Stolen Generations set the tone for the future debate about current Australians’ relation to 
past events and attitudes towards those past practices. ‘For generations Aborigines have 
suffered. Perhaps in time the whites will suffer in the knowledge of what they have done. 
But they cannot expect forgiveness’ (Read, 1982: 20). However, this view was rejected 
by the Right. From the mid-1980s John Howard was arguing that such views of history 
were divisive and later questioned the veracity of the frontier killings, stating that ‘few 
Australians are much interested in symbolic contrition for the misdeeds, both actual and 
perceived, of earlier generations’ (Howard, 1993). In 1994, the Centenary of Federation 
Advisory Committee noted as part of its plans to celebrate one hundred years of the 
Commonwealth of Australia that ‘there is an increasing equation of Australian history 
with self-criticism, to the extent that it may be undermining an appropriate pride in 
Australian achievement’ (Centenary of Federation Advisory Committee, 1994: 2). By 
the late 1990s, the idea of a “balance sheet” of history had developed, whereby
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unfortunate episodes in the past could be relativised next to other collective achievements 
made in the name of the nation. Liberal frontbencher, Tony Abbott expressed this in 
1997: ‘Despite the enormities perpetrated against the Aborigines and the ingrained 
cultural insensitivity towards minorities, Australia’s history gives more ground for pride 
than shame’ (Abbott, 1997: 105). By April 2000, the “balance sheet” approach became 
an actual game of numbers as Liberal Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs, Senator John Herron, denied that sufficient numbers of indigenous children were 
removed from their families to constitute a “generation” {Senate Hansard, 3 April 2000: 
13105).
This dispute over history was also part of a wider need to win back support that 
mainstream parties (notably the Liberal-National Party governing coalition) had lost to 
far-Right organisations since 1996. Howard saw the spread of an overly negative view of 
Australian history as one of the contributing factors to the electoral appeal of Pauline 
Hanson’s populist nationalism (McKenna, 1997: 10). In outlining his plans for “practical 
reconciliation”, Howard had first to address what he saw as the overly negative view of 
Australia’s past. T do not believe it is fair or accurate to portray Australia’s history since 
1788 as little more than a disgraceful record of imperialism, exploitation and racism. 
Such a portrayal is a gross distortion and deliberately neglects the overall story of great 
Australian achievement that is there in our history to be told’ (Howard, 2000b: 90). In 
this regard “mainstream Australianess” was invoked as a counter-identity to the identity 
and rights-based politics of the indigenous movement, whilst certain understandings of 
Australia’s history would be resisted and revised to woo conservative voters back into the 
“mainstream” fold.
The historical counter attack from the Right was an attack on those who sought to 
highlight and popularise a view of history that included the negative aspects of 
colonisation. Hanson also lashed out at the left intelligentsia in her maiden speech in 
September 1996. Building on ideas expressed in some of John Howard’s campaigns 
against “political correctness”, Hanson stated that ‘We now have a situation where a type 
of reverse racism is applied to mainstream Australians by those who promote political
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correctness and those who control the various taxpayer-funded “industries” that flourish 
in our society servicing Aboriginals, multiculturalists and a host of other minority 
groups’ (Hanson, 1997: 2-3). In this sense, the left-revisionist history developed since 
the 1970s, particularly with regard to Australia’s frontier and race relations, came under 
One Nation and the New Right’s broader criticism of “political correctness”. The 
strategy adopted by One Nation to deal with the legacy of dispossession, murder and 
assimilation was to introduce relativism into the debate, that sought to shift attention 
away from the actions of the settler nation whilst assuaging the connotations of collective 
guilt that accompanied this historical record. Hanson argued that ‘if White Australians 
are to feel guilty about settling Australia, then Aborigines should apologise to the 
relatives and descendents of the Chinese that they cannibalised in Northern Queensland 
in the late 19th century’ (Hanson, 1997: 132).
As noted in Chapter 4, the anti-elite sentiment of the far-Right was not directed at 
the Left alone. Graeme Campbell and Mark Uhllmann aimed their attacks at economic 
rationalists as much as any other elite ideology:
It is as if, having been driven from the economic field, the regulators have focused all 
their energies in the social area in a Stalinist attempt to mould society in their image, 
while the laissez-faire advocates have largely abandoned social issues and focused all 
their energies on the economy. As a result, social areas have been unreasonable 
restricted, while the economy has been left without any sensible regulation. Both 
sides, while they may be antagonistic in some respects, effectively complement each 
other in the erosion of nations and national sovereignty’ (Campbell and Uhlmann, 
1995: viii).
The suppression of indigenous rights via the debate over notions of collective and 
enduring responsibility for past wrongs, represented common ground for conservative 
opinion, and that of the New Right wedded to the idea of economic rationalism. For John 
Howard as leader of the Liberal Party, indigenous affairs and debates over history 
provided an opportunity to win back support lost during the rise of One Nation. It also,
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as Andrew Markus and Guy Rundle argue, allowed Howard to maintain his conservative 
view of national unity, whilst diverting criticism away from the effects of his economic 
philosophy (Markus, 2000: 221; Rundle, 2001: 16). The language of national unity was 
employed to deny any special status, and hence special treatment, to indigenous 
Australians.
To do this, Howard and his allies attempted to restore a more “positive” national 
narrative, as a means to counter indigenous claims and political demands. Howard argued 
that ‘Australians of this generation should not be required to accept guilt and blame for 
past actions and policies over which they had no control. But we do have an obligation 
and responsibility to overcome their legacies for our fellow Australians’ (Howard, 2000b: 
90). He continued:
Our hope for the period ahead is that... we will focus on what unites us as Australians 
rather than what divides us; that we will respect and appreciate our differences and 
not make demands on each other which cannot be realised; and that together we will 
build a future in which we can all share fairly as Australians (Howard, 2000b: 96).
This historical counter-offensive also involved an attack on the architects of current 
thinking about indigenous policy as un-Australian. ‘The Coombsian philosophy which 
succeeded in capturing official backing in 1971 was based on a highly antipathetic view 
of Western civilisation generally and Australian civilisation in particular,’ wrote former 
Liberal MHR Peter Howson (Howson, 1999: 13). Again the motivation for this 
intervention in the debate was a fear of the fragmentation of the Australian state, as a 
constant reminder of past practices. Howson continued, ‘The essence of Coombsian 
ambition was to replace the assimilation of Hasluck with a separatist vision, in which 
Australia’s Aboriginal peoples would remain set aside from the rest of Australia, forever 
a permanent reminder of Australia’s shame and illegitimacy within the community of 
nations’ (Howson, 1999: 11).
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This revisionism pushed the historical focus of Australian conservatives and the 
New Right further back to the British imperial roots of the Australian nation. In denying 
that there was ever any kind of genocide on the Australian frontier, Keith Windschuttle 
attempted to counter the de-legitimising notion that ‘the British colonisation of New 
South Wales was the kind of lawless, barbaric regime that... historians have tried to 
portray’ (Windschuttle, 2000b: 17). Windschuttle claimed he was defending nothing less 
than ‘the legitimacy of the British occupation of the Australian continent and of its 
commitment to the rule of law and civilised values’ (Windschuttle, 2000b: 20). It was 
over such justifications for dispossession that the New Right sought to defend in its 
politicisation of Australia’s history.
As noted above, John Howard, whilst expressing ‘regret’ for the policy of forced 
child removal, refused to apologise on behalf of the Commonwealth or the nation on the 
grounds that present generations could not be accountable for the actions of their 
forebears (Howard, 2000a). Intellectual support for this broad position was provided 
principally through the journal Quadrant. Ron Brunton wrote about the subject of the 
Stolen Generations in the pages of Quadrant. He too relativised the debate about child 
removal, by introducing what he called the notion of the “Unconceived Generations” and 
sought to undermine the basis of restitution outlined in the Bringing Them Home Report. 
Brunton argued that family planning practices may also be considered genocidal given 
the elasticity of the term used in the Report. Brunton described the Bringing Them Home 
Report as ‘an irresponsible calumny against the nation’ and one that should be rejected ‘if 
Australia is to maintain its dignity as a nation’ (Brunton, 1998: 24).
Reginald Marsh also attacked black-armband history in general and the findings 
of the 1997 Report in Quadrant. ‘Invoking comparisons with the Holocaust and other 
genocides in different circumstances and historical backgrounds serves only to divert the 
pursuit of reconciliation appropriate for Australian circumstances’ (Marsh, 1999: 18). 
However, he failed to outline just what would be appropriate for Australian 
circumstances, but introduced another relativisation along the lines of Scruton’s argument 
of the mid-1980s. Regarding restitution from the present day Australian government for
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past injustices, Marsh argued that ‘it is on the way to an absurdity like mounting a case 
for compensating the Welsh for Roman invasion and charging the current Italian 
government, as the successors of the Romans, for financial compensation’ (Marsh, 1999: 
18).
By the end of the 1990s, right-wing revisionism had moved from the particulars 
of the Stolen Generations report and the testimonies of individual claimants for 
compensation, to a more general debate about frontier history. Robert Manne argued that 
the debate about history and the stolen generations was part of a larger culture war over 
the meaning of Aboriginal dispossession (Manne, 2001b: 102). Again, Windschuttle’s 
concern, was first to defend the unitary notion of the Australian state and its attendant 
national consciousness. Central to Windschuttle’s argument was the idea that ‘that the 
principle reason massacre stories have been invented and exaggerated over the past two 
hundred years was to justify the policy of separating Aboriginal people from the 
European population’ (Windschuttle, 2000d: 6). Windschuttle believed that ‘massacre 
stories provided the rationale for the notion of separatism that came to dominate policy 
towards Aborigines for most of the twentieth century. The academics who entered the 
debate more recently had some newer, political motives but their main role has been to 
perpetuate this long tradition’ (Windschuttle, 2000c: 24).
From the late 1990s, conservatives asserted a version of Australian history that 
owed much to the legitimating historiography of the colonial era. Racialised discourses 
of history were already there for use, and were additionally sanctioned by historical 
persistence, in the legacy of British historiography. Conservatives reverted to offering 
indigenous people the “choice” between progress and dissolution, starkly re-stating the 
difficult decisions posed by uneven development in a colonial setting. Former Keating 
Minister, Gary Johns, stated in a press release to launch an Institute for Public Affairs 
backgrounder on reconciliation:
a large element of reconciliation is the recognition that present day Australia has the 
most respected means of governance devised, a most bountiful economy, the most
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brilliant intellectual conditions and an openness and tolerance unknown in Aboriginal 
culture. Present Aboriginal leaders were schooled in this dominant culture and have 
benefited mightily from it, and should acknowledge this (Johns, 1999).
John Howson put the dilemma more bluntly: ‘The only way forward for Australia’s 
Aborigines is to join mainstream Australia, with other Australians, as a nation in the 
global community context’ (Howson, 1999: 13).
Such attempts to re-assert the colonial version of history led to a veneration of the 
colonial donor country and its own myths and ideas of nationalism. Thus Britishness 
found its way back into analyses of the nation in Australia. For the RSL, the British 
Empire’s ‘civilizing mission was without parallel in the history of mankind. Law and 
order were taken to primitive peoples. The Union Jack, internationally, was a symbol of 
that law and order and of justice’ (RSL, 1991: 85). In term similar to J.S. Mill’s in the 
nineteenth century, historian Miriam Dixson argued that Australia could be glad of its 
British heritage. ‘Historically, the nation as a worldwide phenomenon... was in part an 
effort to accommodate the passions of ethnicity. Fortunately, Australia is one of the 
clearer cases where, though often dismissed as irrelevant, an old, complex ethnic model -  
in our case the Anglo-Celtic core culture -  can still continue to sustain social coherence 
over transitional years’ (Dixson, 1999: 3).
Keith Windschuttle also adopted this imperial language when, like Charles Dilke, 
he argued that it was the settlers’ duty to carry the torch of civilisation into the dark 
comers of the earth, and in this case save the Aborigines from themselves. As with 
imperial British narratives, it is the British genius that will benefit mankind the most, 
which is part of the bargain that will offset the pain of incorporation within the “modem” 
nation:
By “the best” I especially mean the liberty, equity and prosperity of the prevailing 
Western political, legal and economic systems. By remaining part of the Australian 
community, Aboriginal people have these features of Western culture available to
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them on tap. Difficult though it obviously will be, the most likely resolution of their 
existing social problems lies in discovering how best to take advantage of the Western 
cultural presence (Windschuttle, 2000a: 16).
As with other Quadrant commentators, Windschuttle’s solution was for Aboriginal 
people to embrace the system that dispossessed them in the first place: ‘most historians 
have focused almost entirely on the problems Aborigines faced because of their 
dispossession from their tribal lands and have overlooked, indeed they have not wanted to 
know about, the opportunities this same process has opened up for them’ (Windschuttle, 
2000d: 19). “Progress” was again being offered to the indigenous population, but, as 
always, on the settler’s terms. Thus the effects of uneven development were still being 
felt in indigenous politics to this day. Whilst indigenous communities faced deprivations 
and discrimination, the right responded by re-asserting the British claims to Australia and 
the imperial rhetoric that justified dispossession since 1788.
Conclusion
When the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation was established in 1991, issues of social 
justice crossed merged with wider debates about the legacy of British imperialism in 
Australia and Australians’ relationship with their colonial past. In order to create a 
political atmosphere in which the wider causes of indigenous disadvantage could be 
addressed in a sympathetic manner, indigenous activists and their allies challenged 
dominant narratives of the settler nation. Such a version of history was at variance with 
long-established historiographic traditions in Australian and British imperial history, that 
stressed the benefits of British imperial rule. This challenge to established historiography 
potentially de-legitimised Australian possession of the continent given the history of 
dispossession, death and genocide. The subsequent attack on what was dubbed by its 
critics “black-armband” history, formed part of right-wing, conservative strategy to win 
back votes lost to right wing populist parties, but also to re-establish a political and 
rhetorical framework for Australian legitimacy. The result was a re-statement of 
justifications for the dispossession of indigenous peoples and a defence of British origins 
and political values in Australian nationalism. This reaction was promoted as “Progress”.
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The practical result in this shift in the understanding of the past was the presentation of 
the original stark choice of assimilation or exclusion faced by Australia’s original 
occupants when confronted by the British intrusion into the Australian landmass. This 
conservative reaction to indigenous sovereignty and its associated historical revisionism, 
along with the politics surrounding the republic discussed in Chapter 4, led to another re­
assertion of Britishness in Australia in the late 1990s.
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chapter 6:
Britishness and Nationalism in England
all the nationalisms under study in this thesis, English nationalism remains the 
most attached to the ideology, symbols and language of Britishness. However, 
despite the recent reforms of the British state and the creation of devolved assemblies and 
parliaments in other parts of the realm, the merging of “England” and “Britain” continued 
to operate in contemporary English national consciousness. As a result of the historical 
creation of the United Kingdom, English nationalism continued to express itself as a 
defence of British sovereignty. Despite the fears of some commentators and certain 
politicians alike, the conditions that permitted the mobilisation of an anti-Conservative 
nationalism in Scotland were not present in England. Nor was their a republican 
movement able to mobilise people around the notion of ridding the nation of a “foreign” 
monarch, or such an intense debate about national history such as that linked with 
reconciliation. Without these conditions, the politics of nationalism were ultimately 
played out amongst the political parties with interests in either defending Westminster’s 
sovereignty or “modernising” British nationalism. But this is not to say that such 
“Anglo-British” nationalism had no popular content at all. Undoubtedly, the legal and 
constitutional niceties of Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty made a poor means of 
mobilising the popular element of a nationalism. Instead attitudes towards the monarchy, 
the European Union and race, have been combined with these notions of sovereignty 
which were in turn promoted as forming the English, or British, character. It was in the 
defence of these issues that Britishness continued to play are significant part in forming 
the content of English nationalism during the 1990s.
England Arise?
English nationalism was not consciously called into existence by English nationalists 
during the 1990s in the way that Scottish nationalism in Scotland was, or indeed 
republican nationalism or reconciliation were in Australia. Despite devolution in the rest 
of the United Kingdom and many identity-based political protests such as Countryside 
Alliance rallies, petrol protests, race riots or the Englishness associated with support for
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the national football team, a specifically English nationalism did not emerge. This is not 
to say that English nationalism was not a feature on the political landscape after 1997 in a 
way that it had not been before. Prior to New Labour’s success at the polls however, the 
implications of what was happening in Scotland and Wales hardly seemed to fire the 
imagination in England. In 1995, Stuart Prebble, of the ITV Network replied to a query 
by Alastair Moffat, the Chief Executive of Scottish Television Enterprises, regarding a 
programme on devolution for English television audiences. Prebble declined this 
suggestion, adding, ‘I’m sure this won’t be a popular view on your side of the border, but 
it remains the case that many people in the rest of the UK will feel unaffected by the 
proposed changes, and will find this a very dull subject indeed’ (Prebble, 1995).
But such attitudes amongst political elites were changing. Even prior to the 
Conservative electoral defeats in Scotland and Wales and the devolution referenda of 
1997, some politicians saw the development of an English, as opposed to a British, 
nationalism as the logical outcome of New Labour’s proposed constitutional reforms for 
Scotland and Wales. During the election campaign of 1997, John Major warned that 
New Labour’s plans would let the ‘genie of nationalism’ out of the bottle, adding that 
‘Labour’s policies would, as sure as night follows day, raise the spectre of nationalism in 
England’ (MacMahon et al.., 5 April 1997). Shortly before the Scottish referendum on 
12 September 1997, former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher also predicted the rise of 
an English nationalism unsympathetic to Scottish demands and concerns. ‘Scottish 
politicians do Scots no service if they lead them to believe that they can always pick and 
choose the terms under which they wish to remain in the UK. They should not be 
surprised if the result of doing so is to awaken a resentful English nationalism, which 
questions other aspects of present arrangements which Scots themselves take for granted’ 
(Thatcher, 1998 [1997]: 301). For both Major and Thatcher, the “awakening” of an 
English nationalism was one of the foremost reasons to oppose devolution, which they 
portrayed as a profound constitutional change of no benefit to either Scotland or England. 
Nevertheless, the stirrings of this “English backlash” were particularly noticeable after 
the landslide New Labour election victory on 1 May 1997. Writing in The Spectator, the 
mouthpiece of the Conservative right, Tory MP Edward Heathcote Amory noted that in
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the wake of the 1997 election the grassroots of the Conservative party were ‘in all too 
many cases... opting for an easy and populist English nationalism in an attempt to 
redefine both their party and their country’ (Heathcote Amory, 1997). Nor were these 
views restricted to Conservative politicians resisting New Labour initiatives. Writing in 
the centre-left weekly, New Statesman, David Hayes referred to England as the ‘dark 
shadow of the constitutional debate’ (Hayes, 1997). The common assumption was that 
the rise of a specifically English nationalism was an inevitable corollary of devolution in 
Scotland and Wales.
In some senses, such observers were right. Media interest in Englishness and 
Britishness increased when English fans rioted in France during the World Cup in 1998 
and Scottish fans didn’t. This pattern was repeated during the Euro2000 championships 
in the Low Countries, leading the then Home Secretary Jack Straw, to ask why hostility 
to foreigners seemed to be stronger in England than elsewhere in Britain. Straw stated 
that T think that it’s very important we redefine not only what it means to be British, but 
also what it means to be English’ blaming the xenophobia of England’s football fans on 
what he called ‘the global baggage of empire’ (.Australian, 18 July 2000). However, 
there was nothing particularly new about discussions concerning the behaviour of 
England’s fans overseas. What was novel following New Labour’s 1997 victory was the 
attention now focused onto the relationship between England and the British state, plus 
the growing distinction between the categories “English” and “British”. Writing in 
nostalgic and conservative monthly This England, George Nelson commented on the 
exclusion of the categories “English” and “Welsh” from the 2001 census, despite the 
inclusion of the category “Scottish”, as well as various other minority communities 
established in Britain. ‘No one is in any doubt what has sparked the change,’ Nelson 
wrote, ‘it is a combination of perverse political sensitivity and devolution, both of which 
are helping to destroy the Britain most of its people know and love’ (Nelson 2001b: 34). 
The far-Right British National Party was also forced to respond to the changes brought 
about by devolution and modify its rhetoric accordingly. The success of popular 
nationalism in Scotland and Wales in bringing about constitutional reform could not be 
denied, whilst the a-symmetrical nature of devolution played into already established
197
notions regarding the victimhood of the majority population of the British Isles at the 
hands of minorities and political elites. ‘The British National Party recognises and 
celebrates the cultural diversity of the extremely closely related group of nations which 
have been fused by history to form Great Britain (British National Party, 2002). 
However, it added that ‘the English, more than any other in our British family of nations, 
have been ripped from their cultural roots and denied knowledge of their heritage and 
identity... [But] the rise of English ethnic consciousness is now well under way, 
primarily as a natural reaction to the ruthlessly propagated fiction that all the hundreds of 
different racial groups who have come to our shores since 1948 are now “British.”’ 
(British National Party, 2002). Thus from the latter half of the 1990s, some sense of an 
Englishness distinct from Britishness began to emerge. Such dual consciousness was not 
new, although the two categories were more clearly differentiated than they had been in 
the past. However, after devolution, this popular differentiation began to be translated 
into calls for separate political representation for the English.
The impetus for this English nationalism came from various sources, ranging 
from perceptions of unfairness in the a-symmetrical nature of devolution, to social and 
economic conditions similar to those that created demands for home rule in Scotland. 
Conservative MP Teresa Gorman tabled a motion at Westminster in January' 1998, 
calling for a referendum in England on the establishment of an English parliament, 
arguing that ‘what is good for the Scottish goose is good for the English gander’ 
(Hansards, 16 January 1998: 589). Gorman stated that despite calling for an English 
parliament, she was in fact a Unionist, but that New Labour’s policies had forced her into 
this approach to England, demanding that the English receive ‘fair and equal treatment’ 
and noted that nine out of the twenty cabinet ministers were Scottish or Welsh or 
represented Scottish and Welsh constituencies (.Hansards, 16 January 1998: 596). 
During this debate on the English parliament referendum bill, Conservative MP for 
Bromley and Chislehurst, Eric Forth complained that his constituents felt ‘increasingly 
aggrieved that English voters have never yet been asked their opinion on constitutional 
change, devolution or anything else’ {Hansards, 16 January 1998: 590). He added that 
his constituents:
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are genuinely puzzled and increasingly frustrated that everyone else seems to be 
asked what they want, yet the English -  the majority group in the United Kingdom 
and the people who bankroll everyone else -  have not yet been asked their view 
{Hansards, 16 January 1998: 590).
Furthermore, the establishment of the Scottish Parliament had created an anomaly in the 
representation of Scotland at Westminster. Scottish MPs at Westminster were now able 
to vote on matters pertaining to England, whilst their English counterparts no longer had 
such equivalent powers regarding Scotland. This anomaly was the so-called West 
Lothian Question, posed by the MP for that constituency, Tam Dalyell in the 1970s as an 
argument against devolution. For the Conservatives, this anomaly was ‘a ticking time- 
bomb under the British Constitution’ (Hague, 1999b). Party leader William Hague drew 
on the lessons from resisting devolution since the 1980s. ‘If we have learnt anything from 
the experience in Scotland over the last two decades, then it is that we must provide this 
English consciousness with a legitimate political outlet. Try to ignore this English 
consciousness, or bottle it up, and it could turn into a more dangerous English 
nationalism that could threaten the future of the United Kingdom’ (Hague, 1999b). The 
proposed solution to this situation from the Conservative Party was the establishment of a 
convention on “English Votes for English Laws”. This meant a sort of “gentlemen’s 
agreement” whereby MPs would agree to vote only on those matters that affected the 
country in which the MP held his or her constituency.
Another parliamentary source of a nascent English nationalism was derived from 
the unequal formula used for the distribution of monies from the British government to 
the various administrative units in the United Kingdom. The so-called Barnett Formula 
was devised in the 1970s as a way of allocating funds from the centre based on an a per 
capita needs assessment in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Some 
Members of Parliament representing English constituencies have increasingly questioned 
the funding ratios of the Barnett Formula as out of date and therefore unfair. In 2000, 
the per capita spending on education in England was GBP636, whilst in Scotland it was
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GBP814 (Hansards, 18 January 2001: 554). Commenting on these figures and media 
coverage of the Scottish Parliament’s education spending plans, Labour MP Barry 
Sheerman said:
Some of us who represent English constituencies will increasingly question the ability 
and resources of three parts of the United Kingdom, but especially one in the news at 
the moment -  Scotland. We shall ask how Scotland can spend a great deal more 
money on education than England apparently can? {Hansards, 18 January 2001: 554)
Some of the reasons for the success of the devolution proposals in Scotland, 
notably resentment against over-centralisation and anti-Conservatism, were also present 
in parts of England. In 1996 the London-based Constitution Unit, a reformist think-tank, 
noted that ‘if the public debate about regional government in England has not been 
generally vigorous or urgent, there is at least one existing region -  the North East -  where 
it has been high on the agenda (Constitution Unit, 1996: 12). In 1997, the Campaign for 
a Northern Assembly (CNA) launched a Declaration for the North, similar to the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention’s Claim o f Right of 1988. As in Scotland, Labour and Liberal 
Democrat MPs, local councilors and other interested parties put their names to the 
document aimed at the establishment of a directly elected regional parliament for the 
North-East of England. The CNA declared that:
that the massive potential of the people of this region has long been hindered by 
neglect and isolation from over-centralised government in London. Our ability to 
develop our political, economic and cultural agenda has historically been restrained 
by the absence of meaningful local power. We welcome our Scottish neighbours’ 
move towards their own democratic voice in order to have a greater say in their own 
affairs inside the British system of government... We believe that an historic 
opportunity to bring government down to the people is now in our reach within the 
lifetime of this Parliament’ (Campaign for a Northern Assembly, 1997).
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Similar plans for devolution to the English regions emerged amongst the regional 
political elites, notably in Yorkshire. But unlike Scotland, there was no separatist 
movement to push the debate along or to be contained by the planned devolution of 
powers. As Paul Jagger of the Campaign for Yorkshire said at its launch in 1999, ‘This is 
not an attack on government. We want to assist the government in developing policy 
implementation’ (BBC News, 18 March 1999). Thus unlike in Scotland, the proponents 
of reform could not invoke the potential break-up of the state in order to give their claims 
urgency.
Whilst former Home Secretary Kenneth Baker could quote G. K. Chesterton’s 
lines about the “people of England/Who have not spoken yet” (Baker, 1998), there was 
little evidence that the rise of English consciousness had translated into popular demands 
for political representation. Scottish political observer, Iain MacWhirter commented on 
John Major’s election campaign strategy of talking up the rise of English nationalism as a 
result of the anomaly raised by the West Lothian Question. MacWhirter noted that:
As a Westminster hack obliged to spend much of my time in London, I speak to many 
people in and out of politics. No-one has ever come up to me spluttering with 
indignation about the West Lothian Question, or anything else to do with home rule. 
In pubs, parties in bus queues and at parents’ evenings, devolution is just not an issue. 
Not even London taxi drivers seem exercised by it (MacWhirter, 1997).
However, MacWhirter added some fears about the source of English nationalism himself. 
‘A hard-right Tory Parliamentary rump’, he suggested, ‘will miss no opportunity to 
provoke... conflict and orchestrate the kind of English nationalism we saw during the last 
Euro football championship [of 1996]’ (MacWhirter, 1997). But in fact, the idea of 
English nationalism, was not an ideology with which the Conservative Party seemed 
entirely comfortable. Philip Lynch argues that Tory concern with the twin priorities of 
defending the existing order whilst simultaneously increasing its electoral appeal during 
the nineteenth century meant that the Party focused on the management of the multi­
national UK rather than becoming an English party (Lynch, 1999: 10). This attitude
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remained well entrenched within the Conservative Party even after the election defeat of 
1997 and devolution. As David Hayes noted, ‘the shared fear or threat is that the putative 
English nationalism will be dangerous; better to stick with a union where base emotions 
are contained by stable institutions embodying a higher focus of loyalty’ (Hayes, 1997). 
The historical conditioning of the Conservative Party came into play after 1997. For the 
Conservative Party, Britishness had been a means of managing and subsuming potential 
nationalisms within the borders of the British state, with ultimate political loyalty 
demanded to Crown and Parliament. Thus rather than being a reason to invoke English 
nationalism, the Conservatives and their fellow-travelers regarded devolution as another 
reason to defend the British state from dissolution by forces from within and, just as 
importantly, without. The initiator of the 1998 debate on an English parliament, Teresa 
Gorman, was a vociferous Eurosceptic, in fact only turning her attention to the “English 
Question” when forced to by New Labour’s policies (Hansards, 16 January 1998: 590). 
The greatest concern for the Conservative leadership and the Party faithful was that 
devolution would set a precedent for the parceling up of England into devolved regions, 
that in turn would make the incorporation of a weakened Britain into a federal European 
structure much easier. Conservative MP and Constitutional Affairs spokesperson, Nigel 
Evans wrote that the devolution referendums of 1997-98 ‘let loose a tidal wave of 
nationalism and with that tide a threat to our United Kingdom’. He added that the uneven 
nature of devolution was attractive to Labour and EU politicians precisely because it 
would ‘break the United Kingdom into bite-sized chunks for incorporation into a 
regionally based federal United States of Europe’ (Evans, 2000). Similar fears were 
displayed by the Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), who laid the 
blame for devolution at the door of the European Union, arguing that only when Britain 
regained control of its own government would the causes of Scottish dissatisfaction abate 
(United Kingdom Independence Party, 1997: 12). Thus the idea of Britain as a unitary 
state, led the Conservatives to an equivocal position on the question of England at a time 
when they were the de facto English party. For the Conservative Party, English 
nationalism had to be attended to and given some sort of expression, but only so far as it 
would help defend Britain as a whole against the feared encroaching and centralising 
tendencies of the European Union.
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Rump Britain: the Conservative Party and New Labour
Thus what, since devolution, could pass as English nationalism, primarily expressed itself 
as a defence of British sovereignty. For the Conservatives, the sovereignty of Crown-in­
parliament was central to the self identity of the party’s leadership, whilst New Labour 
re-packaged Britishness as something “modem” in the absence of any specifically 
English reforms to the British state. This overlapping sovereignty in fact prevents the 
articulation of an exclusively English nationalism that many observers feared. In this 
regard, there was less of a political consciousness equivalent with the borders of England, 
but instead a perpetuation of English nationalist allegiance to what we might now term 
“Rump Britain”.1 As we have seen, this tendency to conflate “England” and “Britain” in 
English nationalist discourse has a long history (see Chapter 2). However, the 
establishment of alternative parliaments and assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland made that conflation less tenable. Nevertheless, the role of the state and its 
institutions in historical representations of English nationalism continued to play itself 
out, both within the Conservative Party and in a somewhat different manner, New 
Labour.
Building on Margaret Thatcher’s successful promotion of British nationalism during the 
1980s, the Conservative Party made a defence of Britishness one of its defining features 
between 1992 and 2001. Faced with the prospect of constitutional reform from a New 
Labour government, and growing support for a nationalist solution to Scotland’s political 
problems, Scottish Secretary Michael Forsyth spoke for the Conservative Party in 1996. 
Setting up a contrast between British “patriotism” and Scottish “nationalism”, he declared 
that ‘Now is the hour for patriotism. Never was there a cause with a greater claim upon 
the historic Tory Party. The British identity crafted by the genius of our past statesmen, 
from Bolingbroke to Churchill, is the priceless inheritance we must now defend’ 
(Forsyth, 1996: 21). William Hague, then Welsh Secretary, argued that ‘Nothing can be 
of more importance than the future existence of the United Kingdom’ (Hague, 1996: 22), 
whilst Prime Minister John Major rejected reforms to Britain’s institutions of governance
1 This term was originally coined by Rick Kuhn of the Australian National University.
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as and attack on ‘the constitutional fabric that underpins our freedoms and make us what 
we are’ (Major, 1996).
As the Conservative Party made the defence of British sovereignty its most salient 
tenet during the 1990s, English nationalism was demonised and only accepted whilst it 
continued to be merged with Britishness. In 1999, William Hague, by now leader of the 
Conservative Party, argued that the main threats to the integrity of the UK came from 
separatist nationalism in Scotland, the stirring of a backlash in England and the European 
project. For Hague, Scottish nationalism was dangerous enough’, but there was an ‘even 
more dangerous spectre around the comer -  extreme English nationalism’ (Hague,
1999a). He added that it was not inevitable that this English nationalism would emerge as 
a ‘sinister and uncontrollable force in our politics’ (Hague, 1999a). For the 
Conservatives, the imperial framework of Britishness still operated; a degree of 
nationalism could be accommodated as long as its ultimate focus of loyalty was the 
Crown-in-Parliament. But when that loyalty to the British state was rejected, that form of 
nationalism was itself rejected by the Conservative Party.
With devolution changing the political structure of the United Kingdom, the 
Conservative response was to re-assert Britishness despite being the de facto English 
Party. Jonathan Clark argued that the pattem of development in Britain meant that 
English nationalists had no choice but to defend British sovereignty, whilst their 
neighbours within the British Isles had different options open to them. For Clark, the 
success of a state-based, supra-national British consciousness largely inhibited the 
development of separatist, “ethnic” nationalism within the British Isles. Not only would 
Britishness provide a bulwark against absorption into a federalist European Union, it also 
inhibited the “narrow nationalism” associated with loyalty to the nation rather than the 
state. ‘The historical rootedness of this sort of [supra-]national identity means that people 
who want to steer Britain in federalist directions cannot depend upon nineteenth century 
nationalism, since Britain never really absorbed it’ (Clark, 2000). Whilst popular 
nationalism took root in other parts of the world, British economic and naval supremacy 
negated the need for aspiring middle classes to resort re-drawing state boundaries, raising
204
tariffs and creating symbols of “national” unity around peasant cultures. For English, 
Scottish and Australian nationalists alike, preserving the status quo was the priority, and 
this status quo soon became part of the nationalist discourse. William Hague argued:
There used to be something very un-British about trying to define who the British 
were. We were so sure of ourselves that we felt faintly embarrassed about spelling it 
out on paper. We were the people who could never be conquered, whose freedoms 
were God-given, whose industry was the workshop of the world, whose empire 
brought civilisation to far-off lands, whose navy kept the sea-lanes open, and whose 
Parliament was the mother of all Parliaments (Hague, 1999a.).
In all of this, it was the principle of Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty that was 
paramount, providing a legitimating and unifying theme to the blend of politics and 
history that was and is the essence of that doctrine. Tensions emerged as a result of the 
Tories’ de facto position as the English party and their defence of Westminster 
sovereignty, leading to somewhat contradictory responses to English nationalism and 
parliamentary reform. Conservative adherence to the Crown-in-Parliament prevented the 
expression of English nationalism, except as a defence of this type of sovereignty that 
applied to the whole of the United Kingdom. Tory plans to give political expression to 
what they saw as English nationalism were adopted because they did not challenge the 
sovereignty of Parliament. Hague’s notion of “English Votes on English Laws” was 
preferred to regional devolution precisely because it ‘was based on past precedents’ and 
would have worked ‘within the conventions and traditions of the Westminster 
Parliament’ rather than setting up rival institutions (Hague, 1999b). William Hague felt 
that there was ‘simply no interest in this country for a Wessex Witan or a Mercian Moot’ 
(Hague, 1999b). Nevertheless, the Conservatives did respond to backbench pressure 
about English representation in a devolved Britain. Former Home Secretary Kenneth 
Baker, said that it might be possible to create an English Grand Committee of all 529 
English MPs meeting on Mondays, Tuesdays and Fridays at Westminster, but he 
ultimately rejected this idea as merely a stop-gap solution to the West Lothian Question. 
According to Baker, a more ambitious alternative was to create an actual English
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Parliament, leaving powers for foreign affairs, defence, the Exchequer and social security 
with the Westminster Parliament. The advantage of such a quasi-federal Britain 
dominated by England was that it would prove the best way to channel the emerging 
English nationalism ‘to a constructive purpose’ (Baker, 1998) and one that did not 
challenge the sovereignty of the Crown.
The tension in Tory thinking between English nationalism and British sovereignty 
was particularly stark between 1997-2001 because of the Conservative Party’s failure to 
win any seats outside of England. In 1999, the Conservatives stated that ‘If the 
Conservative Party stands for anything, it stands for resisting the destruction of our 
nationhood’ (Fox et al., 1999: 12). However, the nationhood in question was British, not 
English. The Conservative Party’s long-standing identification with the British state and 
British sovereignty could not easily be dislodged. Reacting to political developments 
within the European Union as well as devolution, the Conservatives pledged to defend 
the integrity and sovereignty of the United Kingdom (Fox et al, 1999: 5). In The Battle 
for Britain published two years after the 1997 defeat, Conservative MPs argued that 
‘whether we come from Scotland, England, Wales or Northern Ireland there is one thing 
we all share: we are British and that is how it should remain’ (Fox et al., 1999: 5). The 
following year the Party stated plainly as part of its Common Sense Revolution policy 
initiative that ‘We are and remain the party of the Union’ (Conservative Party, 2000b: 
42). Accordingly, the Conservatives defined Anglo-British nationalism, not by the 
concept of popular sovereignty, as had emerged in Scotland, but rather by continued 
loyalty to British institutions. For the Conservative Party, Britishness was a means of 
transcending regional, national and religious difference. Several years previously, 
constitutional expert, Lord Hailsham had argued that:
I believe that all the peoples of this group of islands, from the Shetlands to Jersey, 
from County Kerry to Lindisfame if they are to enjoy any sort of decent future at all 
or to make any constructive contribution to Europe or the world must transcend the 
difference of national cultures and religions, and must work together in harmony in
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good times and in bad. In that sense I am a Unionist through and through (Hailsham, 
1992:4).
Moreover, these institutions themselves had become the totems of Anglo-Britishness, 
where other nationalisms might emphasise language or a romanticised peasant culture as 
the bearers of the national character. Taking issue with Stanley Baldwin’s and John 
Major’s romantic and idyllic views of Britain, Charles Moore, editor of the Daily 
Telegraph, argued in a speech to the Conservative Party Conference in 1995 that:
The word “Britain” does not evoke so much a series of pleasing sensory images, like 
well-mown lawns or warm beer or whatever your particular fancy may be, but rather 
a way of running things, or to be more exact a whole collection of ways of running 
things, an intricate network of institutions (Moore, 1995).
In Conservative political philosophy, it was these British institutions that defined what it 
meant to be British above all else, even at a time when the validity of these institutions 
was being called into question by both the European project and nationalists movements 
in Scotland and Wales. The defeat of 1997 forced no discernible re-think in this area. 
With New Labour dominating the centre of British politics, the Conservative Party 
moved to the right and its defence of Britishness hardened, despite accepting the home 
rule settlements for Scotland and Wales. For the Conservatives, British institutions and 
the British people were inseparable. In 1999 William Hague explained why Britain’s 
relations with the EU were so fundamentally important to the Conservative Party:
We debate and agonise over our involvement in the European Union precisely 
because, unlike the Germans or French, we invest our national character in the 
institutions that govern us... Because Britain’s common political institutions are 
central to the British people’s common identity, if you attack these institutions, you 
are attacking the common identity and the qualities that come with it (Hague, 1999a).
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Prior to the General Election of 2001, William Hague argued that ‘In defending the 
sovereignty of our Parliament, we defend the sovereignty of our people’ (Hague, 2001). 
Hague continued the Conservative tradition of Anglo-Britishness, an attitude described 
by Paul Corrigan and David Sayer in the mid-1980s as one of regarding the state as the 
nation made manifest (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985: 195). Whilst Hague staked 
Conservative fortunes on a defence of Britishness, observers to the right of the 
Conservative Party felt that it was too late. Peter Hitchens, a journalist with the Daily 
Express, argued that Britain was a specifically anti-modem entity and could not continue 
to exist under the programme of reform and “modernisation” instigated by New Labour 
in 1997. For Hitchens the perceived decline of Britishness was directly linked to the 
perceived decline of institutions in British public life, not only the Constitution itself, but 
also the decline of the nuclear family, the Church of England and the dumbing down of 
Oxbridge, in addition to the increase of swearing, sexual licence and too much television 
and the decline of received pronunciation and its usurpation by “estuary English” 
(Hitchens, 1999: 325). For Hitchens, New Labour was responsible for much of the 
parlous state of affairs, but the criticism was unfair. New Labour’s version of Britishness 
was different from the Conservative version, but given the constitutional reform enacted 
after 1997, New Labour needed Britain as much as the Conservative Party.
If the Conservative Party defended Britishness at the expense of it becoming the 
“English party”, this was at least an option that might have been open to it were its 
leaders and theorists not ideologically committed to the defence of the British state. The 
Labour Party was also wedded to the idea of Britain, but because it derived 
disproportionate support from Scotland and Wales. Since the mid-1950s, these two 
nations had become electoral heartlands for the Labour Party and support there increased 
even as Labour’s fortunes at Westminster left the party out of government for eighteen 
years. In May 1997 New Labour became, in this sense, the foremost Unionist party in 
the United Kingdom. As noted in Chapter 3, New Labour’s commitment to devolution 
during the 1990s was designed to preserve the integrity of the United Kingdom, despite 
devolution’s detractors arguing that this was the “slippery slope” to independence. The
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then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook argued that ‘by recognising the United Kingdom’s 
diversity, devolution has guaranteed its future’ adding that ‘our future together in a single 
state is all the more secure if we each respect the distinctive identity that makes some of 
us Scottish and others Welsh and English’ (Cook, 2001). Despite shifting rightward in 
order to appeal to “Middle England”, a category Anthony Barnett describes as being 
invented to explain the defeat of the old working class in Britain (Barnett, 1997: 80), 
New Labour was lukewarm about extending devolution to England, if it appeared that 
Scotland and Wales could be secured for the Union. Peter Mandelson, widely credited 
with New Labour’s successful public relations strategy in 1997, saw no votes to be won 
or saved in courting English nationalism. He outlined New Labour’s policy in this area 
saying that ‘in the English regions, devolution should be people-led’ (Mandelson and 
Liddle, 1996: 200), which remained the government line when in office. Shortly after the 
Labour victory in May 1997, the New Statesman editorial urged the new government to 
act against Little Englandism and ‘seize an historic chance to bury nationalism as a 
mainstream political force in Britain’ (New Statesman, 1997). As with the Conservative 
Party, English nationalism would be encouraged only so far, until Britishness would 
again be asserted.
The redefinition of the language and symbols of nationalism was characteristic of 
New Labour’s approach to Britishness. In a speech to the Labour Party Conference in 
Brighton in 1995, Tony Blair invoked ‘One Britain’ as ‘the patriotism of the future’ (New 
Statesman, 1996: 52), whilst the following year, Blair argued that ‘across the nation, 
across class, across political boundaries, the Labour Party is once again able to represent 
all the British people’ (New Statesman, 1996: 27). Whilst Labour could work with the 
nationalisms of the periphery, it’s new need to appeal to conservative “middle England” 
meant that the “nation” at the centre was Britain, not England.
The main message that New Labour wished to impart about its Britishness was 
that, like the Labour Party itself, Britishness was now “modem” and no longer solely 
attached to archaic state institutions as its critics claimed. Blair’s vision for Britain in 
1996 was that he wanted Britain ‘to be a young country again. With a common purpose.
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With ideals we cherish and live up to. Not resting on past glories. Not fighting old 
battles’ (New Statesman, 1996: 46). But given New Labour’s attachment to the (albeit 
somewhat reformed) structures of the UK, the Party was now in a position akin to 
Disraeli’s and Bagehot’s in the middle of the nineteenth century: enacting reforms whilst 
popularising the existing and newer structures. Thus the nationalism attendant to New 
Labour’s programme needed to appear as something novel, whilst retaining links with the 
past. Echoing John Stewart Mill’s approach to nationality and the choices faced by those 
embracing it or rejecting it (see Chapter 2), New Labour ideologist Mark Leonard, argued 
for the re-branding of British identity and nationalism. ‘Either you can work at identity 
and try and make it positive and inclusive. Or by default, you get an identity which is 
backward-looking and exclusive’ (Leonard, 1998). Initially this approach was given the 
journalistic tag “Cool Britannia” (named after either a flavour of Ben & Jerry’s ice cream 
or a song by the Bonzo Dog Doo Dah Band) and quickly came under intense criticism, as 
New Labour attempted to ally itself to famous musicians, comedians and clothes 
designers to give the party some popular and youthful appeal. In a speech to an 
American audience in 1998 entitled “New Britain”, Blair said
I know what many used to think of us: we were “quaint”, a little “old fashioned”. A 
country of pageantry and ceremony, bowler hats and stiff upper lips. Now, I love 
British pageantry and the phlegmatic strength of the British character. But Britain 
today is defined by a lot more than history. Today, the British people are breaking 
down old fashioned class barriers, seizing new opportunities, creating new products, 
building strong communities (Blair, 1998).
Blair continued to describe “New Britain” as a not only ‘a country of passion and 
compassion’ and ‘a multi-racial society that works’, but also a nation now unafraid of 
change. He added, ‘when people want creative designers, architects, film makers, 
musicians, they turn to Britain’ (Blair, 1998.). For Leonard, ‘this is what re-branding is 
all about: closing the gap between perception and reality’ (Leonard, 1998).
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New Labour’s strategy of attempting to redefine the national narrative of Britain 
continued throughout its first term in office. Statements on Britishness now owed more 
to the tradition of left-leaning historians with their emphasis on radical and reform- 
minded organisations, women, minorities and the working classes, than they did to the 
Whig-Conservative version of Anglo-British history with its stress on the institutions of 
governance (Colley, 2001). In a lecture to the Open Society, Robin Cook argued that ‘the 
British are not a race, but a gathering of countless different races and communities, the 
vast majority of which were not indigenous to these islands’ (Cook, 2001). Less 
emphasis was placed on Britain’s constitutional uniqueness, and more stress on the 
history of interaction between different cultures within Britain and British contact with 
the outside world. Cook cited Chicken Tikka Massala as a particularly British dish, being 
a blend of Indian food with a sauce added to satisfy the British desire for meat with gravy 
(Cook, 2001).
New Labour’s Britishness also had to be sufficiently nationalistic to counter 
Conservative and popular fears that Britain would be parcelled into a European super­
state. Despite being equivocal on whether or not Britain should join the Euro, New 
Labour’s position on the general structure of the European Union occupied ground 
formerly identified with the Conservative Left. The New Labour manifesto of 2001 
stated that the Party believed in ‘a Europe made up of nation-states and offering a unique 
blend of inter-governmental cooperation where possible and integration where 
necessary’, whilst it also recognised that the ‘main sources of popular legitimacy in 
Europe remain national governments and parliaments’ (Labour Party, 2001).
Towards the end of 1997, Edward Heathcote Amory wrote that ‘Tony Blair is 
desperately trying to create New Britain because he fears that Old Britain is coming 
apart’ (Heathcote Amory, 1997a). In this he was perhaps overly concerned. The Blair 
government certainly shifted the emphasis on Britishness away from loyalty to 
institutions and onto shared values. In a speech to regional newspaper editors in 2000, 
Blair argued that it was adherence to the collective values of ‘fair play, creativity, 
tolerance and an outward-looking approach to the world’ that truly defined Britishness
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and not loyalty to ‘unchanging institutions’ (Blair, 2000). However, devolution in 
Scotland, Wales and eventually in Northern Ireland, represented only one part of New 
Labour’s “modernisation” of Britain. The independence of the Bank of England, 
abolishing of the right to vote of most hereditary peers in the House of Lords and 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into English and Scots law 
were notable other reforms. But despite, or in fact because of, these changes, and in 
particular the concessions to nationalism on the periphery, the nationalism of the centre 
was invoked as a counter-balance. It was in this regard that New Labour turned to the 
monarchy to provide the sense of unity required during time of change. The stress on 
diversity in Britain, be it national or multi-racial, did have and effect on the nationalism 
of the “majority”, but not in the undermining capacity that the detractors of the new 
Britain feared. The institutional and cultural diversity of Britain required a renewed 
emphasis on Britishness, although less on the unitary sovereignty of Parliament that was 
so dear to conservatives. ‘Paradoxical as it may seem,’ wrote political theorist Bhikhu 
Parekh, ‘the greater and deeper the diversity in a society, the greater the unity and 
cohesion it requires to hold itself together and nurture its diversity’ (Parekh, 2000: 196). 
Writing in the early 1990s, Lord Hailsham wrote that ‘the Monarch is the one element in 
our Constitution in which I would advocate no formal change whatever, either in its 
powers or in the part it plays generally in society’ (Hailsham, 1992: 20). New Labour 
were in agreement and the monarchy was defended and restored, through it’s most 
challenging moments with the death of Diana until some considerable popularity was 
restored by the time of the Golden Jubilee in 2002. Addressing the Queen at her Golden 
Jubilee celebrations, Prime Minister Blair said, ‘you have been a unifying force whilst 
around you there has been immense constitutional and cultural change’ (Blair, 2002). 
Furthermore, the monarchy was here to stay, because it provided the right sort of 
nationalism for the diverse peoples of Britain. ‘You unify our nation ma’am, because you 
symbolise, powerfully true patriotism -  not the erupting emotion of an impulse, but the 
steady commitment of a faithful heart’ (Blair, 2002).
Like the Conservatives, New Labour were able to positively contrast British 
patriotism with “ethnic” separatist nationalism. Labour’s programme of devolution
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appeared to open up the possibility for the expression of an English nationalism, for good 
or for ill. However, encouraging this nationalism was not high on the party’s political 
agenda. New Labour’s commitment to Unionism, and its need to court the more 
conservative opinion of “middle England” meant that Labour’s nationalism had still had 
to be British, rather than English.
Anglo-British Consciousness: Europe, Race and Monarchy
Constitutional philosophy lies at the heart of both Britishness and English nationalism. 
However, in and of itself, it is not a subject guaranteed to get people into the streets in 
defence of its principles. The degree of specialised knowledge required to understand 
and interpret the system inhibits nationalist mobilisation on the basis of purely 
constitutional terms. This is not to argue, as some conservative observers do, that 
England has no nationalism, or that there are no nationalistic sentiments in England 
(Clark, 2000). Whilst the notion of Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty that developed 
from 1688 onwards appears as a somewhat legalistic piece of political philosophy, it has 
become the touchstone for a whole set of political and cultural attitudes that might be 
summed up as English, or better still given the development of the British state during 
this period, Anglo-British consciousness. These political and cultural ideas centred 
around Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty have manifested themselves in English 
nationalism in other more “cultural” forms. It is the defence of Crown-in-Parliament 
sovereignty that forms the basis of ideas about the “British way of doing things” and 
Anglo-Britishness particularity. Attitudes towards Europe, the racial content of the 
English nation and support for the monarchy represent a broad spectrum of “cultural” 
aspects of Anglo-British consciousness, and all continue to conflate Englishness with 
wider categories of belonging.
Negative attitudes to the European political project are an important part of 
Anglo-British consciousness. Euroscepticism in the sense employed below is not solely a 
political attitude towards the European Union currently displayed by the Conservative 
Right, but also refers to a whole set of popular attitudes to the inhabitants of the European 
continent. In this sense, the defence of Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty by the political
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elites, became the defence of the “British way of doing things” in popular consciousness 
(Hailsham, 1992: 2). The development of a political stance known as Euroscepticism 
began under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. It became particularly 
prominent during the negotiations over the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991 and following 
Britain’s exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) the following year. 
This latter event pushed many of the party’s rank-and-file and supporters to the right of 
the leadership on this issue. During the early 1990s, the Conservative leadership 
developed the policy of a “strong Britain in a strong Europe”, hoping to steer a course 
between the growing supranational powers of the EU and anti-European attitudes within 
its own party. For John Major, the British triumph at Maastricht meant the enshrining of 
the notion of “subsidiarity” within the EU, meaning that the Brussels would only take 
decisions that the member states were unable to effectively take themselves. Conservative 
defence of British sovereignty, however, precluded the extension of that principle to 
Scotland and Wales. Ironically, the right-wing defence of British sovereignty against the 
EU began to increasingly mirror the arguments put forward by Scottish nationalists in the 
1980s and 1990s: the Nation’s autonomy had to be preserved in the face of an
encroaching centralisation of political power and decision making that was not in the 
Nation’s economic or cultural interests and threatened democracy. The Conservative 
Party’s Believing in Britain, launched in 2000 stated that ‘we have to resist those who 
want to bounce us into a single currency, who want to surrender ever more of the rights 
and powers of the British people, who want to see this country become a small part of a 
European federal superstate’ (Conservative Party, 2000a). Furthermore, an explicit link 
was made between Britain’s system of governance and its economy: ‘No successful 
enterprise economy, no strong and stable society, can exist if it neglects the rule of law 
and allows its democracy to be tarnished and diminished (Conservative Party, 2000a). 
Launching the Common Sense Revolution that would form the basis of Conservative 
Policies in the lead up to the 2001 election, the Party declared that ‘the world needs 
nations; the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, free after decades of Communist 
oppression, know that... A common sense approach means a robust support for the 
nation-state and the independence of our country’ (Conservative Party 2000b: 31). 
Right-wing commentators had been pushing such a stance during the 1990s. Ambrose
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Evans-Pritchard wrote about his anxiety regarding the impossibility of secession from the 
Maastricht Treaty and feared conflict could ensue as a result (Evans-Pritchard, 1991). 
Paul Johnson described the EU President Jacques Delors as ‘our worst enemy since 
Pierre Laval’ and advocated civil disobedience to the Maastricht Treaty (Johnson, 1992). 
Stephen Garnett expressed fears that ‘a single currency and a central bank will inevitably 
lead to political union and the loss of Britain’s independence (Garnett, 1996: 70).
Organisations to the right of the Conservative Party also employed such language. 
Formed in 1993, the United Kingdom Independence Party campaigned in 1997 and 2001 
on a platform of taking Britain out of the EU. Again, without explicitly recognising it, 
the UKIP’s language reflected that of the reformers’ in Scotland. The main motivation 
for withdrawal is the “democratic deficit” that governance from Brussels has brought 
about. The 1997 manifesto argued that ‘Britain must leave the EU in order to restore 
democratic government’ (United Kingdom Independence Party, 1997: 1). In January 
2000, Conservative and UKIP MEPs in the European Parliament joined together in a 
grouping calling itself “SOS Democracy” in order to highlight that deficit (BBC News, 6 
January 2000). Throughout the 1990s, This England had been running a campaign called 
“Don’t Let Europe Rule Britannia.” In the run up to the 2001 election, this campaign was 
stepped up in alliance with the UKIP. This England’s, Autumn 2001 editorial stated that 
the ‘campaign against federalists who wish to force our country into a “United States of 
Europe” regardless of the views of the British people, will continue until the threat to our 
sovereign independence is finally vanquished’ (This England, 2001a: 66).
Resistance to Brussels did not remain the preserve of party politics, but entered 
into cultural conceptions of Anglo-British nationhood also, aided by sympathetic 
members of the Conservatives and the UKIP. Again the touchstone for anxieties over the 
fate of Britain was the relationship of British symbols and institutions to the European 
Union, particularly the Pound Sterling. Writing to the letters page of This England after 
the 2001 election, Peter Billings of Bristol asked ‘how on earth can we purport to support 
our currency and this island race after the recent election monstrosities, in which those 
who could be bothered to vote resolutely refused to back all those trying to save us from
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the monolithic nightmare of Europe?’ {This England, 2001a: 66). Other symbols of 
everyday life became the focus for a defence of British sovereignty. In 2001 Sunderland 
greengrocer, Steve Thobum, was prosecuted by the local council for selling produce in 
pounds and ounces rather than metric measures. Thobum was quickly dubbed the 
“Metric Martyr” by the right-wing press, but again the issue was very quickly linked to 
the anti-Europe campaign. According to Christopher Booker in the UK Mail, the 
imperial system of weights and measures was ‘so ingrained that we are only beginning to 
realise its value now that it is being taken away’ (Booker, 2001). He continued:
The only new thing about the metrication campaign of the past 30 years, reinforced 
by laws from Brussels, has been its desire to stamp out every last vestige of the 
weights and measures used by people of this nation for 2000 years, and to insist that 
metric is the only system legally tolerated (Booker, 2001).
Added to this general fear of the European Union and its threat to British independence, 
was a particular concern about the driving force behind the European project, that many 
observers on the right identified as the newly re-united Germany. The link between the 
development of the EU and popular memory of Anglo-German conflict was easily made. 
Nicholas Ridley, Secretary of State for Industry, spoke out on the proposed single 
currency in July 1990. ‘This is all a German racket designed to take over the whole of 
Europe. It has to be thwarted. This rushed take-over by the Germans, on the worst 
possible basis, with the French behaving like poodles to the Germans is absolutely 
intolerable (quoted in Husband, 1994: 41). The following year, Spectator columnist, 
John Laughland wrote about the European Community that ‘the very institutions which 
were supposed to contain Germany hegemony will end up entrenching it’ (Laughland, 
1991). During the early 1990s, The Spectator went out of its way to mention the War, 
insinuating that the Germans had not really changed since the Nazi era and that Germany 
‘was a state whose every step is dogged by anxious glances over its shoulder at a guilty 
past’ (,Spectator, 28 November 1992).
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If Linda Colley is correct in arguing that France was seen as Britain’s main 
European rival during the formative years of British consciousness (Chapter 2), then that 
role has been filled in popular consciousness by Germany since the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Nevertheless, an understanding of the events and course of the Second 
World War was seemingly weak amongst the majority of the British population. In a poll 
conducted by The Mirror newspaper and ICM Research, less than half of 18 to 24-year- 
olds interviewed, knew that the Battle of Britain took place in 1940 and one-in-nine 
confused it with the Battle of Hastings in 1066. Furthermore, whilst almost 70per cent of 
respondents knew that Winston Churchill was Britain’s wartime leader, six per cent 
thought it was King Alfred and two per cent believed it was Margaret Thatcher. One- 
third of respondents aged between 45 and 54 were unable to correctly answer four out of 
four questions about the War and the Battle of Britain {BBC News, 15 September 2000). 
Despite this, “the War” stands as a potent metaphor for British struggles with the 
European mainland powers. Former Ministry of Defence civil servant Lindsay Jenkins 
added to the debate about the EU as a cover for the final German mastery of Europe in 
1997. ‘If Britain continues, however reluctantly, to agree to Brussels’ proposals which 
increasingly bear the German imprint, then within a few years it will be a province of 
Germany just as it would have been if the German armed forces had succeeded in 
defeating the British in the Second World War’ (quoted in Garnett, 1997). Nor was it 
difficult to make a link between politics and popular consciousness on the matter of 
Anglo-German rivalry. And despite agreeing to curb its language after the excesses of 
coverage of the Euro96 football championship, the tabloid press in general and the News 
of the World in particular, still could not resist the headline ‘Don’t mention the score’ 
following England’s 5-1 victory over the German national team in 2001 (BBC News, 2 
September 2001).
In addition to this popular and elite Europhobia ran a discernible yearning for old 
attachments to the empire, the Commonwealth and the wider “Anglo-Saxon” world. 
Both Conservative and New Labour governments courted the American alliance, not only 
through NATO but also via the more bi-lateral and informal ties of the so-called “special 
relationship”. Tony Blair was keen to position Britain as a pivotal world-power,
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straddling both Europe and the Atlantic, thereby addressing the tension in Britain’s 
foreign relations that found Britain in a sometimes uneasy diplomatic position between its 
European Union partners and its United States ally (BBC News, 14 November 1999). 
However, the legacy of Britain’s former Empire was still vitally important for Anglo- 
British identity. As with understanding of the Second World War, popular knowledge of 
the Empire appeared confused at best, but 70per cent of people questioned in 1998 agreed 
that Britain’s former empire was a source of pride (.Economist, 28 March 1998). Despite 
such sentimental ties, only the UKIP was prepared to re-instate old trading preferences 
with the former Empire in order to counter the EU trading bloc. The UKIP offset its 
proposed withdrawal from the EU free-trade zone with a commitment to the 
Commonwealth, pledging to ‘regenerate this association and to redress the damage done 
to it by the UK’s membership of the EU’ (UKIP, 1997: 13). Despite this being a 
minority view, the Commonwealth still held an important place in the affections of some 
in England. In January 2000, Conservative MP Julian Brazier introduced a bill in the 
House of Commons calling for a third entry channel at UK ports for nationals of states 
recognising the Queen as head of state, arguing ‘When the chips are down, again and 
again, we have found that shared ties of blood, values and heritage count for more’ 
{Hansards, 18 January 2000). After visiting Australia in 1992, Boris Johnson noted that 
‘Common market quotas, tariffs and levies mean Australia exports about twice as much 
to New Zealand, a country of 3 million people, as it exports to the British motherland... 
No wonder republicanism is abroad’ (Johnson, 1992). In this way, Johnson even 
managed to blame the EU for Australian republicanism, although in Johnson’s view 
republicanism had an additional source: ‘Never underestimate the rampant, muted 
Irishness of these people. So Paul Keating put his hand on Liz’s bum -  good on him’ 
(Johnson, 1992).
However, it was racist reactions to the post-War migration to the British Isles of 
former imperial subjects from the Sub-Continent, Africa and the West Indies, rather than 
the idea of a re-invigorated Commonwealth, that kept ideas of empire and race alive in 
English nationalism. Anthony Barnett argued that the 1997 election was the first time 
since 1968 that Powellism was rejected by the electorate (Barnett, 1997: 45-49).
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Certainly openly bigoted candidates were not elected in 1997 and three were removed by 
their constituents, whilst James Goldsmith’s Referendum Party failed to get a single 
candidate elected. However, to argue that ‘May Day 1997 was a watershed which 
certainly buried an ugly streak in Great Englishness’ (Barnett, 1997: 49) was premature. 
Race continued to hold a prominent place in conceptions of the nation in Britain, 
although in somewhat different ways in Scotland, where anti-Catholicism still maintained 
a hold over politics in a way that did not operate in England. In England, racism held a 
place in the debate about nationalism that was far less evident in Scotland, where 
questions about Scotland’s constitutional position within the Union were dominant. But 
devolution did have some impact on debates about race and Britishness in England. 
Devolution re-invigorated questions about whether Englishness was simply to replace 
Britishness as the state-based identity seemingly encompassing all of England’s ethnic, 
religious and national communities, or whether “English” would only be a category used 
to refer to the non-black or Asian inhabitants of England. Whilst devolution and 
Britain’s multi-racial character were celebrated by New Labour (Cook, 2001), some 
black and Asian commentators, watched the development of nationalism on the periphery 
with alarm. Columnist for The Independent, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown posed the rhetorical 
question, ‘when Scotland has got kilted up and the English have established their 
homelands far from the Welsh and Irish, where do we, the black Britons, go? Perhaps we 
can put in a bid for London, please? (Alibhai-Brown, 2001 [2000]: 271).
The politics of race and nation popularised by Enoch Powell continued under 
Margaret Thatcher’s government in the 1980s. Writing in the early 1990s, Stuart Hall 
argued that, ‘particular forms of cultural racism which have grown up under 
Thatcherism’s shadow bring together and condense into a single discourse questions of 
race and ethnicity with questions of nation, national and cultural belonging’ (Hall, 1993: 
357). In July 1995, Wisden’s Cricket Monthly expanded on Norman Tebbit’s “cricket 
test” litmus of national identity, that the desire to play for England was ‘instinctive, a 
matter of biology’, whilst “outsiders” were less likely to put their hearts and souls into the 
team effort (quoted in Alibhai-Brown, 2001: 151). In such ways did Englishness, 
Britishness, race and nation continue to represent contested ground in post-imperial
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England. John Tyndall, one-time leader of the British National Party, attempted to define 
what it meant to be British in 1998:
We British are the indigenous peoples of the British Isles. We are made up of 
various original tribal groups but all of these were European and the vast majority 
came from Northern Europe... As a further definition of who and what we are, I can 
state emphatically what we are not. We are not Negroes. We are not Asians of any 
description. We are not Arabs. We are not Latin Americans. We have never been 
anything other than white. In other words, we are a race - the British Race. Our 
national character - whatever historical and environmental factors may have played a 
part in forming it - is primarily a product of our racial origins (Tyndall, 2002 
[1998]).
Since the 1970s, Enoch Powell’s questions about collective identity and racial 
and cultural compatibility were taken up by the far-Right in a much more physically 
confrontational manner. However, as the politics of devolution entered the political 
discourse in the late 1990s, even the British National Party started to abandon the 
concept of “Britain” and replace it with that of “England”:
Young whites, who are at the forefront of the resentment against and resistance to 
this liberal slow genocide of the native inhabitants and cultures of these islands, are 
reacting to this by identifying themselves primarily as English - an ethnic and cultural 
concept - rather than as British, which is presented these days as a civic matter of 
residence and passports (British National Party, 2002).
The BNP’s exclusive language might not have been present in the election campaigning 
of the major parties in the 2001 general election, but similar ideas were enough to 
motivate David Copeland, the 24 year old “nail bomber” who attacked centres of West 
Indian, Bangladeshi and homosexual communities two years earlier. Furthermore, the 
BNP made some gains at the local elections following the riots in the north-west of 
England in the spring of 2001. The issue of race did provide some problems for the
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Conservative leadership, particularly in the run up to the 2001 general election. William 
Hague attempted to present post-War migration in a positive light for party members in 
1999, arguing that ‘successive waves of immigrants have enriched our culture, our 
language and, thank God, our cuisine’ (Hague, 1999a). This strategy represented an 
attempt to make multi-racial Britain literally palatable to those in the Conservative Party 
who were openly or secretly sceptical about it. The refusal by MPs John Townend and 
James Cran to sign a pledge sponsored by the Commission for Racial Equality 
committing candidates to ‘avoid using language which is likely to generate racial or 
religious hatred’ embarrassed the Conservative Party. When Townend added that 
immigrants were to blame from rising crime and were ‘undermining Britain’s Anglo- 
Saxon society’, the embarrassment deepened (Woolf, 2001).
It would be wrong to suggest that the concept of Britishness was so contaminated 
by racism that there was no room for contesting exclusive discourses on nationality 
coming from the far-Right. At the same time as the popularity of Britishness declined in 
Scotland and to a lesser extent Wales, it increased amongst Britain’s black and Asian 
communities. Linda Colley pointed to the more positive role that Britishness offered for 
non-white Britons regarding questions of nationalism and belonging. ‘Unlike 
Englishness, Welshness or Scottishness, Britishness is a synthetic and capacious concept, 
with no necessary ethnic or cultural overtones’ (Colley, 2001). As such, British identity 
was more readily adopted by black and Asian Britons, than was English identity. Even 
so, the prominent link between race and nation present in British domestic politics since 
the late 1960s meant that the concepts of race and nation were hard to disentangle. In 
2000 the Commission for Racial Equality issued a report by the Commission on The 
Future o f Multi-Ethnic Britain, chaired by academic Lord Bhikhu Parekh. Parekh drew 
attention to the implicit racial connotations of national consciousness in Britain:
Britishness, as much as Englishness, has systematic, largely unspoken, racial 
connotations. Whiteness nowhere features as an explicit condition of being British, 
but it is widely understood that Englishness, and therefore by extension Britishness, is 
racially coded (quoted in the Economist, 14 October 2000).
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The idea that Englishness and Britishness were tainted with a sort of “institutional 
racism” of the type described in the Macpherson Report into the killing of black teenager 
Stephen Lawrence and the subsequent police handling of the investigation, was rejected 
by The Economist (14 October 2000). Nevertheless, if Powellism’s direct assault on the 
consensus on race relations did not seem to be a vote winner for the major parties after 
1997, more implicit forms of racism would enter the debate about England and 
Britishness. As in Australia, although to a far lesser public extent, understandings of 
history would play an important part in understandings of England. There was nothing 
particularly new about the New Right using race as a means to cohere a sense of 
patriotism. What was new was the emphasis on rolling back the gains of anti-racism in 
the name of traditional freedoms, national pride and the liberation of the white majority 
(Alibhai-Brown, 2001: 136). Defending so-called “traditional freedoms” meant first of 
all popularising their historical origins. As Stuart Hall noted, right-wing versions of 
Anglo-Britishness involved ‘an attempt to capture the future by a determined long detour 
through the past’ (Hall, 1993: 356).
Having entered the debate about Australia’s historical legitimacy in the 1980s, 
and helped shape the debate to a great degree, Roger Scruton was forced to defend his 
native land at the turn of the century. “History” was crucial to Scruton’s conception of 
England as it replaced “race” as a binding element for the English people. Having 
admitted ‘the absurdity of racial ideas when invoked to explain national character’, 
Scruton replaced “race” with “common culture”. When a people have lived unconquered 
on an island for so long, Scruton argued:
There occurs a homogenisation in appearance, in deportment and in temperament. A 
bodily rhythm is acquired and passed on. This rhythm becomes established as an 
almost physiological trait, recognisable at a glance to the foreigner in England and to 
the Englishman abroad (Scruton, 2001: 76).
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Debates about history in England, thus became important for establishing a particular 
world-view and England’s place in it. The context for this debate, was not as in 
Australia’s case, the legitimacy of the founding moment of the nation, but instead was 
located within and against the narrative of Britain’s decline as an imperial power.
Scruton himself believed that at the end of the Second World War ‘an 
overwhelming sense of guilt seemed to paralyse the country -  guilt at its own successes 
and an awareness of their cost’ (Scruton, 2001: 249). Writing in the Spectator, Stephan 
Shakespeare argued that it was this shift in the teaching of history in secondary schools 
that laid the foundations of New Labour’s 1997 victory, where anti-Conservatism was 
strongest amongst first-time voters (Shakespeare, 1997). For John Tyndall, the control 
over history was crucial in the supposed subjection of the white majority. Tyndall 
maintained that a certain understanding of Britain’s imperial past was necessary for the 
preservation of the white British people -  the former imperial overlords - arguing that 
‘there sometimes come moments in a nation's life when to downplay its achievements, 
most of all to forget them, is positively dangerous - dangerous to its self-esteem, 
dangerous to its perception of its own capabilities and dangerous to its awareness of what 
it must do to protect and preserve itself (Tyndall, 2002). But as in Australia, the past had 
to be re-worked but at the same time denied any relevance to the present in order to feed 
into the right-wing suppression of difference. Tyndall continued:
It is not the place here to argue whether this control, this domination, was right or 
wrong, good or bad, mostly beneficent or mostly maleficent... We are simply looking 
at it as a token of achievement - the achievement, for instance, of barely more than a 
hundred British troops in seeing off an attack by thousands of Zulus at Rorke's Drift, 
of just a few regiments in sustaining British rule over hundreds of millions in former 
India (Tyndall, 2002).
But the debate about history was not as politicised as it was in Australia. Instead, 
understandings of the past and there supposed effects on the national character were far 
more deeply embedded, and thus more implicit, in English nationalist discourse
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concerning the Constitution. English constitutionalism involved a particular national 
narrative that spoke about both the development of the English constitution and the 
evolution of the English national character. In the wake of the 1997 election defeat, 
former Conservative Home Secretary Kenneth Baker wrote that ‘evolution and a respect 
for history were the victims of Labour’s victory in 1997’ (Baker, 1998). Teresa Gorman 
was similarly concerned about the effects of New Labour’s programme. ‘Our 
constitutional background and the stability that we have all taken for granted throughout 
our lives, our parents’ lives, and way back into our ancestry, is to be turned on its head’
(Hansards, 16 January 1998: 591). Events in history were grafted onto the 
historiography of constitutional development, with an emphasis placed on continuity, that 
combined a Whiggish version of historical development with a conservative version of a 
stable social order. In 1995, constitutional expert, Vernon Bogdanor wrote that ‘Of the 
European monarchies, the British is by far the oldest, except perhaps for that of Denmark. 
Queen Elizabeth [II] can trace her decent back to Egbert, King of Wessex, in the ninth 
century; and except for the brief Cromwellian interregnum between 1649 and 1660, the 
descendants of Egbert have reigned continually in Britain for the last twelve hundred 
years’ (Bogadanor, 1995: 2). In its nineteenth century form, this constitutional
mythology was portrayed as providing enough liberty to prevent revolution, whilst at the 
same time not conceding too much power to the uneducated masses. By the end of the 
twentieth century, the constitution was portrayed has having saved Britain from the 
establishment of any sort of extremist government as seen on the European continent. 
John Major asked his audience at the Conservative Political Centre to ‘think how many 
countries can boast such freedom, for so long, with so little national strife and struggle, to 
realise what a precious gift that freedom is and how much we owe to the unseen, unsung 
constitutional backbone that binds together our British way of life’ (Major, 1996). 
Michael Forsyth outlined this constitutional history of Anglo-Saxon particularity in 1996. 
‘From the earliest times,’ he argued, ‘the British have had an inclination towards 
parliamentary government. The Anglo-Saxon Witan for example, was an assembly of 
some substance. The importance attached to Magna Carta, as early as the thirteenth 
century, testifies to the constitutional preoccupation of Englishmen’ (Forsyth, 1996: 11). 
For William Hague, it was the Constitution and the sovereignty of Westminster that gave
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the British nation its particular character. ‘The House of Commons is an essential 
guardian of liberty in this country [and] it is the focal point of the nation’ (Hague, 1996: 
34). Three years later her argued that:
the United Kingdom is a unique product of our history: four nations in one. Each 
with its own separate culture and identity; each strong and proud; but each better off 
in a British nation that is stronger and prouder than its constituent parts. That British 
Way has brought us prosperity and democracy and stability in a century where other 
nations have experienced turmoil and tragedy (Hague, 1999b).
Like Australia, “the past” is a crucial element of the legitimacy of the British state. But 
the notion of British institutions as the embodiment of the historical British character 
have been challenged certain shifts in the historiography of Britishness over recent 
decades. When the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich opened a permanent 
exhibition on the British Empire, critics attacked it as ‘a politically correct travesty of the 
empire that will mislead thousands of millennium tourists next year.’ A caption about 
Captain Cook stating that many Aborigines and Maori see him as the man ultimately 
responsible for the dispossession of the native peoples also drew criticism (Guardian 
Weekly, 2-8 September 1999). For Edward Heathcote Amory, the “re-writing” of British 
history by left-leaning historians ranked along with devolution and the development of 
the European Union and globalisation as the three forces leading to the demise of Britain 
(Heathcote Amory, 1997a). Scottish writer, Ian Jack summarised the traditional narrative 
of British history and its role from a British nationalist’s point of view:
I grew up as a Little Briton. The dates I learned at school included 1314 as well as 
1415, 1513 as well as 1588, 1320 as well as 1215. In this way, at Scottish schools of 
40 and more years ago, we learned the history of two countries: about Bannockburn 
as well as Agincourt, Flodden as well as the Armada, the Declaration of Arbroath as 
well as the Magna Carta. This was history of a deeply conventional kind -  wars, 
treaties, monarchs, but it laid the foundations of national understanding (Jack, 2000).
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Such “national understanding” could not be imparted by textbooks alone. In fact 
it was the language and symbolism of the monarchy itself that imparted this version of 
Anglo-British history to a wider audience. The Conservative version of monarchism was 
little changed from the ideas written by Walter Bagehot in the 1860s. The defence of 
British institutions from “hurried” reform can be viewed as a defence of the ‘efficient’ 
part of Bagehot’s constitution. New Labour also remained attached to the monarchy, 
despite the presence of republican sentiments amongst it backbenchers, exploiting the 
Monarchy’s role as “symbol of stability” during Labour’s programme of constitutional 
change.
The monarchy forms an integral part of the British constitution and should not be 
considered as merely decorative. Its vital historical function has been to legitimate 
Parliament’s sovereignty by creating a direct personal allegiance to the location of 
political sovereignty in British society. Scottish Secretary Michael Forsyth described the 
‘Queen in Parliament’ as ‘the supreme expression of the British Constitution, honed and 
refined over more than a thousand years’ (Forsyth, 1996: 11). The gradualism with 
which the Conservatives approached any matters of constitutional reform was reflected 
by and embodied in the history and development of the monarchy itself. Cabinet 
Minister William Waldegrave told the right-wing think tank the Centre for Policy Studies 
in 1996 that ‘as Conservatives we do not reject change, but we believe that changes to 
institutions, some of which have endured for centuries, must be natural incremental and 
evolutionary’ (Waldegrave, 1996: 41). John Major defended the monarchy at a time 
when that institution was under considerable pressure to reform in the early 1990s. 
Major argued that ‘No alternative institution, fabricated by political theorists, would be 
designed with its current role or powers. And yet no alternative could match it in the 
affections of the British people’ (Major, 1996). Writer and columnist for the UK Mail, 
Linda Lee-Potter argued that ‘modernising the Royals means taking away their magic and 
their impact... The only way the Royal Family can maintain its mystique and its power is 
to remain gracious but remote’ (Lee-Potter, 2001). She added that state occasions made 
the British ‘feel proud of their heritage and history’ and that:
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Pomp and circumstance, and pageantry and glamour enrich our lives. Visitors flock 
to Britain to visit our royal palaces and castles to observe our age-old ceremonial 
occasions. They are bewitched by the glory of royal events (Lee-Potter, 2001).
This double justification for monarchy, that it adds a bit of colour and mystery to 
ordinary lives whilst earning tourist dollars for the british economy, has become a 
mainstay monarchist argument. Roger Scruton, however, gave a fuller, philosophical 
explanation of the English character and preference for monarchy and aristocracy, linked 
to England’s historical development and the tradition of empiricism. He argued that 
“reason” seemed to the English unreasonable:
The reasonable person does not solve the problems of morality, religion, politics or 
gardening by consulting a priori rules, but by consultation, negotiation and 
compromise with those who seem to disagree with him [sic] but who might 
nevertheless be right... Tradition and example are far more reliable than abstract 
argument; rituals and ceremonies, because they exist without an explanation are far 
more likely to contain the truth of things than any intellectual doctrine (Scruton, 
2001:49).
For Scruton, this empiricist tradition resulted in ‘a spontaneous preference for 
monarchical over republican government, and for aristocratic titles over professional 
degrees’ (Scruton, 2001: 49).
However, popular hostility towards the monarchy rose during the 1990s and 
reform or “modernisation” seemed possible, despite the weight of tradition and history. 
From marriage scandals to the annus horibilis of 1992 and through to the death of Diana, 
Princess of Wales in 1997, the monarchy’s popularity was at a low ebb. Although, as in 
Australia, republican sentiment found most of its support on the left of the political 
spectrum, it also found some support on the right. In 1994 The Economist, the journal for 
whom Walter Bagehot was editor during the 1860s and ‘70s, turned against the institution 
that Bagehot had theorised, branding it ‘an idea whose time has passed’ (.Economist, 22 
October 1994). Dismissing arguments that the monarchy was indispensable for British
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tourism, or that there may even be popular affection for it, and against the background of 
continuing Conservative difficulties with allegations of corruption and “sleaze”, The 
Economist argued that abolishing the monarchy was essential in order to protect the 
individual and civil society from the encroaching powers of the state. According to The 
Economist, the ‘efficient secret’ of the power of the Commons and the Cabinet was now
damaging and inefficient, permitting abuses of power, excessive centralisation and a 
steady erosion in respect for government... In the monarchy’s current state , there are 
virtually no checks and balances in the British constitution; the fiction that one exists 
is convenient to governments and therefore dangerous to their subjects (.Economist, 
22 October 1994).
The greatest test of of monarchism’s popularity in Britain came in the wake of the death 
of Diana, Princess of Wales on 31 August 1997 and her funeral the following week. For 
a short time, it looked as if the proponents of constitutional reform in Britain might have 
achieved the kind of mass support for their aims that the reformers in Scotland attained 
through opposition to the poll tax. As Demos authors Harnes and Leonard noted ‘The 
contrast between the spontaneous reaction of the public and the cool protocol associated 
with the royal family was stunning... An allegedly symbolic institution that could not 
symbolise the national sentiment at the death of one of its own members did not seem a 
very effective institution’ (Harnes and Leonard, 1998: 19). Commentators quickly drew 
their own conclusions about the surge of grief and anger at the conduct of the royal 
family. Musician Billy Bragg dubbed the popular mood as ‘a modem Peasant’s Revolt’ 
(Bragg, 1997), whilst former editor of Marxism Today, Martin Jacques argued that Diana 
had become ‘the representative of cultural modernity in the face of institutional antiquity’ 
(Jacques, 1997). The New Statesman editorial stated that Diana’s death showed that 
‘Britain was not and need not be a conservative country (where the Conservative Party is 
not “the natural party of government”), but a dynamic, liberal place... As such Diana was 
a moderniser. This spirit of modernity insists upon equality of respect and rights of 
everyone and upon a passionate search to place political trust in the people’ (New 
Statesman, 12 September 1997). Anthony Barnett went so far as to argue that the
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General Election and the Death of Diana amounted to Britain’s “Velvet Revolution” 
(Barnett, 1997: 50).
Although many of the same arguments about over-centralisation of power applied 
to England as well as Scotland during the 1990s, an English nationalism advocating the 
reform or abolition of Britain could not emerge as it did north of the Border. Nor could 
republicans turn an argument about the inequality of hereditary into a nationalist one, 
hoping to rid England of a “foreign”, British monarchy as happened in Australia, 
although some tried. Hywell Williams, a former aide to Conservative Cabinet minister 
John Redwood, argued that the British state ‘proposes bogus models of community 
invented from above rather than ones of our own devising,’ adding that ‘Monarchy has 
prevented the English from inventing themselves as a nation’ (Williams, 2000). 
Journalist Jonathan Freedland also blamed the monarchical power structure for stifling 
popular participation in the political process in Britain. Comparing local politics in 
Britain and America, he argues that ‘popular sovereignty has made Americans 
exhilaratingly free of the passivity and deference that still infect so much of British life 
(Freedland, 1998b).
Writing about the monarchy in the wake of the death of Diana for the left-leaning 
think-tank Demos in 1998, Tim Harnes and Mark Leonard noted that ‘unless public 
opinion shifted dramatically, the case for republicanism will remain one based not on 
democratic impulse, but on elite instinct’ (Harnes and Leonard, 1998: 8). Perhaps the 
most significant republican development in the long term came in 1999 from Scotland. 
Here the Scottish National Party tabled a motion in the new Parliament that the 1701 Act 
of Settlement, guaranteeing a Protestant succession to the throne, be removed as it was 
anti-Catholic and contravened the European Convention on Human Rights (,Scottish 
Parliament Official Report, 16 December, 1999: 1640). This type of discrimination 
affected Scotland in a way that it did not in the rest of Britain, with its important Catholic 
minority in the west of Scotland. The motion was tabled a year later by the SNP in the 
House of Commons and The Guardian ran with the issue during the opening of
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parliament in the year 2000. Several writers picked up on the proposed challenge to the 
Crown over its discriminatory rules of accession.
While most New Labour MPs and supporters desired some sort of 
“modernisation” of the monarchy, ridding Britain of it altogether remained the preserve 
of a few outspoken backbenchers. One result of the events surrounding the funeral of 
Diana Spencer was that the monarchy, albeit one that had to be seen to be “modernising”, 
became an important part of the New Labour project for Britain. Indeed concerns about 
modernising the monarchy and modernising Britain in general were two closely allied 
strategies. Plans to use the somewhat redundant Princess of Wales in a semi-official role 
to advertise Britain overseas obviously came to nothing, but the modernising royal family 
could have been good for this role. On the occasion of the Queen and the Duke of 
Edinburgh’s golden wedding anniversary, Prime Minister Tony Blair invoked the 
marketing language of “Cool Britannia”. ‘You are our Queen,’ he said. ‘We respect and 
cherish you. You are, simply, the best of British’ (quoted in Gerrard, 1998). The 
Independent newspaper noted that the debate about the monarchy had quietened in the 
years since the death of Diana, ‘not so much out of reverence as the realisation that the 
monarchy and all the pomp associated with it is a crucial tourism asset’ (.Independent, 26 
May 1998). But it was a political asset too. In the wake of September 1997, Downing 
Street and Buckingham Palace entered into a mutually beneficial period of reform and re­
popularisation. In addressing the Queen during her Golden Jubilee celebrations in 2002, 
Tony Blair praised those post-Diana reforms: ‘You adapted the Monarchy successfully to 
the modem world -  and that has been a challenge because it is a world that can pay scant 
regard to tradition and often values passing fashions above enduring faith’ (Blair, 2002). 
Ultimately, the Labour Party in Britain, despite the rhetoric of modernisation, could do 
away with neither “British tradition” nor the monarchy and both were safe in New 
Labour’s hands.
Conclusion
The historical merging of Englishness and Britishness continued to operate, even after 
devolution had altered the constitutional foundations on which a conservative version of
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Anglo-Britishness was founded. The structural conditions that created mass support for a 
“nationalist solution” to political problems in Scotland were not present throughout 
England, but were confined to particular regions and thus not able to achieve the anti- 
Conservative dominance that was a feature of Scottish nationalism of the 1990s. But 
even after devolution, neither the Conservative Party or New Labour promoted 
Englishness in place of Britishness in any meaningful way. The Conservative defence of 
Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty against the development of the European Union, meant 
that English nationalism continued to operate around a defence of British sovereignty. 
The monarchy also continued to be promoted as a unifying institution in the new political 
landscape, where New Labour attached itself to a “modernised” monarchy, promoting 
this symbol of Britishness as it reformed the governing structures of the British state. 
Even older political discourses about race and Englishness continued to align English 
consciousness with categories -  Britain, whiteness, -  whose boundaries were greater than 
that of the political entity “England”. Thus it was in England that Britishness continued 
to operate and survive and the content of English nationalism continued to be dominated 
by the themes of Britishness.
231
conclusion:
Nationalism and Britishness in Scotland, Australia and 
England
"V Tationalism and national consciousness are products of the global uneven 
1. i  development of capitalism and modernity. The character and content of particular 
national consciousness and nationalist movements are formed by attempts to legitimate a 
particular location of sovereignty. Chapter 1 demonstrated that whilst nationalism must 
be understood as an integral aspect of the modem world, the existence of any particular 
nation, national consciousness or nationalism is neither pre-determined or “natural”. 
Human agency conditions the ways in which nationalism is directed and the forms it 
takes. However, the ability to shape nationalism and national consciousness is not shared 
equally among all the members of a national collectivity. Often, expressions of 
nationalism are employed or developed in order to justify the sovereignty of a particular 
state, legitimating the state’s exercise of power. However, nationalists can also promote 
an alternative location of sovereignty in order to deny the legitimacy of the existing state 
structure. In order to legitimate their own nationalist movement, nationalists can invoke 
the sovereignty of “the people” over that of the state. This invocation serves the historic 
purpose of creating an alliance between political elites and a sufficient proportion of the 
population to challenge existing power structures and justify demands for a re­
organisation of political boundaries and power relations around the concept of “the 
nation”.
For Ernest Gellner, nationalism was not simply the product of irrational and 
atavistic aspects of human nature, nor a doctrine invented during the nineteenth century, 
but instead was linked to the emergence of industrial society. The value of Gellner’s 
work lay in the forceful link between nationalism and uneven development. In order to 
position themselves advantageously in the changed social and economic situation caused 
by uneven development, local elites needed to break-free of pre-existing structures of 
government. To do so, they needed to form an alliance with the subordinate classes in 
society to overthrow imperial rule, often mobilising around a vernacular language. 
However, Gellner’s focus on the industrial phase of uneven development was too narrow.
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Industrialisation in most cases followed the development of nationalism, rather than 
preceded it. Nevertheless, the uneven nature of development is crucial if we are to 
comprehend the origins of nationalism and its persistence today. Such an understanding 
is better served by linking the emergence of nationalism to the uneven development of 
capitalism. The transition to a capitalist economy resulted in the break-down of former 
feudal social relations, ushering in the “modem era”. The new economy demanded a 
greater degree of co-ordination, communication and participation to generate profits than 
had been the case in the feudal era and “the nation” emerged as an ideological constmct 
reflecting the social and economic reality of the new order. Nations, however, could not 
be created without reference to pre-existing social structures. Standardisation, rather than 
invention, was the notable characteristic of early nationalisms, as languages and 
bureaucratic structures were brought into line in order to effect a better exercise of power 
within the new “national” territories. In the pattem of global development occasioned by 
the spread of capitalism and modernity, nationalism became both the means by which to 
promote and justify economic development, as well as, later on, a means by which to 
resist the imperial intrusion of the major developed powers.
However, most of these precociously developing western European states 
contained a plurality of potential nationalities within their borders, that were managed 
with a greater or lesser degree of success by the states’ rulers and functionaries. Great 
Britain was no exception. By 1801, the government in Westminster exercised authority 
over English, Scots, Welsh, Irish and Cornish, in addition to the continuing rule of many 
overseas possessions such as Bengal, British North America and New South Wales. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, the creation of Britain and the ideology of Britishness, was a 
ruling class driven process legitimating a multi-national state in the new language and 
symbolism of nationalism. In Britain’s case, “the nation” did not have to be invoked in 
order to throw off imperial rule or accelerate economic development as per Gellner’s 
theory: rapid development was already occurring. The function of nationalism and 
national consciousness in this most industrially developed part of the world was therefore 
to maintain the advantageous position already occupied by the elites. In this regard,
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nationalist ideology and language in western Europe was less concerned with the 
fragmentation of empires, but rather about legitimating their expansion.
Nationalism, however, was a problematic ideology for a multinational polity with 
imperial interests such as Great Britain. From its very inception in 1707, the British state 
was designed to accommodate a measure of sovereignty or autonomy within its unitary 
governing system. Accordingly the ideology of “Britishness”, that was initially created 
around the settlements of 1688-1707, accommodated the distinct national sentiments that 
would develop autonomous communities within the British Isles and amongst its 
overseas possessions. Furthermore, the nature of the class alliances in Britain and 
Australia were different to the general model of nationalism developed by Gellner and 
Hroch and discussed in Chapter 1. Rather than the middle and working classes forming 
an alliance against the aristocracy in order to gain political and economic power, in 
Britain the alliance was between the established upper and emerging capitalist classes in 
order to protect their advantageous position against threats from nationalist and working 
class movements. The constitutional system of governance in the Westminster system 
was promoted by supporters such as Edmund Burke and Walter Bagehot as the best of all 
possible systems; embodying just enough democracy to create a positive comparison with 
more autocratic and authoritarian systems, whilst being sufficiently “moderate” to avoid 
the equal danger of too many concessions to democratic demands or “mob rule”. It was 
this alliance that gave Britishness its ideological form and character, and it was this 
ideology that was established in Australia as a result of British colonisation.
From 1707, the main imperative facing British nationalists was the legitimation of 
the United Kingdom and the stifling of forces likely to disunite it. The Jacobite 
rebellions showed that until 1746 Highland Scotland was still a potential base for rival 
claimants to the throne and Ireland became a base for Britain’s enemies during the 
Revolutionary Wars. The loss of the American colonies between 1775 and 1783 was a 
particular blow, where the radical rhetoric concerning “liberty” of the Civil Wars had 
been turned against British rule in north America. Accordingly, the institution of the 
monarchy as it emerged between 1688 and developed throughout the eighteenth century
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was in part designed to manage such strategic and separatist threats by becoming a focus 
of loyalty above “faction”. Initially offered the British Crown in order to guarantee the 
continuation of a Protestant dynasty in the British Isles, the House of Hanover and its 
descendants evolved into an enduring symbol of Britishness and Empire loyalty during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The ideology of Britishness remained sufficiently malleable that it came to mean 
different things in different places. Indeed, the ability of the ideology to accommodate 
local and developing nationalisms was its key strength. Identification with the monarchy 
could not only overcome religious and national differences within the United Kingdom 
itself, but could also serve as a focal point for the expressions of loyalty from a widely- 
dispersed community of Britons and other subject nationalities. By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the monarchy was promoted as the foremost symbol and expression 
of the British Empire’s glory. It was also promoted as an institution and an ideal above 
mere nationality, representing English, Scots, Australians, Irish, Bengalis and other 
peoples of the Empire. But it was not the person of the monarch to whom loyalty was 
given, but rather what people believed the monarch stood for and represented. The 
monarch was the visible and personal symbol of the class alliance that was the result of 
the Glorious Revolution and became the personal embodiment of the Westminster system 
of government. It was as a Crown seemingly above politics and nationality that the 
monarch became the symbol of state and Empire. The legitimation of the British state 
and empire was effected through the veneration of the means of governance, of which the 
Crown was only the most visible part. Whilst the Crown remained the focus of loyalty, 
Parliament got on with the business of governing, directly or indirectly, Britain and the 
Empire. Over the centuries, a narrative grew up around the notions of the Crown-in- 
Parliament and its supposed virtues, the rule of law, moderation, the taming of national 
passions and the spread of this version of civilisation to other parts of the world. It was 
this narrative that formed the common British “culture” with which various different 
nationalities and social classes throughout the Empire could identify without over-riding 
their own local peculiarities.
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However, the development and legitimation of the state and Empire could not 
proceed in the era of nationalism without reference to local particularities and emergent 
nationalisms. In Scotland, once the threat to the Lowland social system from the 
Highland clans had been defeated, Highland romanticism became the dominant 
expression of Scottish identity. In Australia, bush myths and the environment were said 
to shape the immigrant’s character until he or she lost their Old World sensibilities and 
became truly “Australian”. In England local particularities were less often emphasised, 
although when they were it was a bucolic England that was invoked, a land of village 
greens and stable social relations, in stark contrast to the grim realities of urban and 
industrial landscape. When nationalists, poets, ethnographers and historians went in 
search of things typically English, distinctively Scottish or uniquely Australian they 
turned to the countryside, the mountains or the bush. These particular nationalisms were 
contained within an overarching British or imperial ideology, where loyalty to the Crown 
was the ultimate demand above the claims of nationality. Even Aborigines could and did 
appeal to the monarch and her or his representatives at the same time as they were being 
dispossessed in the name of the Crown. In time of war, official allegiance was to King 
and Country, where the monarch was the first focus of loyalty and the (unspecified) 
country the second. Furthermore, these nationalisms did not reject the imperial 
consciousness, but rather grafted local particularisms onto its framework. The 
development or continuation of distinctive national identifications represented both a 
challenge to be managed by British and imperial elites, while at the same time 
contributing to definitions of Britishness.
The seemingly quiescent nature of Scottish nationalism since 1707 serves as an 
illustration of the link between the development of nationalism and national 
consciousness and the development of capitalism. By applying the Gellnerian model 
outlined above, it might have been assumed that during the nineteenth century Scotland 
would have witnessed a similar nationalist movement to that seen in Ireland from the 
1790s onwards. Scotland possessed a relatively recent history of independent statehood, 
a distinct vernacular and a certain amount of popular animosity to its larger neighbour. 
However, both the English and Scottish bourgeoisie possessed a common interest in
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maintaining the state given the almost simultaneous development of capitalism and 
industrialisation in both England and Scotland. Rather than secede from the United 
Kingdom in order to reap the benefits of a new capitalist-industrial order as Gellner’s 
theory suggests, the Scottish bourgeoisie benefited from the access to trade with Empire 
guaranteed by its partnership with the English bourgeoisie, and the protection of this 
trade by the Royal Navy. Furthermore, the terms of the treaty of Union in 1707 had 
removed the Scottish parliament, but left Scottish civil society intact and largely self­
regulating. Unlike other European nationalities at the time, the Scottish middle classes 
were, by-and-large, running their own country despite incorporation within a wider 
political union, and indeed helping to “improve” Scotland’s own peripheral region, the 
Highlands, introducing capitalist means of wealth generation at the expense of the 
indigenous inhabitants. Accordingly, Scottish nationalism developed within, and helped 
shape, the ideology of Britishness, retaining a measure of autonomy, but never seriously 
challenging the integrity of the state until recently. The participation of Scottish elites in 
the government of the United Kingdom and the running of the empire, as well as the 
Highland regiments’ conspicuous involvement in the British army, meant that Scotland 
played a disproportionate role in the development of the British idea via support for the 
Union at home and imperial expansion abroad.
It is against this background of economic interest and above all, traditions of 
Scottish autonomy, that explanations for the re-establishment of a Scottish parliament in 
1999 must be set. Oft-cited reasons for the decline of Britishness in Scotland are the end 
of Britain’s role as the head of a formal empire, the recent phase of globalisation and the 
development of supra-national organisations such as NATO and the European Union that 
are supplanting the sovereignty of nation-states. These explanations are important 
considerations in the current state of nationalism in Scotland, but they fail to explain the 
immediate political contingency of Scottish nationalism and the success of home rule at 
the end of the 1990s. To explain this contingency we need to examine recent politics in 
the light of the legacy of Britishness in Scotland.
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Responsibility for the creation of a Scottish parliament must lie not only with the 
members of the Constitutional Convention, or the Scottish National Party, but the 
Conservative and Unionist Party of Great Britain. Whilst Scottish separatists at times 
liked to portray Scotland’s economic and political woes as a result of colonial-style 
domination by England, the nationalist agitation in Scotland during the 1980s and 1990s 
was also part of a wider revolt against the Conservative Party. What made Scotland 
different from England was that this anti-Conservative resentment could be channeled 
into demands for a nationalist solution to Scotland’s political problems. That a 
nationalist solution to these perceived problems appeared possible during the 1990s was a 
result of the preservation of Scottish governmental autonomy since 1707. This autonomy 
had been preserved less through a nationalist struggle to maintain Scottish culture in the 
face of a larger and more powerful neighbour, than to the more mundane nature of 
Scotland’s imperfect incorporation into the British state. Thus it was not so much the 
power of Highland romanticism or the folk memory of Scotland’s medieval wars with the 
English Crown that maintained a distinctive Scottish consciousness, but the more dour 
operations of local government, education boards and Presbyterian meetings. 
Furthermore, Scottish nationalism developed from the 1980s in order to preserve this 
autonomy. Even the separatists wished to preserve Scotland’s autonomy by
incorporation within the European Union in place of the United Kingdom. When 
Scottish autonomy was threatened by the drives of an encroaching state and a more 
executive style of government in the 1980s, the centre-left Scottish political elites, 
including the separatists, formed an alliance against the Conservative Party. This alliance 
was given a mass character principally through the anti-poll tax agitation of the late 
1980s and early 1990s, setting the stage for the success of home rule nationalism.
As electoral support for the Conservative Party dropped in Scotland but remained 
steady in England during the 1980s, it became possible for opposition parties, in 
particular the Labour Party, to speak of a “democratic deficit”, arguing that Scots were 
not being governed by the party that they overwhelmingly voted for. In Scotland, the old 
argument that continued and unreformed support of the Act of Union was in Scotland’s 
best interests, all but disappeared. The Act of Union was no longer viewed as providing
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the best system of governance for Scotland, but was instead more and more presented as 
the problem, delivering governments to the Scottish electorate for which they had not 
voted. However, internal party dynamics were also significant. Much of the Labour 
Party’s cohort of Westminster MPs came from Scotland This meant that the reforming 
Labour Party leadership needed to keep Britain together in order to reap the benefits of its 
Scottish support, but had to be sensitive to demands for home rule coming from Scottish 
party members. Thus plans for a devolved parliament in Scotland returned to the Labour 
agenda by the early 1990s. In contrast, supporters of the separatist Scottish National 
Party advocated complete separation from the British state and incorporation within the 
European Union. However, whilst the SNP pushed the debate about Scotland’s relations 
to the rest of the United Kingdom along, it was difficult to gauge how much of their 
fluctuating support during the 1980s and 1990s indicated support for secession, rather 
than a protest against the two main Unionist parties, the Conservatives and Labour.
This process of reforming the governing structures of Britain and Scotland, driven 
by the cross-party Scottish Constitutional Convention, posed some tactical problems for 
Scottish separatists and the pro-Scottish parliament organisers of the 1997 referendum. 
For the separatists, the problem was the British state itself. The home rulers were 
claiming that the proposals for devolution were the only measure that could save the 
Union from dissolution as a result of Conservative misrule. If they were correct, then 
logically the separatists should opt for no change, thus hastening the break-up of Britain. 
However, the prospect of further Conservative government in Scotland was something 
they had been campaigning against for almost two decades by 1997, and shortly before 
the referendum, the separatists allied with the home rulers, adopting a gradualist approach 
to independence.
The case for the viability of a small nation such as Scotland was helped by the 
increasing integration of the European Union during the 1990s and the separatists’ 
development of an argument for independence that mitigated potential economic risks of 
independence by the automatic inclusion of an independent Scotland in the E.U.’s free 
trade zone. Nevertheless, it was the need to legitimate this counter-location of
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sovereignty whilst generating mass support for the nationalist demands that led to the 
sovereignty of the Scottish people being invoked over and above that of Westminster. As 
a result of the Scottish people’s continuing sovereignty, “appropriate” political 
representation in the form of a national parliament, or complete independence, was 
demanded. Thus the case of Scotland is perhaps the closest to theoretical model of 
nationalism set out in Chapter 1, but occurred anything up to 200 years later than might 
have been anticipated in that theory. Nevertheless, the victory of Scottish nationalism in 
1997, achieved through an anti-Conservative alliance between separatists and home 
rulers, reinforced the British state in the short-to-medium term, by resolving the crisis of 
political legitimacy in Scotland. Scottish autonomy had been not only preserved, but 
enhanced by the establishment of a parliament, while the threat of secession had, for the 
time being, been contained. To call Scottish nationalism in the 1990s separatist or even 
anti-state is to misunderstand the predominant tradition of Scottish nationalism that 
adheres first and foremost to Britishness and asserts Scottishness within that ideology. 
By 1999, Scottish nationalists had responded to the possibility of the erosion of Scottish 
autonomy, by renegotiating the Treaty of Union of 1707 and establishing a Parliament 
with control over Scotland’s internal affairs. The establishment of a Parliament in 
Edinburgh was indeed a significant development away from previous concepts of 
Scotland’s relationship with the rest of Britain, but it also continued Scotland’s tradition 
of autonomy within the Britain’s political system. In this sense, the nationalist agitation 
of the 1990s eroded notions of Britishness dependent on the sovereignty of the Crown-in- 
Parliament. However the creation of a parliament at Holyrood guaranteed Scottish 
autonomy within the United Kingdom, preserving Scotland’s continuing participation in 
a multi-national polity.
The relationship between nationalism and the political economy in the Australian 
colonies, and later the Australian Commonwealth, was similar to Scotland in certain 
respects. In Australia, the local bourgeoisie was also benefiting from, rather than being 
hindered by the relationship with the imperial centre. Australia’s status as a primary 
producer, notably of wool and gold, linked it intimately with the global economy during 
the nineteenth century. Australia, however, was colonised during the era of nationalism
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and the Australian community was not immune from the nationalist ideas of the time. 
Unlike Scotland, Australia had no tradition of independent statehood to draw national 
myths from. Instead, Australian consciousness developed entirely within the ideological 
framework of Britishness. Rather than throw off the shackles of the old empire in order 
reap the benefits of an emerging capitalist and industrial economy, the Australian 
bourgeoisie sought to maintain the imperial link in order to foster development and to 
obtain protection in the often hostile climate of imperial rivalries. When Australia 
federated in 1901, those wishing to legitimate the new polity needed to foster a sense of 
Australian-ness that made appeals to, and exactions upon, “Australians” viable, but also 
one which did not threaten imperial relations. As a result, an Australian consciousness 
developed that was both imperial and national in rhetoric and orientation.
Consequently, Australian nationalism, despite some anti-British rhetoric, had 
always been that of a nationalism siding with an imperial power, rather than against it. 
Anti-establishment and egalitarian narratives such as the myth of the Gallipoli Campaign, 
attained huge popular currency, but the nationalism of the elites always maintained the 
imperial connection. Gallipoli did not lead to “national independence”, only the “birth of 
a nation”, and although conscription was rejected twice during the Great War, the War 
itself was broadly supported. Race played a crucial part in maintaining the imperial link, 
even if there were clashes between the imperial centre and the colonies about 
immigration from “non-white” parts of the Empire. Sport emerged as one means of 
mediating these colonial and imperial tensions, but it was above all the monarchy that 
developed during the twentieth century as the symbol of enduring connection between 
Britain and Australia. It was these origins that laid down the political structures and 
developed the discourses that would dominate Australian nationalism up to the 1990s and 
beyond.
If the course of nationalism in Scotland in the 1990s was one of a series of 
successful alliances between masses and elites, then the opposite was true of Australian 
republicanism during the same period. Again, contemporary politics intersected with 
older traditions of nationalism and Britishness. It would be wrong to deny that some of
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the reasons that Australia did not replace the Queen with an appointed head of state in 
1999 were tactical. The election of the conservative John Howard in 1996 and his ability 
to split the republican movement between minimalists and direct electionists, made the 
task of winning the referendum considerably harder for the republican camp. 
Additionally, the failure of Australian republicanism in 1999 can, in large part, be 
explained with reference to the development of “anti-elitism” in Australia during the 
1990s. In Scotland, resentment towards political elites was effectively diverted into a 
resentment of the Conservative Party by Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats. 
However, in Australia, the labels “out of touch” and “arrogant” were applied by some 
right-wing critics to all politicians and the Australian political system. Even right-wing 
politicians, such as John Howard and Tony Abbott applied these terms to anyone to the 
left of their own opinions. The minimalist’s adherence to the sovereignty of Parliament 
was crucial in the success of this “anti-elite” sentiment. It was the residual Britishness of 
the republicans, as much as that of the monarchists, that ultimately led to the rejection of 
the republic in 1999.
The fate of Britishness in Australia was presented as an important aspect of the 
republican debate. The minimalist republicans attempted to present the push to remove 
the Queen as head of state as the final step in the attainment of full independence from 
Britain. But the republican push was as much about re-legitimising the Australian system 
as it was about finally making Australia fully independent, a specious claim at best. The 
Australian Republican Movement argued that a foreign head of state alienated the 
populace from their system of government. Republicanism was to be the means by 
which the populace would be re-connected to the political system. But just as the ARM 
invoked the Australian nation to throw out the monarchy, it denied the Australian people 
the symbolic power to chose the president. This was not the result of politicking or 
tactical campaign errors, but was present in the officially sanctioned 1993 (Turnbull) 
proposals for a republic, that lay at the heart of the dominant strand of republicanism. 
These “minimal” proposals were designed to attract bi-partisan support for a republic 
when it came to a referendum, which meant bi-partisan support in Parliament. Such 
support was seen as crucial in order to get any referendum in Australia up. Thus, unlike
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Scotland, where a populist alliance could be made around anti-Conservatism, in Australia 
republican nationalism was conservative itself from the very beginning, Keating’s anti­
monarchism notwithstanding. The result was an alliance designed to re-legitimate the 
state, entrench the sovereignty of Parliament and by-pass any notion of popular 
sovereignty. The Australian nation was invoked by these republicans, but was not 
offered anything in return for its participation.
Such anti-populism dogged the minimalist republican campaign, but was 
countered by the monarchists and the government’s own populism. By 1996, the tag of 
“elitist” was a label that critically harmed the republican movement. As the republicans 
attempted to manage and suppress popular sovereignty at the same time as invoking 
Australian nationalism, populist nationalism was being comprehensively appropriated by 
the far-right. The criticism of the political system coming from Pauline Hanson’s One 
Nation Party was directed equally at the neo-liberals of the New Right as at the socially 
conscious left. One Nation’s intervention in politics affected the republican debate in two 
ways. Firstly, it made the ARM even more cautious and seemed to confirm the notion 
that nationalism and populism should be kept distinctly apart. Secondly, and more 
importantly in the run up to the referendum, it allowed John Howard to regain support 
lost from the Coalition to One Nation by reasserting Burkean, British philosophy in the 
rhetoric of a conservative Australian nationalism, whilst diverting attention from his own 
government’s neo-liberal economics.
By 1999, people inclined to vote for a republic out of a desire to cut formal links 
with the British monarchy found themselves in a dilemma. Voting “No” to an Australian 
head of state would seem to reinforce Britishness and its attendant philosophy in 
Australia. However, voting “Yes” appeared just as unsatisfactory, replacing the previous 
system with one which was structurally almost identical. With both camps operating 
within the ideological confines of Britishness, it was not clear what the Australian people 
would gain by replacing the Queen as head of state other than addressing an issue of 
“national identity”. Nor was it clear what part the Australian people were to play in this 
process or whether they had wanted this process in the first place. Unlike Scotland,
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popular sovereignty could not be invoked by the nationalists, as the minimalist movement 
sought to preserve the sovereignty of the system they wished to change. Shorn of its 
popular appeal, the republican drive of 1999 came to appear exactly what its detractors 
derided it as - elitist. Without the necessary popular support, the attempt to remove the 
Queen as Australia’s head of state failed.
As the republican movement campaigned to remove the Queen as head of state, a 
ten-year process of reconciliation between Aboriginal and settler Australia was 
commenced by the federal government in 1991. Unlike nationalist rhetoric sometimes 
employed in settler Australia, the anti-colonial model of national liberation possessed 
more currency for Australia’s indigenous people. When Australia was claimed and 
colonised by the British, it was believed that all indigenous sovereignty was either 
extinguished, or did not exist in “primitive” aboriginal societies. Thus in contrast to 
Scotland where sovereignty was preserved through the negotiation of a treaty and could 
be re-asserted without entirely threatening the legitimacy of the British state, any re­
assertion of indigenous sovereignty in Australia was profoundly threatening to the 
legitimacy of the settler society.
Unlike settler Australia, whose nationalist ideology had its origins in the political 
conflicts and compromises of the British Isles, an indigenous consciousness was the 
creation of an unequal colonial power relationship. Indigenous consciousness developed 
as colonial control spread across the continent. Such indigenous consciousness was 
usually expressed as resistance to imperial and colonial rule, rather than its adoption and 
adaptation, although in defining “indigenes” settler Australians also helped define 
themselves. Thus it might be tempting to view the assertion of indigenous sovereignty in 
Australia as one of the most profound challenges to Britishness in Australia, potentially 
de-legitimising the settlers possession of the continent as well as the “civilising” claims 
of the British empire and its Australian off-shoot. The ten-year reconciliation process 
also involved a re-conceptualisation of indigenous-settler relations and attempted a shift 
away from “colonial attitudes”. However, it was the profundity of the challenge to the 
sovereignty and legitimacy of the settler society that resulted in a reactionary re-assertion
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of Britishness. The assertion that sovereignty resided in and with Australia’s indigenous 
peoples, automatically challenged the historical narrative upon which settler sovereignty 
was legitimised through possession and development. Britishness, as we have seen, 
contained its own version of myth-history, linking “Progress” and the Westminster 
system of governance. The myth of Britishness concerned the development of the rule 
of law and representative government so that the rights of all, lord and underling, were 
protected. Such a myth, expounded through a strand of British historiography and given 
personal embodiment in the monarch, asserted that the Westminster system of 
governance was the best of all representative systems, having evolved through practice 
rather than conscious design. Establishing such systems of government in Australia and 
supplanting the sovereignty of the original inhabitants therefore represented “Progress”, a 
notion intimately bound up with the national narrative of settler Australia.
To offset their numerical disadvantage, indigenous activists of the twentieth 
century often presented their political demands in the language of the settler nation, 
turning questions about Aboriginal conditions into larger issues about the values and 
attitudes of the non-indigenous population. The development of indigenous activism in 
the post-War years and a greater indigenous voice in national politics, led to a shift in 
Australian historiography away from the parameters of Britishness. This reworking of 
the national narrative was part of the reconciliation movement’s programme for changing 
attitudes in the Australian community. The recounting of histories of dispossession, 
murders, massacres, marginalisation and assimilation sat uncomfortably with notions of 
the spread of civilisation and the individual’s protection under the rule of law. In 
particular, the idea that Australian policies were genocidal, clashed with the received 
wisdom about Australian commitment to democratic ideals and human rights.
This was a revision of history that fundamentally challenged the legitimacy of 
settler Australia. As such, Britishness was re-asserted in the face of this challenge simply 
in the act of countering such claims. “Progress” again became an issue in Australian 
discourse, but as part of a defensive settler nationalism, rather than a goal in itself. And 
again, the role of the far-right in Australian politics, and more importantly its effect on
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“mainstream” right-wing politics, was crucial. One Nation’s racist rhetoric involved not 
only an attack on what it perceived to be Aboriginal “privilege” in redistributive 
programmes, but also a response to the re-assertion of indigenous sovereignty embodied 
in the Mabo decision of the High Court in 1992. As with the republic issue, indigenous 
affairs presented the New Right and mainstream conservatives with an opportunity to win 
back support lost to the far-Right. The need to, at best manage, and at worst suppress 
indigenous sovereignty from the time of colonisation onwards, was justified by racist 
attitudes towards indigenous people. This imperative of nationalism in Australia, the 
denial of indigenous sovereignty, was ready to be exploited anew by the New Right in the 
mid-1990s. The conservative denial of indigenous sovereignty, and the special status of 
Aborigines as the original owners of the land, thus took the form of a public contest over 
interpretations of history and the role of imperialism in Australia’s settler origins, and 
Britishness returned again to political prominence in Australia.
Of all the nationalisms examined in this study, a specifically English nationalism 
has so far been the least consciously called into being. However, whilst nationalism in 
Australia produced a reaction that reproduced Britishness in the course of attempts to 
remove the monarch as head of state and address indigenous grievances, and Scottish 
nationalism ended up strengthening the British state despite springing from a criticisms of 
the British system of government, it was in England that Britishness persisted in its most 
complete form. Given that the historic development of the British state depended to a 
large degree upon the extension of the English state into other parts of the British Isles 
and at times into far-flung colonial possessions, it would be easy to suggest that England 
was the centre of the “culture” of Britishness, and that consequently the concepts of 
“England” and “Britain” were almost fully merged. However, this merging was less a 
product of English demographic dominance within the British Empire, than a result of the 
dominant role of the state in expressions of English nationalism.
The appropriation of other peoples and other places in the definition of “England” 
has long been characteristic of English consciousness. The role that the British state 
played in English nationalism meant, not only that the concepts of Englishness and
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Britishness were often conflated, but also that English nationalists could draw on fewer 
markers of distinctiveness than other nations within the Empire. Unlike the Aborigines, 
the English were not disadvantaged by an unequal colonial relationship and there was no 
need to create a consciousness based on resistance to an imperial overlord. Whilst 
England and Scotland shared the same state, English nationalists did not have the 
structural autonomy (or rather it was not so evident as in Scotland) around which to base 
a national consciousness. English consciousness shared most in common with Australian 
settler consciousness in that it was imperial as much as national. But even Australian 
nationalists were able to promote a sense of distinctiveness around the settlers’ 
interaction with the Australian environment, that they argued created a distinctive 
“national character”.
Until recently, this lack of distinctiveness was not a contentious issue for 
nationalists in England. In fact, such a non-identification with the nation and a strong 
identification with the state was both inherent and encouraged. As we have seen the two 
main imperatives of British nationalism were to legitimate the multi-national state and an 
overseas empire. In order to achieve this, the British ruling classes needed to neutralise 
the nationalist critique of empires that developed from the end of the eighteenth century. 
In this sense the location of sovereignty became increasingly important for two reasons. 
Not only would popular sovereignty imply the political recognition of the middle and 
lower classes, it would also threaten the integrity of the Empire and the British state. 
Thus Britishness was developed and promoted in order to ensure that sovereignty in 
England and Britain remained vested in the Crown-in-Parliament. Consequently, British 
and English nationalism would be characterised by a celebration of the dynasty and its 
parliament, not the “popular” nation itself. Hence, where some nationalists stressed the 
uniqueness of “the people” as the main reason for demanding separate representation 
through a state of their own, English nationalists, already possessed of a state, turned the 
machinery of government into a mythical expression of the Anglo-British genius. 
Although some radical writers attempted to stress a “popular” version of English 
consciousness, it was the dynastic version of Englishness that dominated expressions of 
Anglo-British nationalism.
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It might reasonably be asked, at this stage, whether there is then such a thing as an 
English nationalism or national consciousness? Rather than there being no such thing, it 
is the case that English nationalism, by-and-large, expresses itself as Britishness. It is 
thus most useful to speak of an Anglo-Britishness, rather than an English nationalism as 
such. Such Anglo-Britishness continued to operate throughout the 1990s. The defence of 
the location of sovereignty at Westminster was intensified because of political 
developments outside England itself -  namely the continuing development of the 
European Union and devolution within the United Kingdom. In this sense, what we 
might regard as English nationalism became trapped between the Conservative defence 
of Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty and the “modernising” efforts of a rejuvenated 
Labour party under Tony Blair.
Devolution played an important role in New Labour’s defence of Britain and 
Britishness. Much of New Labour’s parliamentary cohort came from Scotland and Wales 
and it was thus argued that devolution had to be enacted to prevent the complete 
secession of those nations from the United Kingdom with attendant consequences for 
New Labour’s chances of electoral success at Westminster. Once in power, New Labour 
were obliged to adopt the ideology of Britishness as they now controlled the state that 
Britishness was designed to legitimate. So at the same time as new institutions of 
government were being set up because parts of the exercise of governance in Britain were 
deemed undemocratic, comparatively few “English” reforms were being enacted. 
Instead, New Labour strategists attempted to modernise Britain’s image, rather than its 
substance, for popular consumption in England. New Labour did not plan to radically 
overhaul the British state, despite what its more hysterical critics might have said, but 
rather to “modernise” it in order to correct those bits of the system that no longer 
appeared to work (at least to New Labour’s advantage). The Party’s approach was 
therefore “evolutionary” and entirely within the precedents of the gradualism of British 
political tradition.
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But whilst New Labour became the official custodian of Britishness in 1997, no 
understanding of Britishness would be complete without consideration of the 
Conservative and Unionist Party of Great Britain. The Conservative Party emerged in the 
nineteenth century to defend the social position and power of the aristocracy whilst co­
opting the emerging middle and working classes to the imperial and British project. 
Unlike the British Liberal Party, the Conservative party survived the challenge of Labour 
Party and established itself as the “natural party of government” for much of the 
twentieth century. Conservative philosophy relied heavily on narratives of Britishness. 
In fact, the British state was understood as a working embodiment of conservative 
philosophy, even if such philosophy had been generated post facto to legitimate the state 
in the face of domestic and international challenges.
Despite their reduction to a de facto English parliamentary party after the 
elections of 1997, the Conservatives under William Hague intensified their defence of 
Britishness. But as defending Britishness meant defending the sovereignty of the Crown- 
in-Parliament, the Conservatives were unable to seize on an electoral opportunity to 
exploit an English nationalism that would strike at the weakest point of New Labour’s 
support, that of “Middle England”. Furthermore, defence of Westminster’s sovereignty 
led the Conservatives into difficulties over the pace of European integration. Centuries of 
attempts to legitimate Westminster’s sovereignty gave popular support to the idea that to 
be Anglo-British is not to be governed from anywhere but Westminster, that in turn fed 
into popular support for “Euroscepticism”. It is this merging of Englishness and 
Britishness, a product of the defence of Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty and the 
mobilisation of English nationalism around the British state, that has preserved 
Britishness in its most complete form in England.
Thus the fate of Britishness as a national ideology at the turn of the millennium is 
unclear. Whilst Scotland seems the part of Britain most likely to secede, its re­
negotiated, devolved, position within the United Kingdom has for the short term at least, 
solved the crisis that was threatening the Scotland’s relations with Westminster during 
the 1990s. In Australia, which became fully independent during the twentieth century,
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Britishness continued to inform Australian nationalism and its attendant national 
consciousness, even if the symbols of that nationalism were modified for local 
consumption. The imperative of legitimating the British Empire in Australia, forced 
Australian republicans since the nineteenth century to urge what was essentially Walter 
Bagehot’s “crowned republic” onto the Australian people, where Parliament was the real 
sovereign and the people remained the “vacant many”. A second imperative of 
Australian nationalism, the justification of the invasion of other peoples’ land, also served 
to reinforce Britishness despite the efforts of supporters of reconciliation to alter the 
historical grounding of relations between indigenous and settler Australians. Reactions to 
reconciliation and other advances in indigenous politics during the 1990s, were bolstered 
by a defence of the historical record of the imperial mission in Australia. Despite the 
nationalism and nationalist movements operative in Scotland and Australia, Britishness 
continued to function, albeit in somewhat “nationalised” forms. However, in England, 
defence of Crown-in-Parliament sovereignty continued to operate as the dominant Anglo- 
British nationalism. With a New Labour government promoting the national 
consciousness required to legitimate the state it governs, and a Conservative Party 
ideologically wedded to the notion of the Crown-in-Parliament, it would seem that it is in 
England that Britishness will continue in its most un-altered form.
Britishness emerged as a response to the need to legitimate ruling class 
sovereignty in the social, political and economic conditions of the modem era. The 
content of Britishness was formed around legitimating the sovereignty of the Crown-in- 
Parliament, an ideology that was subsequently exported to Australia. Although 
developing in different ways, the nationalisms of Britain and Australia were all deeply 
conditioned by the British context in which they developed. To this day, these 
nationalisms continue to be informed by the ideology and content of Britishness, even as 
some nationalists seek to reject that heritage. Thus the ideological contours of 
Britishness are still discernible in contemporary nationalist politics. This is true, even if 
such politics “nationalise” the content of Britishness, as indeed they have done since the 
British state was legitimated in the language of nationalism from the turn of the 
eighteenth century.
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